

## Development of Military Role in Indonesian Government

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**Abstract:** *The presence of the military in the history of the Indonesian government has long strengthened Indonesia's independence. The military itself has had various impacts on the Indonesian government, including acceptable impacts, good impacts, and bad impacts. Indonesia is trying to create a professional military, which could increase demotions and reduce the military's opportunities for politics. However, there are many obstacles that hinder the success of a professional military and reduce the military's influence in the Indonesian government. After the era of demands for reform and the dismissal of the military from the government, people began to realize that it was difficult for the government and the military to become one. If forced, there will be dysfunction in government institutions. This analytical study concerns the need for a supervisory role in order to improve civil-military relations. Continuous and ongoing monitoring can improve civil-military relations and achieve democratization in civil-military relations. However, until now, the supervision between civilians and the military has not gone well. This happens because of the minimal participation of the government, which supervises and regulates the military, so that there is no arbitrariness in carrying out its duties and relations with civil society.*

**Keywords:** *Development; Government; Military; Indonesia.*

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## Introduction

Based on Article 1 No. 20 of Law Number 34 of 2004, which regulates the Indonesian National Armed Forces, the military is the strength of a country's armed forces, which is regulated based on statutory regulations. Meanwhile, in Faisal Salam's book entitled "Military Justice in Indonesia," it is written that the military is made up of people who have been trained to face challenges or threats from enemies who threaten the integrity of a region or country. From the two descriptions above, it can be concluded that, universally, the military is a non-civilian institution with duties in defense and security. The initial presence of the Indonesian National Army (TNI) was in the context of defending Indonesia's independence from the Dutch, who wanted to colonize Indonesia for the second time through gun violence. The TNI itself is the result of the development of an organization called the People's Security Agency (BKR). Then, on October 5, 1945, it changed its name to the People's Security Army (TKR). In order to adjust to the formation on an international military basis, TKR changed its name to the Indonesian Republican Army (TRI). The government's efforts to renew the national army to find the best version continue while fighting for the nation's independence and sovereignty. To combine the two armed forces, namely the TRI, which is the army in general, and the bodies of the people's struggle, the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) was ratified on June 3, 1947, by the president. The role, functions, and duties of the TNI have also changed (from ABRI), as stipulated in Law Number 34 of 2004 concerning the TNI article 7 paragraph (1), namely that the main task of the TNI is to uphold state

sovereignty, maintain the territorial integrity of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia, which is based on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, and protect the entire Indonesian nation and all of Indonesia's bloodshed from threats and disturbances to the integrity of the Indonesian nation and state.

In this case, the main tasks of the TNI are divided into two parts: military operations for war and non-war military operations. Military operations other than war include:

1. The operation overcame the armed separatist movement
2. Overcoming armed rebellion
3. Overcoming Acts of Terrorism
4. Securing the border area
5. Securing strategic national vital objects
6. Carry out world peace tasks following established foreign policy policies
7. Securing the President, Vice President and their families
8. Empowering the defense area and its supporting forces early following the universal defense system
9. Helping government and regional tasks
10. Assisting the Republic of Indonesia National Police in the framework of the task of security and public order regulated by the law
11. Help secure state guests at the level of heads of state and representatives of foreign governments currently in Indonesia.
12. Help cope with the consequences of natural disasters and evacuation, and provide

assistance to people affected by disasters.

13. Assist search and rescue in accidents (*search and rescue*)
14. Assisting the government in securing shipping and aviation against piracy, hijacking, and smuggling.

Meanwhile, in the field of internal reform, it is still being carried out, following the demands of national reform (Diamond, 1997). The TNI must continue to uphold its commitment to maintaining the achievement of internal reforms and achieving agreed targets to create a better Indonesia in the future. Since 1998, there have been many changes made by the TNI, such as:

- Formulate a new paradigm for the role of ABRI in the 21st century.
- Formulate a new paradigm for the role of the TNI that reaches more into the future as an actualization of the new paradigm for the role of the 21st century ABRI.
- Separating Polri from ABRI has been the decision of the ABRI leadership since April 1, 1999, as the initial transformation.
- Eliminate ABRI's employment through retirement decisions or status transfers (Kep: 03/)/II/1999).
- Eliminate Wansospolpus and Wansospolda/Wansospolda Tk-I.
- Shrinking the number of F.TNI/Polri members in the DPR RI and DPRD I and II to eliminate the socio-political function
- TNI's non-involvement in practical politics or day-to-day politics
- Terminating organizational relations with the Golkar Party and taking the same distance with all existing political parties.
- Committed and consistent to being neutral in elections
- Arrange the relationship between the TNI and the KBT.
- Revise the TNI doctrine to suit reform and the role of ABRI in the 21st century.
- Make changes to Sospol staff to become Komsos staff.
- Make changes to the Chief of Social and Political Staff (Kassopol) to become the Chief of Territorial Staff (Kaster).
- Eliminate Sospoldam, Babinkardam, Sospolrem, and Sospoldim.
- Carrying out the liquidation of ABRI Syawan Staff, ABRI Kamtibmas Staff, and ABRI Babinkar.
- Implementing public accountability for TNI/Military Enterprise Foundations
- Carrying out the liquidation of the Deputy Commander of the Indonesian Armed Forces Organization.
- Eliminate Bakorstanas and Bakorstanasda.
- Confirmation that KDH candidates from the TNI must have retired since the screening stage;
- Carrying out the elimination of the Vigilance Command Post;
- Revoke ABRI Sospol materials from the TNI education curriculum.
- Carrying out the liquidation of the TNI Caster Organization.
- Conduct liquidation of the TNI's Social Communication Staff

(Skomsos) following SKEP of TNI Commander No. 21/VI/2005.

- Implementing the TNI doctrine Tri Dharma Eka Karma (Tridek) replacing Catur Dharma Eka Karma (Cadek) according to the TNI Commander number Kep/2/I/2007 Decree dated January 12, 2007.

The role of the military is explained in the Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 34 of 2004 concerning the Indonesian National Armed Forces in Article 5, which reads: "The TNI plays a role as a tool of the state in the field of defense, which in carrying out its duties is based on state policies and political decisions." Then, the function of the military is explained in Article 6 paragraph (1), which reads: "The TNI as a means of national defense functions as a. deterrence against all forms of military threats and armed threats from outside and within the country against sovereignty (Giddens, 1979), territorial integrity, and national safety, b. to take action against every form of threat as referred to in paragraph (1) letter a, and c. to restore the state's security condition, which is disrupted due to security disturbances. Then, Article 6, paragraph (2), reads: "In carrying out the functions referred to in paragraph (1), TNI is the main component of the national defense system. So, if there is a military threat attacking the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI) from another country that impacts territorial integrity as well as the resilience and security of the Indonesian state, then in the fight, it uses military force. However, if the problems are related to people's welfare and justice for the community, the solution is not in the military realm. As for people who are members of the

military and who comply with military laws or military courts, they can be grouped according to what has been regulated in all regulations related to Soldiers of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia in Article 7 of Law Number 2 of 1988 concerning Soldiers of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia, namely as follows:

1. Indonesian National Armed Forces Soldiers, Indonesian Navy Soldiers, and also Indonesian Air Force Soldiers;
2. Reactivated former ABRI soldiers;
3. The mobilization, Titular military, and foreign military are equated with the military.

As we already know, in Indonesia itself, two presidents with military backgrounds have served in the history of the Indonesian presidency. Many people disagree regarding the military's involvement in social politics because the social-political role of the military exists due to compelling circumstances, such as an emergency situation or a state of war. Because currently, our country is not in a situation as previously mentioned, the military's socio-political role is considered irrelevant. In addition, there is a political guide in viewing the role of social politics (Klinken, 2007; Klinken, 2016), namely the concept of *civilian supremacy*, in which the socio-political function of the military will face democracy and democratization because it is believed that military culture will hinder the progress of democracy that is being pursued (Mahdi & Dinanjani, 1998). According to Arbi Sanit (2003), the presence of the military in the political, social, and economic world in developing countries is due to the lack of *power* for civilians to participate in controlling elements of

people's lives. Civilian politicians who are relatively quickly faced with all kinds of problems, such as the preparation of a political system that is entirely free from a foreign power and organizing a society that is relatively hasty to face the demands of modernization, are still trying out models that might be used to serve the demands of the people themselves.

Until now, policies related to the involvement of the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) in civilian positions are still a polemic and raise many pros and cons from the community (Diprose et al., 2019). This has become one of the broader community's concerns because this issue exists in line with the emergence of thoughts related to the return of the dual function of ABRI, as happened during the New Order era. Issues related to ABRI's dual function often became a topic of discussion shortly after the idea emerged from the TNI Commander, Marshal Hadi Tjahjanto, who wanted to add new positions for high-ranking internal officers and other ministries. As Dunn (2000) has stated, this is about public policy. If seen from a normative perspective, the TNI can fill civilian positions, but with the condition that it must follow the educational background it has taken. From the results of the convergent analysis, it was found that if the non-job TNI increased, then the TNI's capabilities and capacities would be increasingly doubted and questioned in the national security and resilience field. With this, there needs to be encouragement to propose a productive policy, such as maximizing the TNI's capacity.

Many studies discuss the relationship between civilians and the military, such as an article entitled

Democratization of Civil-Military Relations by Koesnasi Kardi. This article tries to identify the process of military reform in Indonesia because it has spawned several structural, cultural, doctrinal, and organizational changes. The results of the identification carried out by Koesnasi show that the dynamics of military reform have not fulfilled a fundamental level regarding the relationship between civilians and the military, which is democratic and adheres to civilian supremacy. The dynamics of military reform in Indonesia show that the successful democratization of civil-military relations cannot be separated from the institutional structure of the military, which is related to the persistence, direction, and initiatives of civil institutions. Koesnasi, in his article, also said that civil and military relations during the reform era showed that the unity and cohesiveness of civil institutions had an impact on problems arising from military reform under the control of the democratic system in Indonesia. Based on Kardi's presentation (2014), civilian supremacy in Indonesia is felt to rely more on "voluntary subordination" of the military, which is not the result of effective civilian control over the military.

### **Method**

The research method that will be used in this analysis is by conducting a reference study and searching for documents, news, journals, and research results that are relevant to the topic analysis. The data analysis itself aims to draw conclusions about the role of the military in the Indonesian government from time to time and civil-military relations in Indonesia.

## **Result and Discussion**

### **The Origins of Military Politics in Indonesia**

The military's perception of politics comes from the colonial period, when the freedom fighters brought a spirit of patriotism aiming for Indonesian independence. Due to the absence of boundaries at that time, the thoughts of military figures assumed that they had a crucial role in Indonesian independence. This thought emerged the desire to be in the post-independence Indonesian government, which aims to play a more significant role than just maintaining sovereignty and defending against attacks from outside and within the country (Ian O'Flynn, 2006).

This was coupled with the absence of restrictions made by the Indonesian military at that time, which should only be a military power. So it raises the presumption that the Indonesian government will need officers when the time comes and will be ready to engage in politics to advance Indonesia (Ito, 2016). This was coupled with the thoughts of the Indonesian military at that time, which considered the armed forces to have authority as both a military force and a socio-political force (Tadjoeddin et al., 2016).

### **Patterns of Civil-Military Relations in Indonesia**

Democracy in a country will run well, grow well, and even develop healthily if the relationship between civilians and the military is healthy. In terms of realizing this, Indonesia carried out the abolition of the dual function of ABRI or the repositioning of the TNI. Civil and military relations depend on a country's political system or government regime (Tadjoeddin et al.,

2016). If a country implements civilian supremacy, the military's role in that country is only a tool for the state to address issues regarding defense, or it can become subordinate to the civilian government. Conversely, if a country implements military supremacy, the military will be more prominent, where the military can act as an instrument of the state and an instrument of power. The military will dominate civilians in various aspects of life, from the economy to the political aspects.

There is a concept regarding the relationship between civilians and the military, namely the concept of "civilian control," where this concept explicitly places the military under the control of civilian leadership. The concept was born due to people's fear of the army for the freedom it has. Kamil (2009) also mentions several characteristics of objective civilian control: First, there is recognition and professionalism in the military regarding the boundaries of professionalism, which is their field. Second, the effectiveness of subordination in making critical decisions made by the military to political leaders. Third, there is agreement and acknowledgment regarding the military's autonomy, authority, and professionalism from political leaders. Thus, the political aspect of the military is reduced, and politics in the military is also reduced.

The existence of reform itself brings new things to civil-military relations that already exist in Indonesia. The existence of various demands for reform that changed the constitutional system with efforts to democratize and strengthen civilians weakened the elements of the military in the Indonesian government. The 1998 Reformation movement was also a

turning point in power relations between the government and the military, which in this context was between President Soeharto and ABRI. The existence of KKN and the dual function of ABRI made the New Order regime, which lasted for 32 years, an authoritarian regime and a dark record for civil-military relations in Indonesia. The military occupied civilian positions from the village to the main level, which instilled the thought that the people could not do anything without help from the military.

The pattern of civil-military relations that the Government of Indonesia itself is trying to build is the existence of military professionalism coupled with the existence of civilian professionalism (Diamond, 1997). The military is expected to monitor the course of politics but not practice politics. The military in Indonesia strives to become a neutral institution when political conflicts occur between groups as well as between the executive and legislature.

The military also hopes for a merger between civilians and the military, in which a coalition between the military and civilians will occur so that the military can restore its power in politics. One of the forms of this coalition is the presence of retired TNI officers in a political party. The existence of a military representative in a civilian institution shows that the military is not lost in the Indonesian government. The existence of retired TNI officers is not without reason; they will use the power they have to strengthen the military and will advocate for military interests. This form of coalition has been running since President Megawati, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, and President Jokowi. The existence of an inter-civil-

military coalition forms authoritarian praetorians in which civilian supremacy is built with the merger of civilians and the military.

Good civil-military relations are to make the military have a role as a guardian of stability and realize social and political dynamics as a public domain in realizing a democratic government. The military's role will be emphasized as an institution that maintains national stability and resilience but does not participate in politics practically. One of the efforts of the Government of Indonesia in carrying out good civil-military relations is to form a government that is formed democratically by prioritizing the voice of the people and the interests of the people.

### **Armed force's dual function**

Indonesia has a long history of civil and military relations. This course is still relevant for discussion, from the New Order era to the current post-reform era. Discussing civil and military relations certainly cannot miss the period when there was a dual function in the New Order era. The idea of a dual-function military has been around since the Old Order. The initiator of the idea was General Abdul Haris Nasution, the Army Chief of Staff at the time. He refers to the concept as the "middle way."

The initial event that powerfully illustrates the military's role in Indonesian politics was the incident of October 17, 1952. The incident was a conflict between the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) and Provisional People's Representative Council (DPRS) members. Reporting from tiro.id, the masses were deployed to the front of the state palace to demand the dissolution of the parliament and

replace the parliament with a new one because the TNI considered that the parliament was too involved in intervening in the affairs of the army. The army mobilized the mass under the leadership of AH Nasution, who was then the Army Chief of Staff.

Leni (2013) explained that a series of motions were issued due to this incident. On September 28, 1952, a motion of no confidence and no acceptance of the policies issued by the Minister of Defense to resolve conflicts within the TNI was issued by Zainal Baharuddin as Chair of the Defense Commission. A motion regarding the improvement of the military structure and the structure of the Ministry of Defense was also issued on October 13, 1952, by IJ Kasimo and supported by Masyumi, Parkindo, and Parindra. Not only that, the third motion was issued on October 14, 1952, by the Secretary General of the PNI, Manai Sophiaan, regarding the improvement of the leadership structure and organization of the military and the Ministry of Defense.

Major General AH Nasution also emphasized that the TNI played a non-military role in the transition period of Indonesian political life. Then, President Sukarno announced that the country was in a state of emergency, so he issued an SOB, which gave legitimacy to the military in carrying out non-military actions.

### **Military Involvement in the Old-Order Government**

The Indonesian military has a huge role in directing or guiding the history of the struggle of the Indonesian nation. The military's role from 1945 to 1949 was considered very conspicuous due to the dualism of leadership in the military and politics. Leni (2013) says

that the Indonesian army is an army that tends to be strong in politics because the Indonesian army is included in the revolutionary Praetorian army. The formation of TNI is a *self-created army* created by itself, not by political parties or by the government. This was because, at that time, the government was reluctant to create an army. Under Soekarno's leadership, the older generation dominated the central government, so they thought Indonesia could become independent peacefully. In contrast to the army at that time, which was dominated by the younger generation, they had views or thoughts that were the opposite of those of the older generation. Thus, the younger generation took the initiative to arm themselves in order to defend Indonesia's independence.

This is one reason the military is often in government and conducts practical politics. Forming a military based on expelling colonialists gave the impression that the military was an independent institution with the right to be part of the government. The Indonesian people do not yet know the importance of limits for military personnel to carry out political practices to minimize the occurrence of irregularities or abuse of authority or power carried out in the context of improving the welfare of the military and leaving civil society behind. During the first five years of Indonesian independence, the military's role in the Indonesian government was also evident. This is, of course, due to the significant role of the Indonesian military in expelling the invaders and fighting for independence.

Panglima Besar Sudirman is one of the guidelines, inspirations, or examples for the TNI to respond to civil-



military relations and determines how the army is involved in politics in Indonesia. This is due to the nature of Sudirman, who always manages problems and conflicts regarding state politics. He also often mediates conflicts between the government and the opposition. Panglima Besar Sudirman also said that the army is a living tool, not a dead tool.

### **Military Involvement in the New Order Government**

This concept continued to be matured by Nasution, especially at the Second Army Seminar in Bandung on August 25–31, 1966. The seminar resulted in an agreement that the army was allowed to carry out its roles outside the military, such as participating in every business and community activity in the fields of ideology, politics, economics, society, and culture. After independence, the military's role as a guard of sovereignty and war diminished (Tadjoeddin et al., 2016). This made the army's condition at that time as if there was no work to be done to maintain national stability. Therefore, this could be a strong reason why the idea of military dual function emerged.

The fall of Soekarno and the rise of Suharto as president did not erase the concept of the dual function of the military. Suharto, who has an army background, continued this concept with new packaging, namely the dual function of ABRI. ABRI's position at that time was strengthened through MPRS Decree No. 11 of 1969 and MPR Decree No. 82 of 1982. This decree provides a legal basis for ABRI as an institution with two functions. The first is maintaining security and order, then holding government power and

governing the country. Many military figures were still active then and filled important positions, such as ministers, governors, and mayors. In addition, ABRI grew more substantial in the civil and governmental sectors when the ABRI faction was formed in the DPR.

During the 1990s, the people seemed increasingly irritated by the systematic silencing by the Soeharto regime, one of which was the deployment of military personnel. Many violations of human rights were committed by the military at that time, ranging from enforced disappearances to murders, as happened in the 1965 incident, namely the G30S, which claimed many lives because the military at that time was forced to intervene to save the nation from a communist coup by acting spontaneously, causing bloodshed and the May 1998 riots.

### **Military Involvement in Reform Government**

After the fall of the Suharto regime in 1998, Indonesia began a period of government known as the reform period. During the reform period, the Indonesian government wanted the military as a unit that differed from the government so that the dual function of ABRI did not occur like during the New Order era. Even though Indonesia has changed to the reform era, the military's role in the reform government itself is still felt and happening. The abolition of the dual function of ABRI itself was one of the demands of the Indonesian people when the reforms took place and the New Order era collapsed. The government, led by each president himself, has a military role.

One example was during the BJ Habibie era, when the military played

the role of an institution that prioritized military professionalism and there was a clear division of powers between the military and civilians. President BJ Habibie also held the first election in the reform era, namely in 1999, and this election was one of Habibie's efforts to reduce ABRI's involvement in the DPR and the government that remained from the New Order era. Only retired military officers may be directly involved as political party members, so they can become members of the DPR if elected in the election process.

Efforts to reduce military power were also carried out during the time of President Gus Dur. Gus Dur carried out policies that sought to build an independent civilian force that could stand without a military role. Some of the policies undertaken by Gus Dur were to make an effective separation of the powers of the TNI and POLRI, to get closer to pro-democracy groups, to reduce the influence of the military in the social lives of the people that had been ingrained during the New Order (Tyson et al., 2018), to reduce the military budget, and many more. The controversial policy carried out by Gus Dur received a response, namely the impeachment carried out by the DPR. Even though it was not carried out directly by the military, it is clear that the military is trying to ensure that there is still a military element in the government system, which President Gus Dur is trying to remove.

The military's involvement in the government was also still felt until the current President Jokowi era. Even though Jokowi is a president who does not have a military background, he places military people in government. Military placement is often known as the Palace Oligar, or soldiers in civilian

clothes, because these officials remove their badges to mingle with the government like civilians. Starting from his second leadership period, Jokowi himself placed high-ranking military officials such as Prabowo, Moeldoko, and Terawan, who were or are still in the cabinet made by President Jokowi.

President Jokowi's efforts to select officials with military backgrounds are due to his limitations as a president with a civilian background in defense elements or other issues that offend the military. This is what underlies the choice made by President Joko Widodo, who chose officials with a military background. However, it cannot be denied that the names of the military who are in the Jokowi government are people who have had excellent services in his victory as President of Indonesia, like Luhut Binsar Pandjaitan, who was one of the key figures in President Jokowi's victory during the presidential election.

The existence of military actors who become political actors themselves is known as praetorians. The existence of praetorians itself was a form of change in the task of the military, which was initially a symbol of state sovereignty and the main barrier to possible attacks, both from outside and from within, and over time the military also joined the government. The existence of Praetorians was felt after the introduction of reform due to the large number of military officials who participated in the Indonesian government.

Looking back, it is difficult to say that civil-military relations were already democratic during the current reform era. The position of the military in self-government should ideally be in civilian control, where decisions taken by the

military are decisions that have been considered and not taken unilaterally by the military. It is civil officials who are in the people's hands in government. However, as is well known, many public officials have served as military members. This becomes a conflict of interest when the civil official still has military thoughts in mind. This is a dilemma in the implementation of civil-military relations.

During the reform period, some regulations limited the military's authority as an institution under the Indonesian government. In Law No. 34 of 2004 concerning the TNI, it has been regulated that professional soldiers do not engage in practical politics, do not do business, and are only tasked with maintaining national security. This still could not be accomplished in the reform era. For example, the military itself is still interfering in civil matters. This is evidenced by the existence of a memorandum of understanding between the military and the government that allows the military to interfere in civilian affairs. The existence of this is, of course, contrary to the law, which previously established the military's authority.

The slogan "Together with the TNI, the People are Strong" has become the indoctrination of the military, which wants the idea that civil society needs the military's role to achieve goals or do things that are civil in nature. The existence of this doctrine is indirectly embedded in society. This has made many former military officials choose a career in politics. Society will perceive them as competent candidates who will only benefit civil society. Although it has been proven that this is not true because not all ex-military members can have smooth careers and make people

prosperous when they have a career in politics.

Even though the repeal of ABRI's dual function at the beginning of the reform period removed the military's authority to double as an official and control business, until the reformation period, the military itself was still running businesses, which were divided into three types, namely formal, illegal, and cooperative businesses. Informal business placing TNI personnel in companies also involves the TNI as an institution, unit, or member of the TNI. Illegal business only involves individuals and units; institutionally, the TNI does not do it. Meanwhile, formal business in the form of foundations and cooperatives involves TNI institutions, units such as Kopassus, and individuals.

The military itself is doing business due to the lack of budget provided by the government, which makes military activities unable to run smoothly. If you look at this, in a reform era like now, one of the reasons for the unfavorable relations between civilians and the military is the government itself. The limited budget allocated to the military by the DPR has forced the military to look for other ways to exercise power. Some of these ways make military members do business or take off their badges and join the government, which is considered more profitable.

The difficulty in separating the military from the government in the reform era is also due to the history of the military, which has long been instrumental in administering the state in the military field, then in politics, and then in the economic field, which aims to prosper the nation. The participation of the military, which has played an essential role in the Indonesian

government from the start, made it difficult for the military to disappear from the Indonesian government. Civil-military relations at the beginning of the independence period seemed authoritarian, with no civilian control over the military.

However, dozens of years after the reform, the discourse on the dual function of the military has resurfaced. On one occasion at that time, the Commander-in-Chief of the TNI, Marshal Hadi, re-launched the involvement of the TNI in civilian spaces after previous President Jokowi revealed plans for restructuring within the TNI. This is due to the high number of high-ranking TNI officers with non-job status. One way to distribute TNI high officers is by including them in ministries. TNI Commander Marshal Hadi also proposed that the placement be included in the revision of Law No. 34 of 2004.

The discourse on returning to the military's dual function suddenly received quite strong criticism from civilian circles. This discourse is considered to have betrayed the spirit of reform that took place in 1998, which mandated the repeal of the New Order doctrine, one of which was regarding the dual function of the military. The political reform movement at that time was built with blood and loss of life for the sake of a democratic idea. The mass movement also had to deal with the military, which was the mainstay of the New Order regime.

With this discourse, there was a concern that the Indonesian military would return to government and carry out practical politics. If this happens, military supremacy may occur and exclude civilian interests. This is contrary to the principles of democracy

adopted by Indonesia, where participation and the voice of the people are crucial and become essential in the implementation of government.

### **Conclusion**

The relationship between civilians and the military in Indonesia continues to develop over time. These developments are due to differences in the political situation and political culture each year, which make for different forms of civil-military relations. Military professionalism itself is something that was quickly built by Western nations but slowly developed by Indonesia. This is due to existing factors such as economic development and others that can hinder performance in the framework of realizing military professionalism.

In Indonesia, there has always been a military element in every era, from the Old Order to the New Order to the Reformation eras. One thing that underlies the military's engagement in politics is that the Indonesian military itself was born as a form of struggle by the Indonesian people to fight against the invaders, which made members of the military feel the need to contribute further to the Indonesian government. The role of the military in the Indonesian government was strongly felt during the New Order era. This is coupled with a dual military function where President Soeharto, besides using the military as a defense institution, also uses the military as a political institution where military officers are placed in strategic positions in the government.

The reform itself became the turning point for military participation in Indonesia. The existence of a policy that regulates the military in Indonesia means that only retired military officers

are allowed to enter politics. Even so, there is still much ex-military in the current Indonesian government. One of the reasons why there are so many retired military officers in the government is that the current president, Jokowi, does not have a military background. Therefore, he needs help from experts in fields related to the military.

In Indonesia itself, in general, civil-military relations have not been said to be good. Doctrines left over from the New Order era made civilians feel that the military was necessary for carrying out civilian activities. Even though this does not seem right, it should be remembered that good civil-military relations are achieved by applying military professionalism. With the professionalism of the military itself, the democratic process in Indonesia can undoubtedly improve. Although its application in Indonesia itself is still challenging to see, there is still an incentive for military officers to practice politics.

It is necessary to have a monitoring role in improving civil-military relations. Continuous and continuous monitoring can improve civil-military relations, and democratization of civil-military relations can occur. However, until now, the supervision that has taken place among military civilians has not been going well. This is due to the lack of participation from the government, which oversees and regulates so that the military does not act arbitrarily in carrying out its duties and in relations with civil society.

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