

From Tolerance To Violent Extremism: Exploring The Citizens Characteristics of West Java

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Abstract: *This article aims to describe the characteristics of the West Java community's views on tolerance that can birth intolerant attitudes and impact violent extremism. The dynamics of security issues include changing national security from state center security to people center security. The consequence of this shift is that security becomes a comprehensive matter, and security management will require cooperation between actors and security institutions. This article uses a conceptual review of violent extremism and national security. The research method used is qualitative, with data collection techniques through literature studies. The results of this study show that the threat of radicalization in West Java Province still has the potential to emerge later and can endanger human security. Some of the data has been presented in three aspects, such as democracy and religion, social aspects of society towards followers of other religions, and religious understanding and practices that produce significant data so that this certainly cannot be ignored. In this case, awareness of human security must begin to be considered at the regional level to accommodate human safety and national security specifically.*

Keywords: Religion Tolerance; Violent Extremism; Democracy in West Java

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Introduction

After the fall of the New Order regime, there was room for the emergence of various expressions built on primordial sentiments and identities, which paved the way for the expansion of radicalism (Supriadi et al., 2020). *Radicalism* is an ideology created by people who want drastic social and political change or reform using violence (Ali et al., 2018; Asrori, 2017; Ruslan, 2017). When viewed from the point of view of religion, it can be interpreted as an understanding that refers to an essential religious foundation with high religious fanaticism, so that it is not uncommon for the method used to be through violence against people who have different views or streams with the aim of actualizing the understanding that is adopted or believed to be accepted by force (Asrori, 2017; Maliki, 2020; Mustofa & Mahmudah, 2019).

Groups that are then dragged into a radical movement start from the socialization process that generally occurs as well as personal, emotional, and psychological factors such as alienation, the search for an identity, and the dignity of revenge, persecution, the breakdown of communication between actors who have authority and society, and technological advances through virtual communication on social media. From the above factors, the radical movement turns into violent extremism because the above factors become a vital incubator to trigger violent extremism in both developed and developing countries. This can be seen in Muslim minorities in Paris, Brussels, and Moscow; white radical disillusionment in the United States; and Somalis in Kenya (Sommers, 2015).

Individuals or groups then co-opt into violent extremism, referring to three major phases: First, there is the initial

alienation from processes and institutions that provide identity or authority in a particular society and the attempt to seek a different identity. The second is radicalization, where there is a transition from radicalization to violent (often mass) behavior. Third, adherence to violence, which, in this phase, distinguishes radicals from violent extremists. Radicals choose contestation or advocacy to achieve their goals, while violent extremism chooses violence to impose their views on society. Some examples are ISIS, Al-Shabaab, or the KKK (UNDP, 2016).

The radicalization of violent extremism is a challenge that continues to grow. Some studies discuss several incidents of radicalization to extremism, such as Salafi Jihadism (Maher, 2016) and conversion to Islam among foreign fighters in the West (Kanda) (Rabasa & Benard, 2015; Roy, 2017; Stern & Berger, 2015).

Canadian Incident Data from a Canadian terrorism, security, and society research network presents that there were approximately 1,800 incidents of violent extremism in Canada from 1960–2014 (Canadian Network for Research on Terrorism, 2018; Wilner & Yar, 2019), such as the tragedy of Martin Couture-Rouleau, who carried out a vehicular attack on the Canadian Armed Forces. The tragedy of Michael Zehaf-Bibeau, who shot dead a corporal and attacked Parliament Hill, Damian Clairmont, who joined Jabhat Al-Nusra. John Maguire, who joined ISIS, and several others (Suljić & Wilner, 2021).

In the West Java region, there have been several incidents of violent extremism, such as in December 2022, when a suicide bombing in front of a Bandung City church killed 11 people. A terrorist network linked to ISIS allegedly

carried out the attack. In addition, several cases of intolerance and interfaith violence also occurred in West Java. Setara Institute noted that nationally, between 2017 and 2021, there were 866 violations of freedom of religion and belief (KBB), with 1,472 incidents (Setara Institute, 2021; Sigit & Hasani, 2021), which are spread

across various provinces in Indonesia, with the majority of incidents occurring in East Java and West Java. In 2021, East Java topped the KBB violation events with 34 incidents, and West Java had as many as 25 events.

It is apparent from the data in the following table:

Table 1. Violations of Freedom of Religion and Belief in Indonesia 2017-2021

No	Year	Number of Violations of Freedom of Religion and Belief	Number of Forms of Action	Description
1	2017	155	201	Spread across 26 provinces, most of them occurred in West Java 29 events, DKI Jakarta 26 events, Central Java 14 events, and East Java 12 events, and Banten 10 events.
2	2018	160	202	Spread across 25 Provinces with dominant events occurring in West Java (24 Events), DKI Jakarta (23 Events), East Java (21 Events), and Central Java (17 Events)
3	2019	200	327	Spread across 28 Provinces with the highest violation time in May (37 events).
4	2020	180	424	Spread across 29 Provinces with a concentration of West Java (39), East Java (23), Aceh (18), DKI Jakarta (13), and Central Java (12).
5	2021	171	318	Six issues of violations of freedom of religion or belief were committed by non-state actors: Intolerance (62 actions), hate speech (27 cases), refusal to establish places of worship (20 cases), blasphemy reporting (15 cases), refusal of activities (13 cases), attacks (12 cases), destruction of places of worship (10 cases).

Source: Results of Data Processing by Setara Institute (2023)

There is a parallel relationship between religious radicalism and acts of violence, with the theoretical basis that violent extremism is born in acts of rejection, resistance, and the desire to change in line with religious doctrine by violent means (Ali et al., 2018). The religious group views narrowly and rigidly religious teachings and is closed to viewing the teachings of other groups (Hidayat, 2021; Ulya, 2016). Furthermore, there are multiple ways to describe the reasons behind violent extremism, such as

those related to specific ideologies, the interpretation of political movements or religious beliefs, economic, ethnic, or separatist problems, and other motivations.

According to a survey by the National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT), 85% of millennials are considered vulnerable to radicalization. One of the driving factors is the development of technology that presents new platforms, such as social media, which can be an incubator for the development of

radicalization that leads to violent extremism in Indonesia (Qodir, 2016). Globalisation has implications for the spread of radicalization that leads to violent extremism because it threatens traditional community values and can reduce the spatial and temporary distance between one country and another (Rabasa & Benard, 2014). In addition, the birth of violent extremism is influenced by religious exclusivity, identity crises, and symptoms of social, economic, cultural, and political crises (Fanani, 2017).

The era of globalisation does not only show a display that moves towards free-market democracy; it also shows cultural pluralism, where ethnic and religious dimensions that did not appear in the Cold War era now come to the forefront in presenting models of political authority, some of which are contrary to democracy and are understood as a form of radicalism. The escalation of conflicts eventually became more widespread and more profound due to the state's failure to manage the transition phase of democracy included in the failed state, so there were consequences for the state that lost the legitimacy of its citizens (Rotberg, 2002). Ultimately, globalisation and democratisation in each country can impact each interdependent country's policy and security map.

Violent extremism has an impact on the national security sector. Buzan (1991) divides the security sector into political, military, economic, and social. The military approach is only one part of a national security system. Socio-cultural and religious relations are necessary for understanding the dynamics of threats and the interaction of security factors. The culture of violence is often typologized as latent conflict because it is deeply rooted, especially in demographically and

ethnically divided societies (Mukhtar, 2011).

In the West Java region in 2021, Indonesian Politics Research and Consulting (IPRC) conducted a public perception survey related to the tolerance condition in West Java. In the religious aspect, the level of tolerance towards citizens related to the organisation and construction of houses of worship of other religions is relatively high, but in several other more personal aspects, such as congratulating other religious celebrations, helping to build places of worship of other religions, and attending other religious events, it is relatively low. Recently, it has been suggested that there are inconsistencies with Islamic teachings at Al-Zaytun Islamic Boarding School situated in Indramayu Regency, and in the view of several institutions, Al-Zaytun Islamic Boarding School can give birth to radical, extreme, and intolerant movements, so it needs to be examined as a closed and exclusive community and ecosystem that has a way of life that is separate from society in general (Ramadhan, 2023). According to the data, the Religious Harmony Index in 2021 in West Java has increased by 7 points, from 72.71 points to 79.72 points in 2022, while in 2019, it was 64.41% (Humas JABAR, 2023).

Related to this, this paper tries to look at the characteristics of West Java society in viewing tolerance that can lead to acts of intolerance and result in violent extremism in West Java Province related to national security issues. The dynamics of security issues include changing national security from state-centred security to people-centred security. The consequence of this shift is that security becomes a comprehensive matter, and security management will require

cooperation between actors and security institutions (Darmono, 2010). Research from the Student Creativity Programme (PKM) Research Team of the University of Education Indonesia found that out of 100 students, 44 high school students in Bandung City indicated radicalism. In general, the method was carried out with mixed methods where a distribution of 35 percent was suspected of being indicated by a religiously radical type, which was divided into 15 percent with radical characteristics of ISIS and Al-Qaeda, 4 percent with ideological radical characteristics, 2 percent with indications of armed criminal radicalism, and 15 percent with characteristics of hardline religious movements physically. The study also stated that social media propaganda is one of the most significant sources of radicalism in Bandung City (Maulana, 2021).

Looking at the characteristics of West Java society in viewing tolerance that can lead to acts of intolerance and result in violent extremism in West Java Province is related to the national security sector, which is not only the aim of securing the state but also the safety of citizens and humanity. Security comprises state defence, public security, and human security (Darmono, 2010). From the description above, this paper will discuss two things, namely: first, looking at the characteristics of the people of West Java on the issue of tolerance that leads to acts of intolerance and violence in West Java from several indicators; and second, the relationship between tolerance and violence in West Java.

This paper suggests that the rise of intolerance can lead to violent extremism and affect national security. It also proposes that studying potential radicalism can help identify alternative

policies to prevent it and protect national security in the future.

Violent Extremism Framework

Violent extremism is an idea formulation that looks at reality and how it should be. Therefore, it is crucial to recognise that violent extremism goes beyond physical violence, as many definitions include acts of terror. This helps prevent confusion between violent extremism and terrorism (Striegher, 2015). Expressions of violent extremism are, in my opinion, radical and mainly related to politics. The main character is intolerant of interests or opinions that do not align with theirs (Sothers, 2013).

Mandel (in Pick et al., 2010) calls radicalization almost similar to extremism. In this case, radicalization means a change in the degree of extremism expressed by individuals or groups. Radicalization generally refers to a process often called “what goes on before the bomb goes off” (Sedgwick, 2010). Violent extremism tends to be hostile to pluralism and more authoritarian, anti-democratic, and uncompromising. With this characteristic, extremists isolate themselves from conversations with non-extremists and at least passively support violence to achieve their political goals (Schmid, 2013).

Most terrorism experts make a distinction between cognitive extremism and violent extremism. Cognitive extremism is defined as political beliefs that differ from those supported by existing state authorities, and individual freedoms must be limited to collective goals, including the mass murder of those who potentially disagree with the program or goal (Midlarsky, 2011). While violent extremism is the use of violence to realise or advance these beliefs (Guhl, 2018),

This view implies that while extremist groups may not use violence at any given point, political changes can lead to violent methods (Schmid, 2014). Furthermore, within violent extremism in the last two decades, counterterrorist tools in many countries have developed a security-based view where policies and practices focus on prevention and rehabilitation, which has been adopted worldwide (Clubb et al., 2022).


Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) is an effort to counter violent extremism in various forms. The implementation of CVE efforts occurs across three levels: primary, secondary, and tertiary. Primary efforts focus on preventing the radicalization of specific populations. Secondary efforts are focused on individuals at risk of radicalization or showing early signs of it. Finally, tertiary prevention targets radicalised individuals. In other words, CVI covers the gamut of prevention from upstream to downstream rehabilitation and reintegration (Birdwell, 2020; Clubb et al., 2022; Harris-Hogan et al., 2016; Raets, 2022). Radicalism operates in a highly structured way, with four distinct layers (Moskalenko & McCauley, 2021), which are as follows:

Based on the pyramid above, ordinary people who are neutral on an issue are classified at the bottom layer (*neutral/innert*), then go up to the third layer, where activists who are concerned about an issue and are ready to take action against the background of their goals are classified in this layer (*sympathizers/activists*). Going up to the second layer, some individuals are categorised as "radical," where the individual is ready to take an action that even has to break the law (*justifiers or radicals*). Then, finally, the topmost layer is a layer classified as *extremist radicalism*. In this layer, individuals are ready to carry out radical actions even if they have to kill unarmed civilians (*terrorists*).

National Security Framework

In the 1990s, a new national security system format was developed using security-related regulations (Muradi, 2009). This approach, known as *security sector reform*, is no longer limited to the *state centre* (Mukhtar, 2017; Muradi, 2009). Thus, there is an impact on the spectrum and concept of security, which becomes broader: First, the focus is limited to territorial security and the human security dimension. Second, there is a shift from security through a military approach to a sustainable development approach, such as the state's national security policy in combating terrorism (Mukhtar, 2009). According to Born & Flupi (in Perwita, 2006), *security sector reform* has three conceptions in a democratic state system: First, security sector reform is a tool for ensuring domestic and international stability. Second, security sector reform will encourage a political-economic climate. Third, there is an increase in

Figure 1. Radicalism Action Pyramid



Source: Results of Data Processing by Moskalenko & Mc Cauley (2021)

democratisation and the building of civil-military relations (Muradi, 2017) in harmony with civilian supremacy.

National security protects and maintains national interests through political, economic, and military means against internal and external threats (Praditya, 2016). National security is necessary for maintaining and defending the state's existence through economic, military, and political power and the development of diplomacy to protect the integrity of the state from threats from outside or within (Darmono, 2010). There are dimensions of security from traditional and non-traditional perspectives. The traditional approach emphasizes that security is a country's security that other countries' military can threaten, so it must be defended using its military power (Muradi, 2013; Mutimer, 1999).

Meanwhile, the non-traditional approach comprises various ideas: First, security focuses on state security and efforts to protect individuals and the environment. Second, the importance of knowing the sources of threats from within and outside Third, security studies are not only about the military sector but are broader, such as the economic and environmental sectors. Fourth, there is the development that in security studies, it is not only feeling threatened but also efforts to attack or dominate the environment (Buzan & Hensen, 2009). The table below lays out the differences in security dimensions between traditional and non-traditional approaches:

Table 1. Dimensions of Security between Traditional and Non-Traditional Approaches

<i>Security Dimension</i>	<i>Traditional Security Approach</i>	<i>Non-traditional Security Approaches</i>
<i>The Origin of Threat</i>	Threats come from outside the country	Threats come from inside and outside the country
<i>The Nature of Threat Changing Response</i>	Military Threats Military Approach	Threats are non-military Non-military approaches through law, social, economic, and diplomacy
<i>Changing Responsibility of Security</i>	State as the sole actor	Security actors are seen from the cooperation of individuals, organizations, and countries at the global level.
<i>Core Values of Security</i>	Security object is the sovereignty and territory of the state	Security objects are human rights, environment, social life, and human security.

Source: Processed from various sources

Method

In this paper, the method used is qualitative with a descriptive approach. Various articles, reports, news, and other literature are the source of data regarding violent extremism and national security issues. The data obtained is then analyzed so that there will be data relevant to this research's objectives. Through these methods, this article will investigate how the radicalization that emerges in West Java Province in the future can lead to violent extremism and disrupt national

security. Some of the data and sources in this article are the results of a survey from Indonesian Politics Research and Consulting in 2022-2023 related to tolerance, violence, and discrimination in West Java Province. Other sources are scientific articles that discuss national security and violent extremism in Indonesia and West Java.

Result and Discussion From Democracy to Tolerance in West Java

Democracy provides a participatory-egalitarian space for community groups to articulate their interests (Beetham, 2004). Democracy must provide space for differences for anyone, as long as applicable laws and regulations justify it. Democracy must also provide every citizen with the right to life, regardless of their socio-cultural and religious backgrounds (Sen, 1999). Blokland (in Hilmy, 2015) illustrates that applying the rights to freedom of speech, association, and assembly only sometimes runs smoothly in the Indonesian context. As part of an Eastern nation, the types and meanings understood in the Indonesian context differ from those understood by individualistic and liberal Western societies.


However, democracy has its own set of problems. One of the problems is that radical groups often benefit from a democratic political system that is not very favourable to democracy. Many radical groups promote specific religious beliefs and actively work to undermine Western democratic systems. Their campaigns often target members of the public to gain support for their cause. For example, some groups view the

democratic system as not adequately representing Islam because they do not believe Islam has a democratic term, which is the creation of human reason. Islam is considered to have preferential treatment compared to other religions, triggering a term used by radical groups called the revolt against God's sovereignty (Lee, 1994). In the Indonesian context, Hilmy (2010) mentioned that radicals' rejection of the democratic system is evident from the group's reluctance to fight through the political party system.

In the democratic space, *violent extremism* and intolerance threaten democracy, internal peace, and inter-group harmony. Violent extremism ultimately has an impact on weakening democratic governance. Several studies mention that in a country with mature democracies such as the United States and most of the European powers, the fear generated by this violent extremism movement will distort public debate, discredit moderate groups, empower political extremes, and polarise society (Byman, 2019).

Based on the description above, this can be related to how West Java sees the context of the democratic system and religion against the potential emergence of radicalism that rejects the democratic system and its impact on national security. The figure below shows the perceptions of West Java residents:

Figure 1. West Java Community Perceptions of Democracy & Religion



Source: Results of Data Processing by Researchers (2023)

Based on this figure, most people are generally satisfied with democracy and feel that the democratic system does not conflict with Islamic teachings. However, if we look at the percentage of dissatisfaction with democracy, another system replaces democracy, and since democracy is contrary to Islamic teachings, the percentage is not small either. In the future, this could potentially lead to the birth of radicalization that can lead to violent extremism in West Java in the context of views on the democratic system and religion. 23% expressed dissatisfaction with democracy, 17.6% agreed that another system replaces democracy, and 13.6% considered that democracy was contrary to Islamic teachings. From these data, there are some assumptions that democracy has failed to fulfil the people's wishes, related to the assumption that democracy is contrary to Islamic teachings, so there is a percentage of 13.6% who want democracy replaced with another system.

Democratisation in Indonesia has finally brought fresh air to Islamic political groups and Islamists who have always wanted to be involved in state politics to regulate the running of the wheels of

government and have ambitions to make Islam the basis of a formal state. In the name of religion, radicalization and intolerance often act arbitrarily against other groups as heretical and deviant sects (Setiabudi et al., 2022). Ekstremisme kekerasan ini pada akhirnya akan berkaitan dengan keamanan nasional di satu negara. In Indonesia itself, policies regarding the handling of radicalism and terrorism in the context of violent extremism have received much resistance from some Muslims (Hilmy, 2015). The rejection is related to the security approach, where the criticism of radical groups is based on the fact that many radical groups are treated arbitrarily, so the argument is that policies with a security approach will not be able to end radicalism (Hilmy, 2010).


From Tolerance to Violent Extremism

In this section, the social reality of religion becomes an understanding that must be shared related to the guarantee of the freedom to embrace their respective religions and hopefully that the community can coexist in diversity. As a society that does not live in a monoculture society, there is a demand to view other

religions as part of oneself, so one religion may isolate itself from interactions with other religious communities. However, during this expected condition, there is often an exclusive view in which every adherent of one religion will always recognise the truth of their religion, although the religion does not simply view that as a wrong act. This view can then give birth to the consequence that there are wrong views, so that, in the end, it can give birth to nature to deny views that are considered wrong. As a result, when the shift deepens, it will give birth to extreme exclusivism that gives birth to truth claims to one view and denies other views.

majority of people have the availability to implement these aspects, but they also see that the unwilling aspect also has a percentage that cannot be ignored. In the aspect of willingness to make friends, people who stated they were not willing amounted to 6.8%, and unwillingness to be neighbours amounted to 8.3%. Unwillingness to help neighbours amounted to 8.8%; unwillingness to engage in dialogue and deliberation activities amounted to 18.9%; and finally, unwillingness to hear advice from other religious leaders amounted to 34.9%. Based on these percentages, personal aspects strengthen when dealing with adherents of other religions. Exclusivism arises when there are questions about the willingness to move, deliberate, and listen to suggestions from other religious leaders (18.9% and 34.9%, respectively). This is related to the belief in one view and isolation from interaction with other religious communities. The nature of a society that does not live in a monoculture must be a common understanding for the community so that there is a pattern of interaction with the belief that each religion has its ways, and basically, there are similar patterns of principles such as truth, salvation, and also goodness.

Figure 2: Willingness of West Java Residents in Social Aspects towards Other Religions



Source: Results of Data Processing by Researchers (2023)


From the description above, applying attention to social aspects where there is a desire to coexist in community plurality is the main thing in everyday life. In the figure above, in the social aspect, there are five aspects discussed: the willingness to be friends, be a good neighbour, help neighbours, willingness to dialogue and also deliberate, and willingness to hear suggestions from other religious leaders. In West Java, the

Globally, the development of radicalization towards violent extremism now leads to religion, especially Islam. This is due to the identity crisis that led to reactions and resistance to the West, which then spread colonialization in the Muslim world and began to split the Muslim world into various nation-states (Mulyono & Mulyoto, 2017; Rijal, 2010). In essence, violent extremism seeks change and the replacement of a government in a society by using violent means.

From a religious point of view, it can be interpreted that radicalization that


leads to violent extremism is based on high religious fanaticism, so this is not infrequently used through violence against people who have different views or streams with the aim of actualizing the ideology that is adopted or believed to be forcibly accepted (Asrori, 2017; Maliki, 2020; Mustofa & Mahmudah, 2019). However, beyond this, radicalism is also rooted in the frictions that occur in society, producing separatism and anti-union movements (Ansori, 2015). Religious radicalization views religion as not only an ideological alternative but a theological and practical obligation that must be carried out simultaneously (Abdullah, 2016). The term radical religious sect is characterised by three trends: First, radicalization is a response to ongoing conditions. The response is generally born through evaluation, rejection, or even resistance. Rejection can be in the form of assumptions, ideas, institutions, or values that are seen as responsible for the continuation of the rejected conditions. Second, radicalization does not stop at rejection but rather is an attempt to replace one form of order with another. Third, fanaticism towards the teachings or ideology adopted means that there is an interpretation of the truth with other systems that will be replaced (Sambulah, 2010; Zada, 2002).

Figure 3: West Java residents' religious understanding of other religions



Source: Results of Data Processing by Researchers (2023)

Figure 4: Religious Practices of West Java Residents towards Other Religions



Source: Results of Data Processing by Researchers (2023)

From these two figures related to religious understanding and practice in West Java, it can be seen that the majority is in religious practice, with the unwillingness to assist with religious activities (62.2%), then the unwillingness to congratulate holidays (56%), invite to religious events, and attend religious

events, respectively, at 54.5% and 73.2%. The community's unwillingness in some aspects of religious practice impacts exclusivist views, so this is not a problem as long as it is still in the view of believing in religious truth. However, it will have a bad impact on the emergence of views to deny views considered wrong and actions against these views that have dire consequences for a diverse society.

The problem of radicalization and the birth of violent extremism requires prevention, rehabilitation, and reintegration efforts. As mentioned in the three Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) efforts, one of the applications consists of primary, secondary, and tertiary. Primary measures should focus on preventing radicalization. Secondary measures should be able to analyse and pay attention to individuals considered to be at risk of becoming radicalized. Tertiary is a form of prevention against radicalised individuals. Thus, CVE should be one aspect of the security approach as a form of mitigation from upstream to downstream between prevention, rehabilitation, and reintegration.

In addition, no primary approach can be used to eradicate radicalization in violent extremism because it is long-term and multidimensional, aiming for institutional strengthening, development, democracy, and security (Muradi, 2015). Today, radicalization and terrorism are often a combination of military and non-military threats, with a combination of conventional and asymmetric threats using cyber devices or other technologies. State defense development policy in terms of soft power must be directed at increasing higher deterrence by fostering defense capabilities through various things such as intelligence capabilities, empowerment in the region, and

diplomacy capabilities that remind us that the problem of violent extremism is increasingly transnational. Non-military defence is vital to countering radicalization and terrorism.

State institutions regulated by legislation must build a non-military defence posture to counteract non-military threats (Muradi, 2017a). The non-military defence posture consists of various dimensions such as ideology, politics, economy, socio-culture, public safety, and good legislation at local, regional, or national levels. However, further than that, the management of national resources and infrastructure or the development of non-military defense capabilities such as early vigilance capabilities, diplomacy capabilities, state defense capabilities, science, technology, social, economic, and moral must be a comprehensive concern for the state to ward off the issue of radicalism in the future.

Therefore, the government's political will and the awareness of all stakeholders of the vulnerability of the state defence environment in the face of threats to radicalism are the starting points for developing a sustainable Indonesian culture of peace. The main attention given to the development of non-military forces is given to the greater potential of defence forces regarding human resources and existing infrastructure (Muradi, 2018).

Conclusion

From the description above, the security approach can be summarized in three ways, namely the expansion of the concept of security, which is not limited to military aspects but includes other aspects. In this section, the subject of security becomes essential to determine.

Secondly, there is a focus on state security and the concentration on which the expansion of the concept of security is debated in this regard. Thirdly, there is an emphasis on the main security subject, which places humans as vulnerable subjects in the face of military and non-military threats. In some developing countries, human security is often threatened not from outside but from the state government itself. The tendency of the state to be unable to fulfil its obligation to provide security from fear of radicalization, which has an impact on violent extremism, is a threat to personal security, which, in some cases that occurred in West Java, is still a threat to human security and can also be a threat to national security. From some of the survey results above, several aspects have the potential for radicalization, such as satisfaction with democracy, religious understanding and practice of other religions, and social aspects of daily life with other religions. Some percentages show relatively high numbers, so in the future, the government must be able to implement policies or strategic steps to suppress the possibility of radicalization and the potential for violent extremism to emerge. Effective security policies need further attention to counteract these potentials.

The threat of radicalization in West Java Province still has the potential to emerge and endanger human security. The government, in this case, the state, must then be present in deepening the concept of security, which is oriented towards adequate national security and is not only based on the state's military power. The potential for radicalization cannot be ignored, considering its impact on violent extremism. Looking at some of the data results that have been presented in three aspects: democracy and religion, social

aspects of society towards adherents of other religions, and religious understanding and practices, which produce data that are pretty significant and cannot be ignored. In this case, awareness of human security must begin to be considered at the regional level to specifically accommodate human security and national security.

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