POPULISM IN THE 2017 JAKARTA GUBERNATORIAL ELECTION

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Received: February 8 2019; Revised: March 13 2019; Accepted: March 31 2019

Abstract: The 2017 Jakarta Gubernatorial Election was one of the most competitive local elections in Indonesia. This election clearly used religious and ethnic populism strategy that divided Jakarta citizens into two groups: A Muslim Governor’s supporters Vs. Incumbent’s supporters. The root of the Muslim governor’s supporters was the rejection of some Islamic organizations against the rise of Chinese-Christian Incumbent Governor – Basuki Tjahaya Purnama or “Ahok”. This sentiment found a momentum when Ahok was accused of blasphemy against Islam that provoked Muslims furious. Moreover, Anies Baswedan became a successful candidate utilizing the sentiments and used mosques to echo the resistance against non-muslim Governor candidate.

Keywords: Blasphemy, Democracy, Jakarta Gubernatorial election, Populism

Introduction
"In the past, we pribumi (a term that could be loosely defined as “native Indonesians”) were oppressed and defeated; now we are independent, now is the time for us to be masters in our own country.” (Anies Baswedan, Governor of Jakarta Inauguration’s Speech, 16 October 2017).

The victory speech of the 2017 elected Jakarta Governor, Anies Baswedan, seemed to be the culmination of all political fights in one of the most brutal local election involving religious and ethnic sentiments. Despite being elected, Baswedan maintained his position as a Governor supported by “native” and Islamic circles, instead of above all diverse groups in Jakarta. A banner stated "Awakening of the Native-Muslims" (Kebangkitan Pribumi Muslim) was installed not far from the location. The day the narrative was clearly built, the victories of Anies Baswedan and Sandiaga Uno were the victories of the Native Muslims against others.

It also confirmed the strategy of Baswedan during the Jakarta Governor Election campaign. In a video circulating at an internal meeting of Baswedan supporters, Fatah as his Political Consultant explained how the sermon in the mosque as the FIS in Algeria effectively won the election. He personally wanted this strategy to be run in Jakarta. (Johan SP, 2017)

So as in command, Friday prayers in Jakarta and surrounding areas were filled with Friday praying’s sermons spreading hatred against the incumbent, Basuki Tjahaya Purnama (Ahok) who is Christian and Chinese. Ahok became muslim’s enemy after his speech in thousand islands considered as blasphemy by Majelis Ulama Indonesia and made public anger. And impact the anger of Muslims in Indonesia.
This strategy was a populist strategy, in which a candidate built a position in front of a ranks of homogeneous society by building antagonistic relationships with other. As Jakarta is the central of Indonesian politics and became Jakarta Governor is the next step to be leader in the national level, it is very important to understand what happened in the 2017 Jakarta election. This paper explained the proses of how the populism was built in the Jakarta 2017 Gubernatorial election and its impact to Democracy in Indonesia.

Mude and Kalwatser (2012, pp. 3–7) stated three main approaches to populism. The first is populism as a particular type of political movement. In this perspective, populism is a multiclass movement organized around a charismatic leader (Germani, 1978). The main ingredient is not only the presence of a strong leader but also the formation of a movement that appeals to heterogenous social groups. This approach is mainly used to explain Latin American populism and fascism in Europe when regarding the emergence of extremist mass movement.

The second approach is populism as a political style, characterized by the promotion of a particular kind of link between political leaders and electorate, a link structured around a loose and opportunistic appeal to “the people” to win and/or exercise political power.

The third approach is – as used in this paper: populism as a discourse. Concerning this perspective, Laclau (2005, p. 18) explains that populism is characterized by confronting the existing hegemony by means of a discursive construction capable of dividing the social into two categories: “the power bloc” versus “the people.” Following this category, Panizza (2005, pp. 3–4), defined populism as “an anti status-quo discourse that simplifies the political space by symbolically dividing society between ‘the people’ (as the underdogs) and its ‘other’.” Furthermore, he argued that the identification of “the people” and “the other” are political constructs, symbolically established through the relation of antagonism, a mode of identification in which the relation between its form and its content is given by the process of naming—that is, of establishing who the enemies of the people, and therefore the people itself, are.

Study by Spruyt, Keppens and Droogenbroeck (2016) show that populism is embedded in a feeling of deep dissatisfaction, not only with politics but also with people’s lives in general. In addition, we show that populism is most strongly supported by stigmatization groups who face difficulties in finding a positive social identity.

As Indonesia has been a democratic state since 1998, populism in this paper refers to Canovan’s (1999) explanation of a populist movement within a mature, well-established democratic system. She argued that in modern democratic societies, populism is best seen as an appeal to the people against both the established structure of power and the dominant ideas and values of the society. Populists claim legitimacy on the grounds that they speak for the people, to represent the democratic sovereign, not a sectional interest of a specific economic class. Populist values also vary according to the context, depending upon the nature of the elite and the dominant political discourse (Canovan, 1999, P. 3).

Based on the current Europe’s experience, there are several main features of populism (Fuest, 2017). First, populists usually describe society as divided into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups: people are often juxtaposed with ruling elites who are seen as corrupt. The second is
overemphasizing the negative effects of globalization. Populists reject immigration and oppose the integration of politics and international institutions that support and regulate economic exchanges between countries. Third, populists support expansive fiscal policies and tend to override disturbing government budget constraints.

Referring to Mudde (2017) there are three key core concepts of populism. First, the “people”. People in the populist’ perception is usually related to the self-perception (or self-idealization) of the targeted people as the construction of the populist. Second, general wills. They closely linked to homogenous interpretation of people who have same interests and preferences. Basic of the general wills is common sense and anyone who opposes it, is devious and part of the corrupt elite. Third, the elite. It is distinguished based on morality: good people Vs. evil elite.

Populist can deploy a mixture of national, ethnic, class, regional, and religious identities in order to define who belongs within the category of 'us' and – by extension – who is consigned to 'them'. In several western countries, right wing politicians use Christianity as religious identity that used to confront Islam as threat of the people wellbeing.

Several cases of religious based populism collected in the provocative book title: Saving the People, How populist Hijack Religion. Since 9/11, Muslim wanted to impose their religious values and traditions on the people as part of a surreptitious ‘Islamization’ plan. Ideas of invasion, infiltration, contagion, conspiracy, replacement and impending irreversible crisis represent key components of the populist imaginary, and all of those are present in the notion that a deliberate process of islamisation is occurring under our noses in many Western democracies. (Marzouki, McDonell, 2016: 5).

Populism also cannot be released from the media for the spread of the populists idea. Nowadays, internet - especially social media became the most important media, compare to the conventional one.

Research by Engesser, Ernst, Esser, and Buchel (2015) found that populism manifests itself in a fragmented form on social media. Populist statements can be found in various countries, parties, and levels of politician status. While a large number of politicians advocated for the people, attacks on the economic elite were favored by populist left-wingers. Attacks on the media elite and exclusion from others, however, were mostly carried out by right-wing politicians. This shows that social media gives populist actors the freedom to articulate their ideology and spread their messages.

Study by Salgado (2018) in Portugal, found that the populist issues such as corruption and immigration spread by social media. The mainstream media play a role as “establish” media that counter the issue.

Gerbaude (2018) stated that the compatibility between social media and populist politics stems from the way the ability of mass media social networks, when 'mass networks’ involving billions of people around the world, provide channels that are appropriate for mass politics and appeal to people typical of populism. Social media in populist movements play a role as a people’s voice channel and popular rally, providing, on the one hand, a means for dissatisfied individuals to express themselves, and on the other hand, with spaces where dissatisfied Internet users can gather and formed a partisan online crowd.

Methods
This research is used a qualitative method. Qualitative method is defined as an inquiry process of understanding
based on distinct methodological traditions of inquiry that explore a social or human problem (Creswell, 1998, p. 15). The researcher builds a complex, holistic picture, analyses words, reports detailed views of informants and conducts the study in a natural setting.

This qualitative research is classified as a case study: an exploration of a “bounded system” or a case over time via detailed, in-depth data collection involving multiple sources of information that is rich in context. (Creswell, 1998, p. 61). Several interviews, observations and document analysis conducted to collect the data. To analyse the data, this research used the four forms of data analysis and interpretation used in the case study by Stake (as cited in Creswell, 1998, pp. 153–154):

Result and Discussion

Previously, Jakarta politics received less attention among scholars. Massaki and Honna (2014) provide several reasons. First, it was understood that local politics independent of national politics did not exist in Jakarta. The boundary between national and Jakarta politics is blurred and both are considered closely related.

Second, Jakarta politics is very different from the politics in other parts of Indonesia. As the nation’s capital, Jakarta is too metropolitan and has the highest percentage of the upper middle class in the country. Political behavior and the pattern of selecting these groups are very decisive in Jakarta and not the same as those in other parts of Indonesia. Third, Jakarta’s politics are openly visible to everyone. Every day, all major national media outlets research and cover the activities of the governor, deputy governor and provincial parliament of Jakarta.

However, after the 2012 election when Joko Widodo won the election against Incumbent Fauzi Bowo, and then he was elected President, Jakarta Politics became one of the most important political events. In 2012, Joko Widodo (Jokowi) and Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok) ran to be Jakarta Governor and Vice Governor, supported by PDIP and Gerindra Parties. Both of them were political outsiders in Jakarta, yet famous as success leaders in their hometowns: Jokowi in Surakarta and Ahok in Belitung Timur. They capitalized on the frustration of Jakartans, while offered hopes for a new identity and possible solutions: the New Jakarta (Jakarta Baru). For many Jakartans, The New Jakarta was the answer to their frustrations on Former Governor Fauzi Bowo and formal political institutions. They created oppositional relationship between the “New Jakarta” as symbol of his struggle in election, and the established “Old Jakarta” that was represented by Foke as the incumbent (Hamid, 2012).

But Jokowi governed Jakarta on short period, less than two years. In 2014, he ran for Presidential election and won. Politics in Jakarta has become more interesting. It meant that the Governor of Jakarta position was a strategic political stepping-stone to be a national figure. Then on November 19th, 2014, Ahok was inaugurated as the Governor of Jakarta. The mandate to realize New Jakarta was now under the leadership of Ahok. From the beginning, the rise of Ahok as a non-muslim Governor cause more rejection, especially from some Islamic groups. One of the biggest groups was Save Jakarta Movement (Gerakan Menyelamatkan Jakarta – GMJ) that claimed supports by 99 elements. The most important element of GMJ was Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam – FP). The tagline of GMJ was Rejecting Jakarta from a Non-Muslim Governor (“kafir”). They also questioned several Ahok’s policy: prohibition of slaughtering sacrifice animals (Qurban) in public space, allowing alcohol drinks in hotel and
supermarket and also Ahok’s idea about localization of prostitution. (Republika, 01 June 2015) GMJ conduct a rally in 1 December 2014 with the title: Rally of 1 million people get rid of Ahok and to disseminate this invitation.

Figure 1: Rally of 1 million people to get rid of Ahok

In another rally, on December 1st 2014, the GMJ enthroned a Jakarta muslim figure and member of FPI, Fahrurozzi Ishaq, as the Jakarta’s muslim Governor. Then GMJ continuously campaigned for muslim candidate to be Governor in the next election. They made online campaign to support their idea through gubernurmuslim.com.

The Battle

Religious and identity became main issue, altogether with poverty issue also during the Governor Election. GMJ, besides making anti Ahok campaign, also actively campaigned and even initiated a selection of Muslim Governor Candidates. Muslim-native identity was confronted with Ahok’s Christian identity.

GMJ with Islamic Community Forum (Forum Umat Islam, FUI) and Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) create the High Council of Jakarta for Syariah (Islamic Law) to the Muslim Governor of Jakarta (Majelis Tinggi Jakarta Bersyariah Untuk Gubernur Jakarta MTJB-GMJ), led by Habib Riziek Syihab.

MTJB-GMJ held convention of the Governor of Jakarta in order to realize Jakarta with Syariah Implementation. Beside MTJB-GMJ, there was also the Jakarta Servant Assembly (Majelis Pelayan Jakarta, MPJ), a collection of Islamic scholars who also aims to nominate candidates for governors, led by Didin Hafidhudhin, former President of Justice Party.

However, the process by MTJB-GMJ and MPJ failed in bringing up candidates for Governor who can compete officially. All the official candidates who officially registered through the Election Commission came through political parties. MTJB-GMJ only succeed to propose Sandiaga Uno to be one of the alternatives of Governor or Vice Governor.

Finally, there were three pair of candidates in the 2017 Jakarta Governor election: Agus Harimurti Yudhoyono (Agus) - Sylviana Murni (Sylvi), Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok) - Djarot Saiful
Hayat (Djarot), and Anies Baswedan (Anies) - Sandiaga Uno (Sandi) who will fight in the election.

Agus-Sylvi pair was nominated by four political parties: the Democratic Party, United Development Party, National Awakening Party and National Mandate Party. Agus was the eldest son of the 6th President of Indonesia, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. He resigned as a military middle officer to become a governor candidate. Sylvia was a senior bureaucrat in Jakarta Local Government. Sylvian's position opened opportunities for bureaucrat supports.

Ahok-Djarot was nominated by Indonesian Democratic Struggle Party, Golkar Party, Hanura Party, and National Democrat Party. Ahok was an incumbent, replacing Joko Widodo as the previous Governor. He previously was a member of National Parliament from Golkar Party and Regent of Belitung Timor. Djarot was the Vice Governor of Jakarta, replacing Ahok. Previously he was Mayor of Blitar, East Java, for two periods.

The third candidate pair was Anies Baswedan (Anies) - Sandiaga Uno (Sandi) supported by Gerindra Party and Prosperous Justice Party. At that time, Anies was a former minister of education and culture had just been removed from Jokowi’s cabinet. Previously he was a political scientist and was once the Rector of Paramadina University. Sandy was a young and wealthy entrepreneur in various fields, especially investment and energy.

Various Islamic groups who joined in JB-GMJ and MPJ, finally agreed that the most important thing to do is supporting the candidate of Muslim Governor, both Agus-Sylvi or Anis-Sandy. The priority was to prevent non-moslem Governor winning the election (VOA Islam, 2016).

During the campaign, programmatic issues to solve various problems in Jakarta did not become important discourses. Furthermore, incumbent seemed to fail showing its performance in fixing Jakarta problems. Ahok's success story was covered by religious and ethnic issues dominated news surrounding the election.

As a result, in the first round followed by three candidate pairs of election, the following votes were obtained.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Candidates and Supporter Party</th>
<th>Voters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Agus Harimurti Yudhoyono – Sylviana Murni (Democrat Party, Unity Development Party, National Awakening Party, dan National Mandate Party)</td>
<td>17.05%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Basuki Tjahaya Purnama – Djarot Saiful Hayat (Indonesian Democratic Struggle Party, Golkar Party, Hanura Party, National Democrat Party)</td>
<td>42.99%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Anies Baswedan – Sandiaga Uno (Gerindra Party dan Welfare and Justice Party)</td>
<td>39.95%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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Source: KPU DKI Jakarta (Jakarta General Election Commission) (2017)

As regulated in Law no. 29 of 2007 on the Provincial Government of the Special Capital Region of Jakarta, the winner of the Regional Head Election must obtain more than 50% of the vote. Since no one gets more than 50% votes, the second round of elections must be held. Basuki - Djarot and Anies - Sandi drove into the second round, while Agus - Sylvi was eliminated. The result of the final election could be seen in the table below as a comparison.

Table 2
Result of Final Round of the 2017 Jakarta Gubernatorial Election 19 April 2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Candidates</th>
<th>Voters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Basuki Tjahaya Purnama – Djarot Saiful Hayat</td>
<td>42.04%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Anies Baswedan – Sandiaga Uno</td>
<td>57.96%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: KPU DKI Jakarta (Jakarta General Election Commission) (2017)

Observing results for each district, this is very unexpected Ahok almost got no additional votes in the second round. On the contrary, Anies- Sandi got overwhelming number of votes, successfully hijacked almost all the voters Agus – Sylvi in the first round. Notice the table below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Candidates</th>
<th>Voters for Each Candidate in Municipality/City Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Agus-Sylvi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1st</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Thousand Islands</td>
<td>3891 (27.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>North Jakarta</td>
<td>142.142 (15.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>West Jakarta</td>
<td>203.107 (16.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Central Jakarta</td>
<td>101.744 (17.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>South Jakarta</td>
<td>177.363 (14.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>East Jakarta</td>
<td>309.708 (19.4%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: KPU DKI Jakarta (Jakarta General Election Commission) (2017)

The People Vs Other

Populism in local politics especially in Jakarta was not a new phenomenon. In the 2012 Jakarta Gubernatoorial Election, Jokowi used populism by establishing identity as a new Jakarta, face-to-face with "Old Jakarta". This pattern succeeded to bring Jokowi into the Governor of DKI Jakarta (Hamid, 2014).
In the 2017 Jakarta Gubernunatorial Election, populism occurred but with different packaging. Religion, ethnicity, and poverty were combined into commodities to build and strengthen the identity those became antithesis of the incumbent. Islamic groups - who feel as majority community - didn’t feel having access to power and resources since 2014, the showing their resistance and demonstrated opposition to Ahok’s leadership.

The momentum was when Ahok in his activities as Governor in Thousand Islands Regency, September 27 2016 made a speech that contain the statement: In your inner hearts, ladies and gentlemen, you may feel you cannot vote for me, because [you have been] lied to by the use of Surah al-Maidah, Verse 51. [...] So, if you cannot vote for me because you are afraid of being condemned to hell, you do not need to feel uneasy, because you are being fooled. It is alright.”

His statement uploaded in Youtube by provincial official and the shorter version, only the statement above uploaded again in Facebook with edited transcript by Buni Yani in October 2016. This video became viral, broadcasted 346,354 times and shared 11.033 times (Pamungkas and Octaviany, 2017).

Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI) responded and wrote reprimand letter (surat teguran) to Ahok in October 9th, 2016. In October 11th, 2016, MUI made Religious Opinion and Statement (Pendapat dan Sikap Keagamaan):

“...the statement of Basuki Tjahaja Purnama was categorized: (1) insulting the Koran and or (2) insulting Ulama (Islamic scholars), that (the statement) have legal consequences.”

1. Anti Ahok Rally

The MUI statement was then responded by various Islamic groups by forming the MUI Fatwa Support Movement (GNPF-MUI). The GNPF undertook a series of actions to defend Islam and Ulama and support the enforcement of Al Maidah’s letter: rejecting non-moslem as leaders, in this case Governor Ahok. They also urged Ahok to be legally processed as a blasphemy suspect. GNPF MUI was led by Bachtiar Nasir as Chairman and Habib Riziek Syihab as Chairman of the Board of Trustees.

At least seven massive Islamic Defense Rallies (Aksi Bela Islam) were carried out not only involving the Islamic community in Jakarta, but also from various regions of Indonesia (extracted from various sources by the Author). Hundred thousand people using Islamic attribute came to Jakarta to join the rally request for the Police to process Ahok’s Blasphemy. In third and biggest rally on 2nd December 2016 – known as 212 Action (Aksi 212) --, President Joko Widodo met the participants of the Rally and followed Friday prayers led by Habib Riziek Syihab. The massive and intensive rally against Ahok build massive public opinion and became national headline for long time.

2. Mosque as Basis and Intimidation for Ahok’s Supporters

As stated at the beginning of this paper, making the Mosque as the movement basis was a special strategy conveyed by its political consultant Anies Baswedan. The strengthening of anti-Ahok sentiment by using Al-Maidah verse 51 letter, is constantly voiced in various activities in mosque, especially Friday prayer, not only in Jakarta, but also outside Jakarta. This reinforces the antagonistic position, between Muslim Vs Ahok Supporters. Muslims means using Al Maidah verse 51 as a guide to vote, Ahok’s
supporters are also supporters of the Blasphemy.

One of its effects was the Muslim society’s refusal to do corpse praying for those who were supposed to support Ahok. One example was Hindun, whose corpse was rejected for worshipped in Al Mu’minun Mosque Setiabudi, South Jakarta. The people refused to inscribe his body at the Mosque for knowing that in the first round of elections Hindun voted Ahok. The religious figures said that Hindun was not worshipped in Al Mu’minun Mosque because of the heavy rain. In fact, in front of the mosque was attached a large banner stated “This Mosque does not Hold Praying for Supporters and Defenders of Blasphemy” with quotation of Koran’s letter, At-Taubah: 84 which legitimize such action (Tabloid Bintang, 2017).

The same thing happened at Warung Jati, Pancoran, South Jakarta. The corpse of a resident can be worshipped after his family sign the letter at the request of the RT Chairman to elect the Muslim Governor. Otherwise, his body was refused to be worshipped. (liputan6.com, 2017)

![Figure 2 Banner, Not Praying for Ahok’s Supporter Corpse](source: Detik.com (2017))

This kind of phenomenon is a response to the widespread use of the Mosque as a means of campaign of anti non-moslem governor candidate in the Mosque.

**Intimidation During Campaign and Voting Period**

Activities during the campaign period – and never happened before – were the abandonment of Ahok and Djarot campaigns in several places in Jakarta. The mass using muslim attributes expelled Ahok and Djarot because Ahok was the blasphemy perpetrator. As a result, Ahok and Djarot failed to carry out campaigns in several places, and the issue of blasphemy widened (www.tempo.co, 2016). Furthermore, during voting period, another another intimidation movement happened. A movement called Al-Maidah Tour (Tamasya Al-Maidah) mobilized anti-Ahok volunteers to monitor the polling stations in Jakarta on the final-round vday. Each polling station was monitored by around 100 people.
The volunteers didn't only come from Jakarta, but from outside Jakarta such as Tangerang, Surabaya and Ciamis. In social media messages circulating ahead of the second election, there were calls for Muslims to come to the TPS and to escort the enforcement of Al Maidah verse 51 which prohibits Muslims to choose a non-Muslim leader. In posters circulating online, it appeared Sightseeing Al maidah was driven by GEMA Jakarta, GMMP and Exponent 212.

The abandonment of Ahok's campaigns and Al Maidah Tour movement provoked fears in Jakarta society to express their political support freely. Ahok's Muslim supporters were reluctant to get blasphemy supporters label once they admid they supported Ahok. Morever, they faced consequences not to be prayed in mosque if they died. For Indonesians Muslims which religion was not only private matters but social affairs, the intimidation created deep fear, because life as a Muslim would be considered imperfect by GEMA Jakarta, GMMP and Exponent 212 as an organization that opposes Ahok.

Figure 3. Leaflet Al Maidah Tour

**Populism and Democracy in Jakarta**

In 2012, Jokowi used populism to build differentiation and antagonistic relationships between New Jakarta and Old Jakarta in a top-down manner. On the contrary, the polarization over the 2017 Jakarta Elections was bottom-up built. The Muslim community's anger over Ahok's statement made Muslim identity stronger, not only in Jakarta but in various places in Indonesia.

As a matter of fact, the kind of pattern for using both Muslim and native identities, was already tried in the 2012 Jakarta Gubernatorial Election. Rhoma Irama, who supported incumbent Fauzi Bowo, used mosque to campaign not to elect a non-moslem leader, in which Ahok was the vice governor candidate of Jokowi. Fauzi who claimed as Betawinese made an effort to establish his religious image throughout his governorship. (Miichi, 2014)

Another - extreme one was when an intimidation and violence video broadcasted during campaign period in
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YouTube threatened that if the Chinese-Indonesian participated in the election, the 1998 riot in Jakarta would happen again.

However, this effort was unsuccessful because after all the governor candidate was Jokowi, a Muslim and a Javanese. The situation changed when Ahok replaced Jokowi. Ahok however represented double-minority in Indonesia: a Christian and a Chinese.

Thus, rejection of Ahok on religious grounds was built long before the 2017 Gubernatorial Election. Then it found the momentum of the Ahok’s statement in Thousand Islands Regency. The blasphemy issue became a major political one in the 2017 Jakarta election, replacing the programmatic issues. Ahok, a Chinese descent, was closely associated with minority who mastered the economic sector in Indonesia. In contrast, that image was dealing with “native”, the majority identical with poverty and marginalization.

Religious identity, ethnicity and poverty issues merged into one identity, native- Muslim Vs. Ahok. The Muslim community felt that supporting a Muslim governor candidate and fighting Ahok was not just political choice, but a form of defending Islam. Therefore, the Muslim demonstrations demanded Ahok to be punished in a case of blasphemy called as “the Defending Islam Actions”. Successfully, the actions became source of references for voters in Jakarta.

The strengthening of religious-based identities managed by various Islamic organizations met the political interests of the governor candidates. Hence, it created deals between Islamic mass organizations and two pairs of Muslim Candidate Candidates: Anies-Sandi and Agus-Sylvi. It was reflected on February 11th, 2017, in which all Muslim governor candidates became part of the action at Istiqlal Mosque.

This cleavage was reinforced by the massive use of internet, both websites and social media. Disbelief of some mainstream media emerged news websites reflected Muslim aspirations such as VoAIslam, nahimunkar.com, etc. Furthermore, in some anti-Ahok rallies, journalists from the media considered as “enemy”, i.e. Metro TV or Kompas, got various acts of intimidation and violence. Meanwhile, the Defending Islam Actions were greatly supported by media owned by Ahok's political opponents, such as TVOne and INews (Merdeka.com, 2017).

Spreading the issue of religious blasphemy was a major factor to make Ahok as Muslim’s enemy, spread quickly through social media such as various whatsapp groups and facebook accounts. The social media action is also the backbone of Islamic defenders who could gather hundred thousands of people over and over in the name of defending religion (Pamungkas and Octaviani, 2017).

Populism is always evolving by means of mass media. The anti-colonial movement developed through print and radio technology. Thaksin in Thailand and Koizumi in Japan popularized themselves and his ideas by using television. (Hawkins and Selway, 2017) Estrada in the Philippines was building image as a defender of the poor with action films (Mizuno and Pongpaichit, 2009). Currently, information and ideas promote populism are disseminated using the internet, especially social media.

Not only religious issue, the poverty one was also played by Anies through attacking Ahok's eviction policy. In fact, some evictions Jakarta were funded by private sector (developer) such as Podomoro Group. Anies built alliances by signing political contracts with Urban Poor Network (JRMK) Jakarta and Urban Poor Consortium (UPC). The political contract contained: the change of the
village spatial plan, the legalization of the village land, the affordable shelter program for the poor, the business licensing for street vendors and the transfer of profession for pedicab drivers. In its release, it was stated that the signing of a political contract with Anies was a punishment for Ahok who violated the political contract that had been made with UPC (UPC and JRMK, 2017).

The whole process then made Anies emerge as a populist leader, met his interests to become a governor candidate, using religious and ethnic identities as well as poverty one. After qualifying for the final round election, Anies became the only candidate for Muslim Governor, head to head with Ahok, the non-moslem Governor Candidate. So here, the issue of religion was getting stronger. The use of Friday prayers as mean of campaign to reject Ahok was widespread. The intimidation movement in the form of banning of the corpse praying for Ahok’s supporters and voters was more open. Al Maidah Trip on election day made Ahok’s votes stagnant at the final round of elections.

Referring to Panizza (2005: 6), intimidation as a form of violence is an extreme form of antagonism. However, such violence is more of a mode of identification, how one group distinguishes itself from another (other) group by being physically opposite. Voters of Agus and Sylvi in the first round, shifted into Anies – Sandy in the final round. The number of Anies-Sandy’s votes in the second round was the sum of Agus-Sylvi and Anies Sandi’s votes in the first round.

This means that Muslim voter’s blocks (facing Ahok voters’ blocks) in the first round have indeed been formed. Ahok was regarded as "the other" who must be defeated, and the voice of Muslim voters who initially polarized, merged in the final round. Having Muslim Governor to lead Jakarta was considered as the general will of people.

It was proved by the Exit Poll conducted by Indicator Indonesia, that showed t the main reason for choosing Anies-Sandi was because "Religion same with Me” equal to 57%. This was paradox with satisfaction level of Ahok performance which is high enough equal to 71.8% and equal to 58.4% assuming better condition of Jakarta economy (Indikator Politik Indonesia, 2017).

Yet, populism built by Anies by combining three elements: Muslim-native-poor identities didn’t end after the 2017 Jakarta Gubernatorial Election was over. Being a Governor of Jakarta was now considered a stepping point to become the number one figure in Indonesia. So Anies’s inauguration with racist speech and banners with the words "The awakening of Muslim-Natives" was the first start for the fulfillment of Anies’s next political ambitions.

Anies’s speech that confirms his victory as a Native-Muslim victory, against colonization, is typical and similar to the speech of populist leaders like Ros Perot who says: "We (the people) ’re the owners of this country." Or Hugo Chavez (Panizza 2005):

“I declare the people to be the only and the true owners of the sovereignty. I declare the venezulean people the true owners of their own history. “

In addition to the religion used as the basis for building antagonistic relationships, as well as ethnicity. In this case, refer to Mudde (2017) such populist leader is called nativist populist, distinguish different groups based on their nativism and their populism. “People” in Jakarta context did not only refer to muslim, but also for native people, and ethnic minorities excluded from the people. In Jakarta elite as an enemy, not only became enemy of the “people”
because putting the interests of ethnic minorities, but representation of them.

As Mude and Kalwatser (2012) convey in his writings, populism can strengthen or become a threat to democracy. In the context of Indonesia, populism occurs during a consolidated democratic situation, characterized by elections as a means of gaining power, as populism can use the notion and praxis of majority rule to circumvent and ignore minority rights.

The history of majority and minority relations in Indonesia is full of problems. Jakarta was the center of violence against minorities in 1998 during the Majority. Religious identity politicization and ethnicity, can trigger similar sentiments and events at other times in other places and in the future.

Second, populism can promote the establishment of a new political cleavage. Instead of positioning itself as a unifying society and as a leader of all classes, Anies built a bloc of its own as a pribumi-Muslim leader. Islam, indigenes and poverty became a commodity where Anies would stand there, building positioning as indigenous Muslim leader, defender of the poor. Given the issue of religion in the Jakarta elections, extending to the regions, this is an opportunity for the use of the issue in the next political momentum, the 2019 presidential election.

**Conclusion**

Populism using religious and ethnic identity plus the issue of poverty managed to divide the citizens of Jakarta during Jakarta 2017 Gubernatorial election. Society split in two. First, the supporter and voters of the Muslim Governor. The idea of Muslim governor is rooted in the rejection of some Islamic organizations against the rise of Ahok replacing Jokowi who was elected President. They succeed to manage the sentiment that Jakarta inhabited by Stepan and Linz (1996) said, *the only game in town.*

So, populism can certainly be regarded as influencing the quality of democracy. Populism by using religion and identity and using the issue of poverty is a threat to democracy. From some negative aspects of populism to democracy, what may happen was know Muslim communities should be led by Muslim leaders. The momentum is the blasphemy by Ahok’s that emerging various movements: demonstration involves large masses, intimidation of Ahok’s supporters, and the use of mosques as a mouthpiece to reject non-moslem leaders.

Second, Ahok supporter. The case of blasphemy makes Ahok’s supporters called supporters of blasphemy, and if Muslims are considered hypocritical. Ahok’s voters, especially from the Muslims, have difficulty expressing their expressions, because of their concentration on social life, for example, they refused to be worshiped when they died. The movement encourages the emergence of Muslim leaders to meet the interests of candidates who use this strategy. Anies Baswedan became a successful leader utilizing this sentiment and using the mosque to echo the resistance against non-moslem leaders.

The pinnacle of victory in the form of a speech confirms that his victory is a victory of the pribumi-Muslim against the Occupation, not the victory of the whole Jakarta citizen. Anies populism is not the end. When expressed in an explicit victory speech, he is the beginning of a further escalation in politics at the national level. In this context, the populism poses a threat to democracy, since the use of a majority identity (Muslim-native) will threaten minorities and promote division in the Indonesian life order and society that unity has been formed and hurt democracy system in Indonesia.
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