Journal of Governance
Volume 8 Issue 3, September 2023 (367-383)
(P-ISSN 2528-276X) (E-ISSN 2598-6465)
http://dx.doi.org/10.31506/jog.v8i3.20904

University Curricula and Student Movement in Indonesia: "Gejayan Memanggil" Protest in Yogyakarta

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Received: 2 June 2023; Revised: 8 August 2023; Accepted:19 August 2023

Abstract: *Student movements have played a significant political role in many countries in Asia, including Indonesia. They have been labeled "agents of change", and their movements are regarded as "moral forces" that push political change through street protests. Why do students join protests? What motivates them? How do their motivations relate to institutional aspects of universities, including the course materials they learn in class? This article attempts to answer these questions within an Indonesian context using the case of "Gejayan Memanggil" ('Gejayan Calling'), a 2019 student movement that had been the largest such movement in Yogyakarta since 1998. This article argues that students' self-perception as "agents of change", rather than institutional support, was their primary motivation to join the protests. Other contributing factors were the demands and form of the protest.*
Keywords: *Gejayan Memanggil; Student Protest; Indonesia; UGM; Youth Politics.*

How to Cite:
Savirani, A. (2023). University Curricula and Student Movement in Indonesia : "Gejayan Memanggil" Protest in Yogyakarta. *Journal of Governance*, *8*(3), 367–383. https://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.31506/jog.v8i3.20904

Introduction

Over the past decades, student movements and protests have received media coverage across the globe, including in Asian countries. In the second half of 2020, news media reported that students in Thailand held street protests to criticize the military-backed government and the lofty monarchy system; students in many Indonesian cities protested the Job Creation Bill, popularly known as the "Omnibus Law"; and, since 2019, students in Hong Kong have resisted the government's planned extradition law and rejected it as a form of Chinese encroachment (Victor 2019).

Indonesian students, particularly at the university level, have long been an "oppositional force" (Aspinall 2012). Young people, or pemuda, are identified as "sources of hope" and "agents of change", and they are depicted heroically in the country's political history. Student movements differ from other social movements, such as environmentalist and union movements, due to their "liminal, intellectual, and physically concentrated status" (Weiss et al., 2012: 6). Compared to the total population, they are few in number. In 2018, for instance, there were fewer than seven million students in Indonesia's public and private universities; this represented less than 9% of the 80–107 million Indonesians aged 19–23. Of these few students, even fewer are politically active.

This article explores the reasons why students join movements, as well as how their motivations correlate with the universities' institutional aspects—particularly the courses offered as part of their curricula, as well as the institutional support of students' lecturers, departments, or faculties. It explores these questions by bringing together the literature on student movements and the role of curricula in education. It specifically explores how university curricula (i.e., the courses offered), particularly in the social and political sciences, shape students' decisions to join protests in Yogyakarta. Despite the importance of university students in Indonesian politics throughout history, to date there has been limited research on what motivates students to join protests, as well as how university curricula and institutional set-ups contribute (or do not contribute) to student movements. It is quietly assumed that students are driven by their idealism when joining street protests.

As its case study, this article uses the "Gejayan Memanggil" (or "Gejayan Calling") student movement, which was initiated in Yogyakarta in September 2019. To date, this movement has conducted five protests, which have been attended by more than 5,000 students. It emerged in September 2019 as part of a wave of student protests that spread throughout the country, resulting in the deaths of 5 students and the arrest of more than 240. These protests emerged in response to the national political situation, in which members of the national parliament (who were approaching the end of their terms) rushed to enact various bills and bypassed all sorts of participatory democratic processes. This included a bill that revised the role of the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), the most respected state institution in the country.

Studies on the Indonesian student movement in the Reformasi era are not new. Sastramidjaja (2019), for instance, explores and argues how the era of democracy in Indonesia impacts the form of the movement. Previously, Aspinall (2012) challenged "moral force," which drives student movement, and argued that it is a myth. Madrid (1999) specifically

explores the roles of an Islamic Indonesian student movement affiliated with the Justice and Prosperous Party, namely the Indonesian Muslim Students Action Union (KAMMI). He argued that they played a role as a "force of moderation" against the general understanding that they were part of conservative politics. Within these existing studies, to date, there have not been any studies on this topic that connect the motive of joining the movement with courses and curricula in their class.

This article shows that students' self-perception as "agents of change" is the most important factor in students' decision to join protests. The relationship between students' political activities and their studies is limited, though some progressive lecturers have sought to cultivate a spirit of activism. As the majority of courses offered are oriented towards knowledge (the what aspect) rather than affection (the what to do aspect), courses contribute little to students' sensitivity; knowing little about being good citizens, they thus never really engage themselves in social activities outside of classes. Students' decision to join protests is further influenced by movements' organizing strategies and targeted issues.

Method

To support its arguments, this article combines quantitative and qualitative research methods. An online survey of participants of the Gejayan Calling movement was conducted in September 2020, with 169 total respondents. This was followed by semi-structured interviews with faculty administrators, as well as the undergraduate program coordinator at the Faculty of Social and Political Science, Gadjah Mada University. To complement the quantitative data, a series of online focus group discussions were conducted with protest organizers and participants. A desk study was conducted to study the curricula of the department of politics, department of government, and/or department of politics and government at the faculties of social and political sciences at six universities: three outside Java (Hasanuddin University in Sulawesi, Andalas University in Sumatra, and Nusa Cendana University in East Nusa Tenggara), and three in Java (University of Indonesia, Jenderal Sudirman University, and Brawijaya University). These universities were selected to represent Indonesia's major universities within and outside Java.

In a scheme, the research method applied in this article is as followed

Figure 1**.** Research method



Sources : (Researcher, 2023)

This paper is arrayed into five sections. First, it offers a glance at the history of student movements and university curricula design. This is followed by a review of the literature, which serves to unite social movement studies and basic pedagogical theory. Empirical data will subsequently be presented; this will be followed by discussion.

Result and Discussion

Student Movements, University Curricula, and Citizenship

In education systems, curricula are not only for learning or education activities but also have ideological and political purposes (Apple, 1990). Any discussion of what does, what can, and what should go in classrooms fundamentally involves the hopes, dreams, fears, and realities of humanity (1990: vii). Connell (1992) addresses similar issues, arguing that the education process is one of the most important arenas in which citizenship ideals are operationalized. This means the learning process does not only convey knowledge to students but also cultivates certain values. In other words, education is part of a social process that facilitates participants' transformation into good citizens. The principles and values of curricula are situated within a context of social inequality and class division, and thus Connel promotes a 'curricular justice' that recognizes "the way social effects are embedded in the curricula as practiced" (Connell, 1992: 138). It can be seen, thus, that education activities offer a space where the ideas and norms of citizenship can be cultivated.

Using a macro perspective, Torres (1998) argues that education reform always deals with questions of citizenship, democracy, and multiculturalism. He further argues that theories of multiculturalism are intimately linked with the politics of culture and education (Torres 1998: 421). In a more empirical case, Fung and Su (2016) explore Hong Kong high school students' participation in social and political activities and their classroom lessons. They argue that students' high participation levels during the 2014 "Umbrella" protests were inextricably linked to the enactment of a

"liberal studies" curriculum (designed as part of citizenship education reform in a post-colonial setting) in Hong Kong. In their study, a majority of students (67%) expressed that the liberal studies curriculum—particularly key words and concepts such as'social justice', 'credibility of government', and'safeguarding the rule of law'—played an important role in their decision to join the movement (Fung & Su, 2016: 96–97). Other factors, such as the police force's use of excessive violence when dealing with protesters, also escalated the protests in Hong Kong (Wong and Cheung 2019). Another study into the connection between curricula and students' affective learning was conducted by Sleteer (2002) using the case of California's state curriculum framework. She argues that, while the framework acknowledges ethnic, religious, and gender differences, it prioritizes the creation of allegiance to the existing social order over the historic marginalization of minority groups. These studies both show that curricula significantly influence students' attitudes towards social and political issues and that this influence may be progressive or regressive.

I would argue that student movements are arenas in which 'acts of citizenship' are exercised; as such, the literature must be explored. They are argued to be "among a few genres of movement defined in part by the biological life cycle; their inherently temporary status encourages a degree of efficiency and creativity in students' mobilization" (Weiss et al., 2012: 5). Student movements have several shared features: a) their constituency is limited; not all students join movements; b) their capital is knowledge; c) they are campus-based and thus very limited in scope; and d) they are flexible in the issues they address. Weiss et al. (2012: 10), referring to Schubert, Tetzlaff, and Vennewald (1994), classify students as a sub-group of professionals, being those who possess the most modern knowledge about society and who thus serve as its intelligentsia.

Nevertheless, student protests cannot be isolated from the macro-political regimes to which they react. In the Asian context, during the 1980s and 1990s, economic development was a primary economic agenda, and this went hand in hand with political development, meaning controlling citizens' expression of their political rights. In the case of Indonesia, the economic development of the 1980s and 1990s desired for students to "fill the technostructure" required to manage the country's economic development (Joesoef, 1984: 70). Consequently, many students not only absorbed the technocratic knowledge expected of them but also "gravitate[d] toward critical theories either as part of their education or as a side effect of it" (Weiss et al. 2012: 11).

Students also react to issues that impact them directly, such as neoliberalism in higher education. Neoliberal policy aims to produce human resources capable of fulfilling labor needs and making money rather than educating students to be good citizens who are sensitive to their country's problems. This can be seen, for example, in the protests of Chilean university students who called themselves the 'Chilean Winter' (in reference to the revolution in the Middle East popularly known as the Arab Spring) in 2011. These students demanded that the government stop its privatization of the education sector and improve public education, thereby creating social justice and equal opportunities. While Chilean students did not participate in the country's transition from dictatorship to democracy, this expensive education

brought more than 12,000 students to the streets in Santiago for more than 2 weeks (Cabalin, 2012). Other scholars have argued that this protest was an expression of accumulated grievances against the neoliberal features of the Chilean education system (Bellei et al. 2014).

These sets of theories are connected. Curricula are tools for instilling students with a particular ideological and political orientation, and student movements are arenas in which students can express their concern and care for their country. These student movements are oriented towards topics that have drawn the public's attention, including liberal democracy, clean and accountable government, and protection of minority rights.

Student Movements in Indonesia: A Glance Historical Perspective

Young people, including university students, have played an important role in Indonesia's political history. Before Indonesia proclaimed its independence in 1945, two important political events significantly involved youths. The first, which began in 1908, was the 'national awakening', in which young people from different cultural and regional backgrounds united despite their differences. The second occurred in 1928, when the Youth Pledge (Sumpah Pemuda) was declared, asserting that all youths shared one motherland, one nation, and one language; at this time, Indonesia's national anthem was also first sung and performed by youths (both students and non-students). Between 1944 and 1946, youths became the backbone of the Indonesian revolution; Benedict Anderson even recognizes the youths' "revolutionary force" as contributing significantly to the revolution (Anderson, 1972: 1). Several weeks before Indonesia' proclaimed its independence on August 17, 1945, a small group of youths kidnapped Soekarno and Mohammad Hatta (Indonesia's first president and vice president) and urged them to accelerate the country's independence. Indonesian independence could only be possible with the help of young people.

The student movement in Indonesia is strongly associated with the country's demographic profile. As Indonesia's economic development has increased, the number of students has increased rapidly. For instance, in 1949–1950, in the early years of independence, Indonesia was home to only six institutions of higher learning, with a total enrolment of approximately 18,000 students. According to Glassburner, a fiftyfold increase had occurred by 1964/65; 355 tertiary education institutions were spread through Indonesia, with a total enrolment of 278,000 (Fakih, 2020: 94–95). As of 2017, there are more than 4,500 tertiary education institutions in Indonesia, including universities, institutes, vocational schools, and polytechnics. More than 75% are privately owned and operated. Indonesian student movements, thus, operate within an expanding educational system.

Two decades after Indonesia's independence, Indonesia was in a political and economic crisis. Fragmentation occurred among the supporters of President Soekarno (particularly the Communist Party of Indonesia) and Soekarno's opponents, including the Indonesian military. At the time, Soekarno had adopted a "Guided Democracy" system, wherein power was centered solely on himself and other political actors—including political parties (except the Indonesian Communist Party) and the military—were marginalized. University

students, backed by the military and originating mostly from the University of Indonesia in Jakarta, descended to the streets (Raillon, 1989). Soeharto toppled Soekarno, and in 1966 he became president; Indonesia thus entered the so-called "New Order" era.

One decade later, Soeharto's ambitious economic development agenda, as well as his authoritarian political style and his reliance on military power, had exacerbated the gap between the rich and the poor. This produced resentment among the opposition groups, including students and some members of the military. They descended to the streets during a January 1974 state visit by the Prime Minister of Japan, and their protests ultimately resulted in riots (Raillon, 1989). These protests and the subsequent riots in the capital city had severe political consequences.

Students' political activities were restricted under a 'Campus Normalization' (NKK/BKK) policy, under which students were essentially ordered to study diligently and avoid becoming involved with political activities. Student activities and organizations were controlled by campus apparatuses, and the selection of student organizations' leaders was closely monitored. Books deemed to threaten the national ideology of Pancasila (derived from the root words panca 'five' and sila 'principles'). Students adapted to this restriction by establishing discussion groups as spaces in which books and publications, mostly forbidden by the state (including books with a Marxist or communist lean), could be discussed. In the early 1990s, two students from Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta, were arrested and sentenced to eight years imprisonment for selling and distributing the works of Pramoedya Ananta Toer, a famous Indonesian author who had been affiliated with the Communist Party of Indonesia (Makdori 2019).

When the Asian economic crisis struck Indonesia in 1997, it stimulated a domestic political crisis that ultimately ended the New Order regime. Elite fragmentation, local protests, and economic hardship (including the rapid devaluation of the Indonesian rupiah and staggering job losses) combined to bring down this regime. Students marched in many cities across the archipelago, demanding Soeharto's resignation.

More than two decades after Indonesia began its political reform in 1998, students in Yogyakarta organized "Gejayan Memanggil" (literally, Gejayan Calling). This protest, the case study in this article, was the largest student protest in Yogyakarta since 1998. More than 5,000 students descended to the streets, and their protests were followed by similar ones around Indonesia; ultimately, 5 students died and more than 240 were arrested. These protests emerged in response to the national political situation, in which members of the national parliament (who were approaching the end of their terms) rushed to enact various bills and bypassed all sorts of participatory democratic processes. This included a bill that revised the role of the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), the most respected state institution in the country. Other controversial bills included ones on sexual violence, on revising the Criminal Code, and on resource-related sectors such as mining, agriculture, and oil and gas. Protestors sought to strengthen anti-corruption measures, to protect the rights of women and marginal groups, and to stymie the environmental degradation caused by excessive exploitation. Owing to the breadth of these protests as well as protesters' criticism of parliament, the 2019 student protests were dubbed the

'2019 batch', implying a continuation of the movements mentioned above.

While the 1998 protests were situated in an authoritarian regime, "Gejayan Calling" is situated in a relatively democratic era. Protestors faced no threat of political imprisonment from the regime, and indeed, the "Gejayan Calling" protest was akin to a political festival in which participants could happily and eagerly express their shared concerns. This atmosphere of fun, with little political threat, differentiated the protests from the tense ones of 1998 (Savirani, 2019). Protesters made their own posters, conveying their material in a fun manner and using a style unique to their generation. These were broadcast nationwide by the media, and ultimately the protest became popular nationally.

"Gejayan Calling": Survey and Respondent Profile

An online survey of "Gejayan Calling" participants was conducted using Google Forms from September 5–21, 2020. A total of 169 students filled out the questionnaire, which assessed students' individual backgrounds, motivations for protesting, and opinions regarding the connection between their protests and their discipline. The vast majority of respondents (78%) were students at Gadjah Mada University (UGM), followed by Muhammadiyah University of Yogyakarta (UMY) and Sunan Kalijaga State Islamic University (UIN Sunan Kalijaga). Most students (more than 80%) came from faculties of social and political science; others studied at the faculties of medicine, biology, agriculture, engineering, veterinary, livestock science, and educational science (from the Yogyakarta University of Pedagogy). As such, there was a bias towards students from the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences at UGM. In terms of gender, 46.7% of respondents were female and 53.3% were males. Yogyakarta-born students represented 25% of respondents. The majority, 52%, originally came from other Javanese provinces (Central, West, East, and Banten); another 13.8% came from Sumatra. The vast majority (72%) of respondents entered university between 2017 and 2019, meaning that they were in the first to the third year of their studies at the time of the survey.

Although the "Gejayan Calling" student movement had held five street protests by September 2020, most respondents had only joined the first protest (52.1%) or the first two protests (29.6%). The first protest was attended mostly by students, while the second protest included a significant number of other marginal groups (such as laborers) and groups that shared similar concerns with protesters. After vocational high school students joined university students' protests in Jakarta, high school students in Yogyakarta also joined local protests.

The majority of respondents were also active in student organizations (79.3%), both internal (student body, extracurricular units) and external (such as the Association of Islamic Students [HMI], the Association of Nationalist Indonesian Students [GMNI], the Association of Catholic Students [PMKRI], etc.). Some students were also active in other off-campus community activities but not in external campus organizations (38.5%). Almost 62% of respondents indicated that their organizational activities contributed to their decision to participate in the protest. Approximately 20% were not active in any student association; this shows that protests involved not only 'activists', but also ordinary students.

Students As Agent of Change?

Most respondents were driven in part by their idealism as students (72.8%), and/or by their interest in doing new and interesting things (25%). A smaller number were motivated by class assignments (1.8%), or to skip class (1.2%)—as the demonstration was held during weekdays. In one FGD, most participants agreed that students were agents of change, as evidenced by their joining the protests.

> Not joining the protest would make me feel bad about myself. My friends were on the street, in the middle of the day, under the hot sun. I joined because it was an opportunity for me to contribute to the betterment of this country (J, FGD, November 7, 2020).

This idealism correlates strongly with protest momentum. FGD participants said that participating in the protest was a wonderful experience, one that may not come again in their lifetime. This was particularly true for the 2019 cohort (i.e., those who had only begun their studies in July 2019).

> With this momentum, it is very crucial to be part of it; we will be part of the history of student movements (GA, FGD, November 7, 2020).

> We learn that becoming part of politics can start from the street. This is part of our euphoria as a student, and ["Gejayan Memanggil"] was such a good opportunity and experience (MI, FGD, November 7, 2020).

Joining the protest was an unforgettable experience, and for some students a touching moment.

> I still remember that, when we marched, we passed a construction project. The workers shouted their support at us. I felt so touched, and felt that joining the protest was a noble thing to do.

The atmosphere during the protest was one of peace, happiness, fun, and solidarity between protesters and the people/street vendors along the street used for the protest.

> It was really a humid day, but everybody was so cheerful. Everyone felt safe to be there. This was different than the other Gejayan Calling protests (the fifth one), when the regime started to be more oppressive in dealing with student protests against the "Omnibus" law (V, FGD, November 7, 2020).

As mentioned earlier, 80% of respondents studied at the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences at UGM, and as such, responses are biased towards said faculty. For students from the Faculty of Cultural Studies (FIB) and other disciplines that have no courses on politics, power, and democracy, the situation is different. Only students from certain departments, such as anthropology and history, could understand the protests and participate. Unlike at the Faculty of

Social and Political Sciences, new students at the Faculty of Cultural Sciences were too afraid to join the protest, as they viewed demonstrations as scary political events (NN, FGD, November 11, 2020).

Respondents' perception that students are agents of change also asserts their special and unique roles as students. This reflects the argument that students have a sense of social responsibility, being "a tiny and privileged elite in predominantly uneducated, peasant societies" (Weiss et al., 2012: 8). Even as protest organizers' attempted to deconstruct this image of students by avoiding the use of university-affiliated media, such as the alma mater jackets commonly worn during street protests, this did not change society's own perceptions (GW, FGD, November 11, 2020).

Apart from students' strong feelings as agents of change, protesters' demands also contributed to their decision to join the protests. One demand, for instance, was the enactment of the draft bill on eradicating sexual violence. A female FGD participant mentioned that, by joining the protest, she hoped to end the delay in the bill's enactment. The majority of UGM students were familiar with cases of on-campus sexual harassment, including at their own alma mater. In 2018, a student pseudonymized as "Agni" was sexually harassed by a male friend during a work experience activity (KKN) in Maluku, Eastern Indonesia; however, UGM's administrators did not deal with this matter seriously (Tehputri 2018). This ignited many ‘closed’ cases of sexual harassment that male lecturers do to their female students to come up in public at UGM and other universities in Indonesia, causing new awareness among female university students. In the draft bill on the protection of sexual victims, victims will be protected. Such a background informed this respondent's decision to join the "Gejayan Memanggil" protest. The decision to protest, we may see, is directly related to participants experiences and motivations.

Students' enthusiasm for protesting was not only driven by their individual motivations but also by the support of their lecturers and faculty. Again, this was quite particular to the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences. Respondents indicated that they received support from their lecturers (83.4%), from department administrators (74%), and from faculty management (69%). Support from lecturers was very strong, as reported in the news media (Maharani 2919). At the same time, however, administrators at the university level did not see this clearly (80%). During the protests, university administrators were pressured by the Ministry of Higher Education to stop students' protests. UGM's rector, for instance, issued a letter indicating that they did not support the protests; similar letters were issued by other universities, such as Sanata Dharma University (USD), Islamic University of Indonesia (UII), Yogyakarta State University (UNY), and Atmajaya University of Yogyakarta (UAJY), all of which forbade their students from participating (Syaifullah 2019).

Generation Matters

Crosstabulation of respondents' year of enrolment and perception of students as agents of change shows that the longer students learn at university, the less they tend to support student movement or believe that students are agents of change. Students from the 2018, 2017, and 2016 batches, respectively, represented 35%, 18%, and 13% of all respondents. Fewer students who entered university before 2016 and participated in the protests viewed themselves as agents

of social change. Crosstabulation between students' year of enrolment and perception of the importance of including student protests in curricula showed similar tendencies; students who enrolled earlier were less likely to agree that this was important.

Approximately 20% of respondents came from the Faculty of Medicine, Biology, Veterinary, Livestock Science, Engineering, Agriculture Technology, Economics and Business, and Fashion. Of these, almost 60% of them agreed that it was necessary to have course materials related to student movements. This seems to show a thirst for knowledge about social movements, a concept that is foreign to them.

Regarding the relevance of their protest activities to their classroom materials, a higher percentage of students in the older batch (those who entered university in or before 2016) answered "no" than in the 2017 and 2018 batches. We can argue, thus, that senior students were less likely to connect their protests to their classroom materials. In an FGD, one participant stated that third- and fourth-year students were busy preparing for their final assignments, and thus they focused more on this practical concern than the student movement. It is therefore possible to identify a four-to-five-year cycle in students' activities: during their first and second years, students have the opportunity to fully integrate themselves into campus life, including in student protests; in their third year, students must complete their compulsory work experience program and begin work on their undergraduate thesis. One FGD participant, currently in his fifth year of studies, stated that he used to be actively involved in protests but now prioritizes his assignments over any last-minute invitations that students' meetings usually hold. One possible reason for the greater pragmatism amongst older students is previous experience; where senior students have participated in protests but not achieved any tangible results, they have less enthusiasm for participating in the student movement. It means, from the survey result at least, that the backbone of student movement is those who were in the first or second year of their university time, when they just oriented themselves to the new life and were excited about new things in the university's life. The second year has not been too heavy in terms of courses and assignments, which differed from the third and fourth year, a year when students are preparing for the final stage of their university life.

Students Protests and University Curricula

Are these protests related to the curricula students learn in class? Generally, we can assume that, as regimes change, so do curricula. However, new curricula do not automatically change students' behavior or their attitudes towards social and political issues. During the thirty years of the New Order, material at all levels of education skewed heavily towards the ideologization of Pancasila. Pancasila Studies was made a compulsory course, and students who failed the course would be required to repeat the whole year. Civic education, religion (the state recognized only five religions, although other local beliefs were present), and Indonesian history (as interpreted by the regime) were likewise compulsory, and all reflected the state's Pancasila ideology, anti-communist ideas, and emphasis on harmony over conflict and differences.

In the 1980s and into the early 1990s, the Ministry of Education held annual school competitions for the internalization and implementation of

Pancasila. Monday morning parades, in a military style, were compulsory for students at all levels of education. Authoritarianism was part of students' everyday lives during the New Order. At the university level, students were not only required to study Pancasila but also complete a course called kewiraan, conveying nationalistic materials regarding the 'defense of the nation'.

After the end of the New Order, state ideological materials were reduced, or at least contextualized. Institutionally, pursuant to Decree of the Minister of Education no. 232 of 2000, there are five course types: a) personal development (MPK), b) science and skills (MKK), c) innovation skills (MKB), d) innovative behaviors, and e) communal living (MBB). These materials are supplemented by students' final undergraduate theses as well as a live-in work experience program (KKN). In the past, national-level associations had controlled and monitored university curricula for specific disciplines. Although this has not been formally refuted, it is less effective in practice, as faculties and departments have the freedom to design their own curricula.

At the university level, several basic courses—including Pancasila, religion, and the Indonesian language—are compulsory; interpretation and contextualization are allowed in teaching. Another new course, "Human Rights and Citizenship", was introduced after the end of the New Order in some universities. Furthermore, social science perspectives that critically consider power relations (the Frankfurt School, cultural studies, postcolonial theory, postmodern theory, subaltern studies, etc.) have been adopted in post-Soeharto-era university curricula (Samuel & Sutopo, 2017). There has thus been a significant shift from the New Order's state-centered and nationalist curricula to more liberal and critical ones. This new paradigm reflects Indonesia's new ideology, which has three main features: nostalgia, cosmopolitanism, and individualism (Geller 2015).

However, if we look deeper, we can find that the assumed connection between regime change, curricula change, and student movements and attitudes is not always automatic. The curricula of the department of politics, department of government, and/or department of politics and government at the faculties of social and political sciences at six universities were reviewed; these universities were Hasanuddin University (Sulawesi), Andalas University (Sumatra), Nusa Cendana University (East Nusa Tenggara), University of Indonesia (Jakarta), Jenderal Sudirman University (Central Java), and Brawijaya University (East Java). According to law, students must receive between 144 and 147 course credits within 5–7 years to complete their undergraduate program; some universities, such as UGM, have required students to complete their studies in five years since 2016. Courses must comply with the National Higher Education Law (Law No. 12 of 2012), Presidential Regulation No. 8 of 2012 on the National Qualification Framework (KKNI), Ministerial Regulation No. 44 of 2012 on University Governance, and disciplines' own boards. National law regulates the general goals of university learning, the proportion of courses at the university, faculty, and department level, and the total number of credits necessary for study completion. In addition, it also regulates the competencies, learning outcomes, and learning methods used; for example, it identifies Pancasila, Religion, English, and Indonesian as compulsory courses at the university level.

According to the curricular documents of the six universities mentioned above, departments of politics offer more courses related to social movements and/or marginal groups than departments of government. This is because the department of politics places more emphasis on politics in general than the department of government, which in general aims to prepare its graduates to become civil servants. However, these courses are fewer in number than courses such as elections, political thinking, or governance. In general, less than 5–10% of courses offered by departments relate to civil society or social movements, and those courses are predominantly compulsory ones (for example, "State and Civil Society" and "Theory of Social Movements"). At Jenderal Soedirman University, the department of politics has more compulsory courses relating to social movements, including "Labor Politics", "Ideology of Political Movement", "Agrarian Politics", and "Identity Politics and Multiculturalism".

The latter is an elective course at Brawijaya University and Andalas University; "Gender and Politics" is also an elective course at Andalas University. At Hasanuddin University, of the 66 courses offered by the Department of Government, none are titled social or political movements. The Department of Politics and Government at Nusa Cendana University offers courses on "Democracy and Human Rights", "Social Movements and Identity Politics", and "Agrarian Politics". At the university level, as at other universities, first-year students are required to complete a Pancasila Studies course. The University of Indonesia has two concentrations: "Politics and Democratization in Indonesia" and "Comparative Politics". Courses related to marginal groups, namely "Labor Politics and Industrial Relations", "Identity Politics and Citizenship", and "Human Rights and Political Change", are elective.

As such, respondents were asked whether student protests should be part of university curricula, either directly or indirectly (i.e., either as a specific class titled "Student Movements" or "Social Movements", or within other courses that emphasize citizens' right to protest and criticize public policy). Most respondents indicated that it would be good to have classes related to student protests (67.5%). Looking at the number of respondents coming from a social/political sciences or humanities background, this makes sense, as both disciplines are linked to political issues and social movements.

At the departmental level, curricula have changed since 2005. The Department of International Relations, traditionally known for studying foreign politics, has added a new concentration ("Conflict Studies and Peace") to its classical concentrations ("Global Politics and Security" and "International Political Economy and Development"). This new concentration has material that is inexorably linked to social movements, including peaceful and non-violent protests. Lecturers have used street protests, including those initiated by "Gejayan Calling", as laboratories for students (Interview, Coordinator of the UGM International Relation Undergraduate Program, July 29, 2020).

A similar curricular arrangement exists at the Department of Politics and Government, which allows students to concentrate on power in the civil society arena through courses dealing with social movements in such sectors as labor, the urban poor, and minority groups. In other departments, such as the Department of Sociology and Welfare Policy, some

courses use the term'movement'. At the Department of Communication, although no courses directly use the term'movement', FGD participants indicated that relevant materials are delivered through the case studies used to enliven classroom discussion (GA, FGD 7 November 2020).

Some classes used the "Gejayan Memanggil" protests as a classroom assignment. At the Department of International Relations, for instance, one class assigned students to produce an observation report as diplomats. Elsewhere, students were assigned to observe the strategies (both peaceful and non-peaceful) used by protestors (V and J, FGD, November 7, 2020).

At other faculties, none of the courses offered are directly linked with social and political movements; however, indirect connections are evident. For instance, students at the Department of French Literature, Faculty of Cultural Sciences, mentioned in the FGD that they learn about French political thinkers, many of whom were foundational in the development of democratic systems. Students are inspired by these thinkers, and this influences how they see Indonesia's political reality and motivates them to join protests.

If we look at qualitative aspects, the courses offered emphasize knowledge (the what) over skill (the how) and affection level (the what to do). This point was made during a FGD with student organizers, who reflected on their own knowledge and its use during protests and compared it with that of students who had not joined the protest. We can see here that, although students learn about movements, courses do not automatically help them learn the how of organizing or perform the act itself. Classroom materials do not facilitate students' positioning of themselves as citizens who have the right to express their opinions through political movements. Their knowledge remains limited to knowledge rather than being transformed into internalized values. This does not mean, however, that this knowledge is useless; it is indeed useful for analyzing political situations. Furthermore, students at the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences are exposed to extensive information on political matters in the classroom, and this has made them numb. Because they know so much about Indonesian politics and elite control, they see social movements as having minimal effect (G, FGD, November 11, 2020).

To return to an earlier point, universities have several courses that are compulsory for all students. This includes Pancasila, the five principles that constitute Indonesia's national ideology. Citizenship is part of the fourth principle. However, course content deals more with the what aspect, including Indonesia's political system and the function of state bodies in its democratic system. Courses deal little with active citizenship, the need to remain aware of one's surroundings, and being willing to act on it.

Conclusion

This article has attempted to explore what motivates students to join street protests, as well as how their motivations relate to what they learn in class and the extent to which they receive institutional support in post-authoritarian Indonesia. Based on the above discussion, three main conclusions may be drawn.

First, students are motivated to join protests primarily due to their perception that "students are agents of change". The historical legacy of students' special contributions to Indonesia's independence remains strong, and thus students see their activities as a continuation of this

legacy. Other factors that contribute to students' participation in protests include their specific demands (particularly their support for the Corruption Eradication Commission and the Sexual Violence Eradication Law). In addition, students decision to join protests was influenced by materials on social media and other popular online media.

Second, university curricula—particularly at the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences—contributed minimally to students' protests. Compulsory courses contributed knowledge rather than action; courses dealing with social movements and marginal groups were similarly restricted to the knowledge level and failed to teach students what to do (i.e., reach the affective level). Here we can see that the concept of good citizenship remains knowledge rather than action, though this knowledge is still useful (particularly for organizers) and has contributed to protests. Other content has similarly been limited to the knowledge level, according to FGD participants.

Third, other factors have motivated students to join protests. Owing to the way organizers framed their demands in conventional and social media, "Gejayan Memanggil" was viewed as 'friendly' by participants, meaning that the movement and its protests were not associated with 'radical' activism. Organizers also provided space for 'personalization', too, thereby giving participants more freedom to express themselves creatively through posters. Protest organizers' decision to avoid emphasizing a campus identity increased inclusivity and expanded the reach of protests; this strategy, thus, enabled students to present themselves as ordinary citizens rather than an intellectual elite.

Acknowledgment

Thank you for students who organized "Gejayan Memanggil" protest in 2019, for their reflection and insight.

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