

Threat Perception in Indonesia: Time Series Analysis of Defense Doctrines Between 1991 - 2023

Priyanto Priyanto^{1*}, Mujaddid Akbar², Fauzia Gustarina Cempaka Timur²

¹Total War Strategy Program, Faculty of Defense Strategy, Republic Indonesia Defense University

²Asymmetric Warfare Program, Faculty of Defense Strategy, Republic Indonesia Defense University

*Correspondence Email: priyantosuharto@idu.ac.id

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Abstract: *National Defense Doctrine is a teaching about the fundamental principles of national defense. Defense doctrine is very important as a guideline in administering national defense. Defense doctrine is greatly influenced by developments in the global, regional, and national strategic environment, which could potentially give rise to threats, whether military, non-military, or hybrid. Defense doctrine will continue to evolve according to developments in the strategic environment and the dynamics of these threats. How to assess the nature of threats and the basic principles in overcoming these threats, as stated in the national defense doctrine from 1991 to 2023, is certainly something important to know in order to identify the various types of threats that have emerged or will emerge in the future. The research approach used by researchers is a qualitative approach using secondary data sources in the form of documents. From the research results, it can be concluded that, first, the National Defense Doctrine has undergone changes five times, namely since 1991, 2007, 2014, 2015, and 2023. Second, there are a number of similarities and differences between existing defense doctrines. Third, the Reformation Era had a significant impact on changes to the country's defense and security system. Fourth, synergy between defense components is very important in the implementation of defense.*

Keywords: *National Defense Doctrine; Defense Components; Defense Posture.*

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Introduction

Global geopolitics is currently faced with the challenges of situations and conditions where changes occur very quickly, full of uncertainty and with a high level of complexity and ambiguity. What is referred to as Volatility, Uncertainty, Complexity, and Ambiguity (VUCA) runs parallel with increasingly massive technological advances that require reinterpretation and redefinition of the concept of future threats and how to deal with them (Sarjito et al., 2024). In addition, the level of interdependence between various international actors, both state and non-state actors, is also getting higher, which causes the complexity and ambiguity of threats to also increase and is often difficult to understand with old methods, so adjustments are needed in dealing with the new threat dynamics (Hendra & Ningrum, 2024).

Every effort to form a state automatically implies an awareness of defense. Therefore, defense is considered an absolute requirement that must be owned by every country that wants to maintain its sovereignty and territorial integrity while protecting the entire nation from all forms of threats both from within and outside the country. Without an adequate defense, the threat to the existence of the country will be greater (Wiranto, 2020).

At the same time, the potential for conflict and tension is also increasingly open, especially in relation to access to resources, technology, and also the struggle for global and regional power influence (Sartono et al., 2019). Power is no longer just in the context of conventional military and economic dominance but covers a wider spectrum and is interconnected with each other, including aspects of history, culture,

science, and technological mastery. The dichotomy between military and non-military threats also seems to be increasingly blurred, marked by the emergence of a discourse on hybrid warfare that combines conventional and non-conventional warfare models (Deni, 2021).

Facing the reality of these complex threats, the national defense system must be built by taking into account the nature of actual and potential threats as a result of the dynamics of the global, regional, and national strategic environment (Kusuma et al., 2021). Defense strategies must be projected to deal with various types of threats, not only on land, sea, and air, but also in cyberspace and outer space. Modern warfare will be characterized by a combination of conventional and non-conventional conflict elements (Sa'diyah & Vinata, 2016).

The defense strategy itself must refer to the State Defense Doctrine. According to Andi Widjajanto (2010), the State Defense Doctrine is the basic principle that provides direction for the management of defense resources to achieve national security objectives. Meanwhile, in the State Defense Doctrine 2023 document, the state defense doctrine is defined as a teaching on the fundamental principles of state defense that is believed to be true, extracted from the value of the nation's struggle and past experience to serve as a guideline for the implementation of state defense faced with the dynamics of change in the frame of national interests (Danga, 2023). Thus, each country's defense doctrine also has different characteristics as well as its defense strategy.

For Indonesia, the State Defense Doctrine serves as a doctrine at the strategic level that is used as a reference in

the formulation of military defense doctrine and non-military defense doctrine (Widjajanto, 2005). At the operational level, the military defense doctrine in this case is the TNI doctrine "Tri Dharma Eka Karma" (Tridek), which serves as a guideline for the Army doctrine "Kartika Eka Paksi," the Navy doctrine "Jalesveva Jayamahe," and the Air Force doctrine "Swa Bhuwana Paksa." The State Defense Doctrine is also a strategic guideline for non-military defense that is elaborated in the non-military defense policies of each government agency outside the defense sector as the main element, in accordance with the form and nature of the threats faced by being supported by other elements of the nation's power (Alfajri et al., 2019).

Based on the 1945 Constitution Article 30 paragraph (2), the defense system adopted by the Indonesian Nation is the Universal People's Defense and Security System. Universal people's defense and security are all universal defense efforts whose implementation is based on awareness of the rights and obligations of citizens and confidence in their own strength (Supriyatno, 2014). Universal national defense involves all citizens, utilizing all national resources, and the entire territory of the country in the national defense effort, which is the basis for the implementation of a universal people's defense and security system (Indrawan, 2015). Thus, the essence of the State Defense Doctrine is a guideline on how to apply the principles of universality, populism, and territoriality in building, fostering, deploying, and using all components and elements of state defense at all levels, ranging from strategic to operational to tactical levels (Hidayat, 2015).

The defense doctrine itself in its embodiment continues to evolve,

adjusting to various aspects of the development of the global, regional, and national strategic environment. In addition, it also takes into account the dynamics of emerging threats that continue to grow and become more complex. Therefore, this study intends to analyze the State Defense Doctrine, especially covering two aspects, namely how the view of the nature of the threat and how the conception of the implementation of state defense itself in dealing with the threat from time to time. In this case, it can be specifically reviewed from the document on the Indonesian State Defense Doctrine that has been issued since 1991 until 2023.

Method

In this study, researchers used a qualitative approach, which is one of the scientific methods widely used in research in the field of social science. Qualitative research is a scientific study that aims to understand a phenomenon in a natural social context by promoting a process of in-depth communication interaction between the researcher and the phenomenon under study (Sudaryono, 2021).

With regard to data sources, researchers use secondary data sources collected from various sources. Sugiyono (2016) argues that secondary data is data provided by data sources to data seekers/researchers indirectly, for example, through other people or through documents. In this study, researchers quoted from various documents related to the State Defense Doctrine as well as academic texts or literature, journals, brochures, and so on as material for analysis of the object of research, in this case the Indonesian State Defense Doctrine.

Result and Discussion

State Security Defense Doctrine 1991

In the history of the development of Indonesia's defense and security doctrine, the first official state defense doctrine was issued by the Ministry of Defense and Security of the Republic of Indonesia through the Decree of the Minister of Defense and Security Number: KEP/17/X/1991 dated 5 October 1991 on the State Defense and Security Doctrine of the Republic of Indonesia. The decree was signed by the then Minister of Defense and Security, General TNI L.B. Moerdani.

Although the long history of Indonesia's struggle, both before and after independence, has given birth to the concept of the Universal People's Defense and Security System as stipulated in the 1945 Constitution, the first formal doctrine of state defense and security was only contained in the State Security Defense Doctrine in 1991. This doctrine was also the last State Defense and Security Doctrine before entering the 1998 Reformation Era. It should also be noted that previously there was indeed a Doctrine of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia (ABRI), namely Catur Dharma Eka Karma (Cadek), which was initiated in November 1966. In fact, the Cadek Doctrine was also revised during the era of ABRI Commander General TNI L.B. Moerdani in 1988 (Said, 2002).

In the 1991 State Security Defense Doctrine, the nature of threats is interpreted as everything that can negatively affect the achievement of national goals and the survival of the nation and state, which in its manifestation can be in the form of threats, interference, obstacles, and challenges, both from outside and within the country. The nature of threats covers a fairly broad spectrum that is classified in the form of

low-intensity threats such as criminal crimes, sabotage, terror, and subversion, and high-intensity threats in the form of armed rebellion, limited war, and open war, both with conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction (Samego, 2001).

In that era, the understanding of security was interpreted in a relatively narrow sense and emphasized domestic threats. Meanwhile, the meaning of defense refers to threats originating from abroad. Threats coming from abroad are in the form of military invasions, and threats coming from within the country can be in the form of community riots caused by socio-economic disparities, threats of violent community riots caused by certain groups to impose their interests unconstitutionally, threats of armed rebellion in the nature of separatism, and threats of armed rebellion caused by groups who want to change the state ideology and form a new state (Bakri, 2009).

In this 1991 Doctrine, the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia (ABRI) had a very important role in almost every aspect of life. In this era, the Dwifungsi ABRI was also implemented, where ABRI, in addition to carrying out defense and security functions, also carried out socio-political functions. With this Dwifungsi, ABRI is expected to play a role as an initial response and countermeasure to any threats that arise as well as a pioneer, dynamiser, and stabiliser in the entire life of society, nation, and state.

The essence of state security defense is the resistance of the people to face every form of threat to the safety of the nation and state. The characteristics of this people's resistance include, First, populism, namely the participation of all people, citizens in accordance with their abilities and expertise; Second,

universality, namely the entire power of the nation and state is able to mobilise itself to overcome every form of threat from outside and from within the country. Third, territoriality, namely the entire territory of the country is the focus of resistance and the entire environment is utilised to support every form of resistance continuously.

The 1991 doctrine also explicitly divides two broad categories of forces, namely forces to carry out armed resistance and forces to carry out unarmed resistance. The power to carry out armed resistance is built up as the TNI universe, which consists of real and potential reinforcements. Real reinforcements are real forces that are built up as ABRI, which consists of two layers of strength, namely ready forces that are continuously in active service and reserve forces that are only activated when needed without having to carry out general mobilization. Meanwhile, potential reinforcements include all people's energy, national infrastructure, and facilities that have been prepared to carry out armed resistance with the ability to carry out the functions of public order, people's protection, people's security, and people's resistance. Potential reinforcements will only be activated through general mobilization if needed to carry out a universal people's war. The power to carry out unarmed resistance is all people's energy outside the TNI universe that can be mobilized to support the implementation of a universal people's war according to their respective professional fields (Indonesia, 1991).

In the conduct of warfare, this doctrine divides the field of defense into three layers: the first layer, the Buffer Defense Field, is outside the boundary line of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and the air layer above it. The second layer is

the Main Defense Area, which is planned as the decisive field of operations from the EEZ to the territorial sea. The third layer, Areas of Resistance, is located in the land strategic compartments, including the waters of the archipelago and the air layer above it. At certain locations and distances from the defense fields and the base areas of defense and resistance, logistics support centers are prepared. This division of the three defense theaters will continue to be used until today with some adjustments to the terminology. From the 1991 Doctrine, it has actually been seen that decentralized logistics support centers are very important in carrying out universal warfare, although in its implementation it has not been able to be built optimally and still tends to be centralized.

Normatively, this doctrine also explains how the stages are carried out in facing enemy attacks from abroad and facing domestic threats. Actions taken to deal with enemy attacks from abroad are carried out in stages; first, creating conditions to prevent the onset of war through strategic intelligence activities and diplomacy. Second, thwarting enemy invasions by paralyzing and destroying the enemy since preparation in its territory, on the way, and after landing. Thirdly, weakening and undermining the power of the enemy who managed to occupy the archipelago. Fourth, destroying and throwing the enemy out of the archipelago. Fifth, restoring security and saving the people.

Meanwhile, actions to overcome threats to internal security are basically carried out by first creating conditions to prevent disruption of domestic security stability. Second, conduct repressive activities to enforce the law and quell armed rebellion and other security disturbances. Third, restoring security and saving the community.

The 1991 State Security Defense Doctrine is relatively more concise than the State Defense Doctrines that came after it. This is, of course, inseparable from the differences in threats and the dynamics of the strategic environment that continue to evolve from time to time, both globally, regionally, and nationally. In addition, increasingly massive technological advances also influence the threat perception of each country.

State Defense Doctrine of the Republic of Indonesia 2007

Post-Reformation 1998, there have been many changes in the constitutional system and the socio-political life of society, including in terms of defense and security. In the reformation era, the Indonesian National Police (Polri) is no longer attached to the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI), or previously known as ABRI, but is an independent institution that is directly responsible to the President. Polri's main task is to maintain public order and security, so it no longer directly carries out the function of national defense, which is the main task of the TNI. The interpretation of the meaning of security continues to be a discourse that has not yet reached an agreement among stakeholders in the field of defense and security.

In the early years of the reformation era, a number of new laws and regulations relating to defense and security were born, including Law No. 3 of 2002 on State Defense, Law No. 2 of 2002 on the Indonesian National Police, and Law No. 34 of 2004 on the Indonesian National Armed Forces. In terms of the State Defense Doctrine, the 1991 State Security Defense Doctrine needs to be readjusted in the face of potential threats and the dynamics of the strategic environment, including domestic

conditions. The adjustment of the Defense Doctrine is contained in Minister of Defense Regulation Number: Per/23/M/XII/2007 on the State Defense Doctrine of the Republic of Indonesia signed by Minister of Defense Juwono Sudarsono on 28 December 2007 (Hardianto, 2021).

The 2007 State Defense Doctrine is the first State Defense Doctrine born in the Reformation Era. Various adjustments were made, including the naming of the doctrine itself, which was originally referred to as the State Security Defense Doctrine, since the 2007 Doctrine is specifically referred to as the State Defense Doctrine and no longer uses the word security. This is related to the separation of TNI and Polri, where Polri is responsible for the security aspect, although in fact the concept of security itself is much broader than the meaning of security intended in the main task of Polri, which is more inclined only to public security and order.

The identification of threats is the main factor that forms the basis for the design of the National Defense System. In this 2007 Doctrine, threats are classified into types, sources, and actors. Based on the type, national defense threats are classified into military threats and nonmilitary threats. When viewed from the source, the threats faced by Indonesia can come from outside Indonesia or transnational crimes, both committed by state actors and non-state actors, as well as threats arising within the country. The identification of threat sources has been more detailed and developed when compared to the previous doctrine, considering the increasingly complex dynamics of the strategic environment and the development of technology, which has led to the absurdity of conventional state boundaries.

From the limitations on threats as mentioned above, threats categorized as military threats can be in the form of aggression or invasion, territorial violations, espionage, sabotage, acts of armed terror, armed rebellion, threats to sea or air security, and civil war, or what is often called communal conflict. Non-military threats are essentially threats that use non-military factors that are considered to have the ability to endanger or have implications for threatening the sovereignty of the state, the integrity of the state territory, and the safety of the entire nation. Non-military threats can have ideological, political, economic, social, information, and technological dimensions as well as public safety dimensions. Non-military threats can also occur simultaneously with military threats, thus requiring accuracy both in identifying and in handling them (Widjajanto, 2006).

In an effort to realize and maintain the entire territory of the Republic of Indonesia as a defense unit, the 2007 Doctrine states that the implementation of defense is carried out through the functions of deterrence, action, and recovery. The deterrence function is an effort to prevent and eliminate every threat, both from outside and arising domestically. The enforcement function is the integration of military and nonmilitary defense efforts to face and overcome all forms of threats, both external and domestic. Meanwhile, the recovery function has an inward and outward scope, which, in essence, is how to restore the state's security conditions that have been disrupted due to security chaos, both militarily and non-militarily.

This doctrine affirms that the success of the Universal People's War is determined by the unity of the TNI-Rakyat (People). Therefore, the development of

defense and the deployment of forces have a territorial dimension and are held with the aim of building and maintaining TNI-Rakyat unity. Similar to the 1991 Doctrine, the 2007 Doctrine explains that the preparation of the country's territory as a defense field is held based on strategic estimates of possible threats faced and projected in three layers of defense fields, namely the Buffer Defense Field, the Main Defense Field, and the Resistance Area.

As stipulated in Law No. 3 of 2002 on National Defense, the 2007 Doctrine classifies defense components into three elements, namely the Main Component, in this case the TNI, the Reserve Component, and the Support Component. The Reserve Component is formed from national resources that are prepared to be deployed through mobilization to enlarge and strengthen the strength and capability of the TNI as the Main Component. The Supporting Component is a national resource other than the Main Component and Reserve Component that can be used to increase the strength and capability of the Main Component and Reserve Component.

Military defense relies on the TNI as the main component, supported by reserve components and supporting components that are prepared and developed to face military threats. TNI dynamizes military defense as the main layer of state defense to carry out Military Operations for War (MOW) and Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). Military defense in carrying out MOW is based on political decisions through the deployment of forces by the President. In carrying out MOW, TNI develops military strategies in accordance with the nature of the threats faced by taking into account Indonesia's geography and available defense resources. MOW, organized by

TNI, is packaged in the integration of three dimensions (*Tri Matra Terpadu*).

The use of reserve components and supporting components is adjusted to the weight of the threat faced. The Reserve Component is prepared to enlarge and strengthen the Main Component. The status of the Reserve Component changes to combatant after being mobilized, and its status as a combatant ends through demobilization. Supporting components are utilized to enhance the capabilities of the main component and reserve component.

In the face of non-military threats, the organization of non-military defense is structured into civil defense to prevent and face threats with ideological, political, economic, socio-cultural, and technological dimensions. In the framework of facing threats with public safety dimensions, civil defense is implemented through security functions, including mitigating the impact of natural and human-induced disasters, humanitarian operations, SAR, outbreaks of disease and famine, disruptions to power plants and transportation, and strikes.

The essence of non-military defense is defense through efforts without the use of force of arms by empowering ideological, political, economic, socio-cultural, and technological factors. Citizen involvement in non-military defense is manifested through profession, knowledge and expertise, and intelligence in national development and in the implementation of national defense, either directly or indirectly. In the implementation of government functions, non-military defense is within the scope of the functions of the Department/Non-Departmental Government Institution (NDGI) through the implementation of national development designed by

integrating welfare interests and defense interests.

The 2007 doctrine views that war between countries with a "one-on-one" pattern will be increasingly abandoned and shifted to a pattern of multinational forces or allied forces against a smaller country. Within an active defensive framework, Indonesia's outward-facing defense is non-aggressive and non-expansive to the extent that state sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the safety of the entire nation and national interests are not threatened. Defense with an active defensive nature is the basis for not being bound or participating in a defense pact with other countries.

TNI assistance tasks through the involvement of TNI forces in the functions of government agencies outside the defense function, including world peace duties, are carried out in the MOOTW pattern. The implementation is at the request of the party that requires assistance. Specifically for the task of world peace, the involvement of TNI forces is carried out based on the political decision of the government and under the mandate of the United Nations, or on regional agreements that are binding for peace tasks in the region.

In the face of military threats in the form of aggression, the defense strategy prepared is a layered defense strategy within the framework of total war by placing military defense as the core of power. It is implemented with MOW through the deployment and utilization of all national forces that integrate armed forces and people's resistance in an integrated manner.

In the face of military threats that are not aggression, defenses, both military and nonmilitary, must be able to play a strategy to quickly resolve them so that they do not have an impact on widespread

aspects of life. The state defense system in dealing with conditions when the state faces actual threats in the form of non-military threats places the non-military defense layer as the main element. The non-military defense layer, which is the main element, is played by the department/NDGI whose functions are directly related to or most dominant in the non-military threat faced.

State Defense Doctrine 2014

In 2014, the Ministry of Defense issued a new defense doctrine through Minister of Defense Regulation No. 25/2014 signed by Minister of Defense Purnomo Yusgiantoro. In this doctrine, the nature of threats is categorized into actual threats and potential threats. Actual threats are real threats, in the form of armed separatists, terrorism, radical groups, communal conflicts, theft of natural resources such as illegal fishing, illegal logging, and illegal mining, as well as natural disasters. While potential threats are the seeds of threats that can arise at any time, such as border disputes, national disintegration, intergroup conflicts, social unrest, efforts to replace the Pancasila ideology, and so on.

As with the 2007 Doctrine, the threat itself can be classified into types, sources, and actors. Based on the type, national defense threats are classified into military threats and nonmilitary threats. Seen from the source, threats can come from abroad and threats that arise domestically. Meanwhile, based on the actor, it can be carried out by state actors or non-state actors.

Military threats are threats using organized armed forces that are considered to have the ability to endanger the sovereignty of the state, the territorial integrity of the state, and the safety of the entire nation. Military threats can be in the

form of aggression and non-aggression military threats. More specifically, forms of aggression can be classified as:

- Invasion is an attack by the armed forces of another country on the territory of the Republic of Indonesia.
- Bombardment in the form of the use of other weapons carried out by the armed forces of other countries against the territory of the Republic of Indonesia.
- Blockade of a port, coast, or airspace of the Republic of Indonesia by the armed forces of another country.
- Attack by elements of the Armed Forces of another country against elements of TNI land units, sea units, or air units.
- An element of the armed forces of another country that is within the territory of the Republic of Indonesia based on a treaty whose actions or presence are contrary to the provisions in the treaty.
- The act of a country that allows the use of its territory by another country as a preparation area for aggression against the Republic of Indonesia.
- Sending armed groups or mercenaries by other countries to commit acts of violence in the territory of the Republic of Indonesia.

Military threats that are not aggression can come from outside or from within the country. Military threats in the form of non-aggression can be classified as, among others, violations of Indonesian territory committed by other countries, armed rebellion, sabotage, espionage, acts of armed terror, security threats in the sea and air of Indonesia's national jurisdiction, and communal conflicts.

Non-military threats are essentially threats using non-military factors that can endanger or have implications for threatening state sovereignty, the

territorial integrity of the Republic of Indonesia, and the safety of the nation. Non-military threats can have ideological, political, economic, social, information, technological, and public safety dimensions. Nonmilitary threats can also occur simultaneously with military threats, thus requiring accuracy both in identifying and in handling them.

In this doctrine, the nature of threats is beginning to be realized more widely, where technological advances that are developing so fast at the same time also bring new threats that must be watched out for. The actual threat in the field of technology is due to the misuse of technology by certain parties by using technological capabilities to carry out criminal acts such as cybercrime, banking, wiretapping, and copyright piracy. Another form is the use of social networks to spread false information and opinions that can encourage politically motivated social movements. More technically, in the internet world, there are often site break-ins carried out by crackers (malicious hackers), stealing data or just looking.

Technological threats can also occur in the form of the spread of viruses, as well as the theft of Indonesia's biological resource rights, both legally and illegally. Illegally, it can occur through smuggling to be developed in their country, while legally it is done through careless research cooperation so that the results are not reported, due to weak supervision or due to limited technology to monitor.

Threats in the dimension of public safety are caused by natural or man-made disasters, transport accidents, and social problems. Threats with a legislative dimension are threats that originate from the juridical formulation of a legislative norm due to negligence or deliberate

factors in the process of forming and interpreting its substance.

Escalation of military threats can arise due to both internal and external threats. The escalation of external military threats moves quickly and dynamically. This can lead to war involving some or all components of the nation. The escalation begins from peaceful conditions to conflict conditions, both on a small, medium, and large scale. If the conflict cannot be resolved through diplomacy, it can develop into war, either limited war or total war. This escalation is not always sequential but can happen from a peaceful situation directly jumping to a medium-scale conflict or directly to a limited war, even directly to total war.

The escalation of military threats from within begins with civil order, can escalate into a civil emergency, then into a military emergency based on the political decision of the state. The escalation of nonmilitary threats is adjusted to the types and forms of threats that will affect regional conditions. Threat escalation starts from low, medium, and high conditions. The escalation that occurs may not be sequential but directly related to conditions that require the handling of all components of the nation. Determination of high escalation is carried out by institutions that have authority over national security.

The 2014 Doctrine asserts that although Indonesia will eventually reach a high level of progress, the universal model remains a strategic option to be developed by placing citizens as subjects of national defense in accordance with their respective roles. As with the 2007 Doctrine, in the 2014 Doctrine, efforts to realize and maintain the entire territory of the Republic of Indonesia as a defense unit are organized in the functions of deterrence, action, and recovery.

When the implementation of Military Operations for War (MOW) does not achieve success, to maintain the survival and existence of the Republic of Indonesia, a protracted war is carried out, which is essentially a continuation of state defense efforts. In the range of national security conditions with a low-intensity conflict spectrum, the military defense function, namely the TNI, is involved in conducting military operations other than war (MOOTW). Handling in the form of MOOTW is based on state policy and political decisions. In overcoming social threats such as natural disaster management, refugees, providing humanitarian assistance, and assisting search and rescue, TNI involvement to achieve speed of action can be done while waiting for state policies and political decisions.

In regional issues that lead to greater unrest, regional leaders can request directly to the main component in accordance with applicable legislation. In the spectrum of conflict, when the state security condition is at a critical level, the government imposes a state of emergency, ranging from civil emergency to military emergency or state of war. The involvement of reserve components and supporting components to enlarge the strength of the main component in the face of war conditions can be done by mobilization. In a state of military emergency and a state of war, in addition to carrying out the function of state defense based on political decisions and applicable laws and regulations, the TNI can take over government functions in the area where the state of military emergency is imposed or the area declared as a state of war.

Nonmilitary defense functions are involved both in peacetime and in times of military emergency and state of war. In

peacetime, the involvement of non-military defense functions is carried out by ministries/institutions outside the defense sector in accordance with their main roles and tasks. In times of military emergency and state of war, the involvement of nonmilitary defense functions can be involved through mobilization in order to strengthen and enlarge the strength of the TNI as the main component.

In conditions of threats that can endanger state sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the safety of the entire nation, ministries/institutions cooperate with all national forces. Ministries/Institutions, in accordance with their respective duties and functions, take steps to overcome, assisted by other related elements of national power. The use of the main component in assisting non-military threats is carried out if there are state policies and political decisions, except for threats with a public safety dimension.

The implementation of warfare is essentially the arrangement of a defense system that includes the preparation of strength, preparation of the country's territory as a defense mandala (zone), preparation of defense logistics, implementation of warfare, and recovery of the impact of damage caused by warfare. The preparation of forces is carried out by the government early and continuously through the development of national resources to become a defense force. The defense force is organized into the Main Component, namely the TNI, as well as the Reserve Component and Supporting Component.

As with the previous doctrine but with different terms, the preparation of the country's territory as a defense mandala is projected in three layers of defense mandalas, namely the Outer

Defense Mandala, which is the foremost layer, namely the defense mandala outside the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and the airspace above it. The Main Defense Mandala is the core layer of the defense mandala from the EEZ to the territorial sea, seabed, land, and airspace above it, which becomes the mandala of war. The Inner Defense Mandala is the third layer located in the rear areas outside the war mandala, including the waters of the archipelago and the airspace above it, which is built and prepared as a base area for resistance to maintain the continuity of resistance.

The Ministry of Defense, in the face of military threats, prepares military defense in the form of the Main Component (TNI) to carry out Military Operations for War (MOW). The Ministry of Defense, assisted by relevant ministries, prepares nonmilitary defense to be transformed into military defense through mobilization into the Reserve Component in enlarging and strengthening the Main Component, as well as preparing Supporting Components that can directly or indirectly increase the strength and capability of the Main Component and Reserve Component.

In facing non-military threats, ministries/institutions outside the defense sector prepare the main elements in accordance with the form and nature of the non-military threats faced. The Main Component (TNI) acts as another element in non-military defense through Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), providing assistance to the main element. Meanwhile, the reserve components and supporting components that have been formed in the implementation of military defense are demobilized back to their respective institutions to become the main elements and other elements in non-military defense.

In military defense, TNI, as the main layer, carries out MOW tasks to deal with aggression. Military defense to carry out MOOTW tasks is carried out in two forms of activities, as a cornerstone TNI carries out MOOTW of combat and non-combat nature, as MOOTW assistance is carried out to provide assistance to the ministry/institution. Combat is carried out in the context of dealing with separatists, armed rebellion, terrorism, securing border areas, and world peace. Non-combat MOOTW is carried out for VVIP security and national vital object security. MOOTW for assistance tasks is carried out by the TNI as another element of the nation's power in assisting the main element. Forms of assistance include assistance to the regional government, assistance in securing state guests, assistance in overcoming disasters, SAR assistance, and assistance in securing shipping and aviation.

Non-military defense is the participation of ministries/institutions outside the defense sector in facing threats with ideological, political, economic, socio-cultural, technological, and public safety dimensions. The involvement of citizens in non-military defense is adjusted to their profession, knowledge, and expertise in ministry/institution by empowering national resources to support the implementation of national defense.

State Defense Doctrine 2015

In December 2015, the new Minister of Defense, Ryamizard Ryacudu, readjusted the State Defense Doctrine through Minister of Defense Regulation No. 38/2015. The 2015 Doctrine is almost the same as the 2014 Doctrine; there are only a few things that distinguish it from the previous doctrine, including the so-called hybrid threat. The doctrine explains that based on the identification of the

nature of threats that are very dynamic, it allows for the merging of various threats called hybrids. Therefore, the current and future forms of threats can be classified into three types, namely military threats, both armed and unarmed; non-military threats; and hybrid threats (KBG Sumudu Madutharanga, 2023).

As with the previous doctrine, threats can be classified into types, sources, and actors. Based on the type, defense threats are classified into military threats, nonmilitary threats, and hybrid threats. When viewed from the source, the threats faced by Indonesia can come from abroad and within the country. Meanwhile, based on actors, threats can be carried out by state actors and non-state actors.

In terms of military threats, the 2015 Doctrine also explains that military threats can take the form of military threats in the form of aggression and military threats in the form of non-aggression. Nonmilitary threats can originate from abroad and can also originate from within the country, carried out by state and non-state actors. Nonmilitary threats are classified into threats with dimensions such as ideology, politics, economy, socio-culture, public safety, technology, and legislation.

Hybrid threats are threats that are mixed in nature and are a combination of military and non-military threats. Hybrid threats, among others, combine conventional, asymmetric, terrorist, and cyber warfare and criminal threats that are diverse and dynamic. In addition to these various combinations of threats, hybrid threats can also be in the form of an integration of attacks between the use of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive (CBRNE) weapons and information warfare.

In terms of threat escalation, the 2015 doctrine also has similarities with the 2014 doctrine, both in terms of the escalation of external and internal military threats. Similarly, the escalation of non-military threats starts from low, medium, and high conditions. The escalation that occurs may not always be sequential but directly related to conditions that require the handling of all components of the nation. The new thing is related to the escalation of hybrid threats, which must be adjusted to the nature of hybrid threats that combine military and non-military threats. Threat escalation can follow the pattern of military threats starting from civil order, civil emergency, and military emergency conditions in accordance with the state's political decision so that its handling uses military defense patterns and is assisted by non-military defense. However, the escalation of hybrid threats under certain conditions can change from one escalation to another without going through the normal escalation stages according to the general provisions.

Meanwhile, in terms of the implementation of defense, it is also through the functions of deterrence, action, and recovery. What is new is the function of action in the face of hybrid threats that place military and nonmilitary forces in an integrated manner according to the nature of the threat faced by taking into account professional and proportional capabilities. Enforcement against hybrid threats is carried out with a military defense pattern that places the TNI as the main component, strengthened by the reserve component and supporting component, as well as cooperating with the ministry/institution outside the defense sector as the main element, supported by other elements of the nation's strength.

In terms of the implementation of Military Operations for War (MOW) and Military Operations Other than War (MOOTW), it is still the same as the previous doctrine. Similarly, in terms of providing assistance to the regional government, where conditions lead to a larger riot, regional leaders can request directly to the TNI in accordance with applicable laws and regulations.

As with the previous doctrine, non-military defense relies on the ministry/institution outside the defense sector as the main element, supported by other elements of the nation's power by utilizing national resources and other infrastructure that are prepared and organized to deal with non-military threats. Non-military threats include threats with ideological, political, economic, socio-cultural, technological, public safety, and legislative dimensions that have a direct or indirect impact on national interests, namely the life of the people, nation, and state of Indonesia based on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution.

State Defense Doctrine 2023

In response to increasingly complex security challenges, Indonesia's Defense Doctrine has been reformulated and refined through the Indonesian Minister of Defense Regulation No. 12 of 2023, signed by the Minister of Defense, Prabowo Subianto, who is also the President-elect in the 2024 elections. The 2023 Defense Doctrine contains a number of new things that have not been included in previous defense doctrines, in response to the dynamics of the global, regional, and national strategic environments that give rise to new types of threats.

According to the 2023 Doctrine, the defense concept to be developed and implemented is large island defense. This

concept places large islands and strategic island clusters as the main power base in integrating state defense components in an integrated and directed manner. The defense of large islands and strategic island clusters takes advantage of the geographical condition as an archipelagic country is considered one of the asymmetrical advantages, where when the communication of the islands is cut off, each large island and small island cluster becomes an independent defense center and is able to defend the territory, people, and all sources of life, the wheels of government, and protect all vital objects and defense resources.

Therefore, according to this doctrine, the national defense system on each large island needs to be equipped with strength, capability, and degree in all aspects, both personnel, material, or logistics, as well as technological systems and social systems. In addition, tactics, techniques, and combat strategies need to be developed with a variety of creativity that can provide asymmetrical advantages according to the character of the region, whether urban, coastal, or forest, on land, sea, or air.

The 2023 Doctrine has also sought to address and anticipate new threat models and challenges in defense. Among them are related to asymmetric warfare and urban warfare capabilities. Asymmetric warfare is defined as warfare conducted by forces with superior conditions against forces with inferior conditions or vice versa, with prominent features optimally utilizing the imbalance itself. Asymmetric warfare can occur in all domains of warfare, including land, sea, air, space, and cyber. In asymmetric warfare there is a situation of imbalance (asymmetric) or it can also be said to be an irregular situation between the warring parties.

One form of asymmetric warfare capability is urban warfare capability. Urban warfare can be defined as warfare that takes place in cities or urban areas. Conceptually, cities or urban areas are very important areas that are always placed as centers of government and power and other critical matters. Therefore, the conquest or seizure as well as the defense or protection of cities and urban areas becomes very strategic and important. According to the 2023 Doctrine, urban warfare consists of three fundamental elements: cities, weapons, and forces. Urban warfare is determined by the scale and demographics of the urban settlements where warfare takes place, the weaponry available to combatants, and the size of the military force or the like.

Based on the 2023 Doctrine, threats can be classified based on the form, actor, source, media, and nature of the threat. Forms of threats are no longer only military and non-military threats, but new threats have emerged, namely hybrid threats, which are a combination of military and non-military threats. Actors of threats are also no longer limited to state actors but also non-state actors and state-sponsored actors. The source of threats is also increasingly blurred between threats from abroad and threats from within the country. Threat media are no longer limited to land, sea, and air media but are also developing in cyber and space media. Meanwhile, the nature of threats can be in the form of actual threats and potential threats.

In this new defense doctrine, military threats are categorized into the following types:

- Aggression, in the form of invasions, bombardments, blockades, attacks by elements of other armed forces, acts of a state allowing the use of its territory

by another state as a staging area for aggression against Indonesia, armed groups, or mercenaries.

- Territorial violations by foreign non-commercial aircraft or vessels.
- Espionage against military secrets.
- Sabotage against military assets and national vital objects.
- Acts of terror escalated.
- Armed rebellion, and
- Civil war

Table 1. Threat Classification

Form/Type	1. Military 2. Non-military 3. Hybrids
Actor	1. Country 2. Non-state 3. State Sponsored
Source	1. Overseas 2. Domestic
Media	1. Land 2. Sea 3. Air 4. Space 5. Cyber
Nature	1. Actual 2. Potential

Source: State Defense Doctrine (2023)

Non-military threats are classified into threats with ideological, political, economic, socio-cultural, public safety, information technology, and legislative dimensions. Meanwhile, hybrid threats, as mentioned earlier, are threats that are a combination of military and non-military threats. For example, the combination of political chaos, mass riots, separatism, and invasion. A combination of cyber threats and espionage threats.

According to this doctrine, in assessing threat priorities, the assessment

is carried out using certain criteria: First, the level of fatality of destruction, which is related to the impact on state sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national safety, related to the capabilities of threat actors. Second, the level of likelihood of occurrence, which is an estimate of the possibility of a threat to occur, faced with the scenario of the implementation of the war itself. Third, the level of urgency, which concerns when a threat is expected to occur, has occurred, will occur (potentially) in the short, medium, or long term. Fourth, the level of difficulty of facing, which is how difficult a form of threat can be faced, mitigated, or recovered after a threat occurs, which is related to one's own capabilities.

In relation to threat escalation assessment, this doctrine divides into military threat escalation, non-military threat escalation, and hybrid threat escalation. Military threat escalation is an increase in military threats that moves quickly and dynamically due to threats from abroad and from within the country that can result in war involving part or all of the nation's territory and strength. Non-military threat escalation is a fast-moving and dynamic increase in threats of a non-military nature, both on a low, medium, and high scale, caused by non-military factors with ideological, political, economic, socio-cultural, public safety, information technology, and legislative dimensions. Hybrid threat escalation is an increase in threats with escalation that is a combination of military and non-military threat escalation caused by both military factors that can come from abroad and within the country as well as non-military factors.

As mentioned earlier, one of the key points of the 2023 Doctrine is the concept of large island defense and strategic island clusters. This defense concept is an

archipelagic state defense concept that views all islands, Indonesian waters and all their contents, and the airspace above them as a whole unit, placing large islands as the main base of defense strengthened by the defense of small island clusters, as well as surrounding waters arranged in layers and closing each other starting from the Outer Mandala, Main Mandala to Inner Mandala in order to defend the entire territory of sovereignty and national jurisdiction of the Republic of Indonesia.

The defense of large islands and clusters of strategic islands is carried out with a layered defense pattern through the Air Defense Strategy of the Archipelago State, including the Air Defense Identification Zone, which aims to identify early foreign aircraft that will enter the national air jurisdiction as well as the safety of the Indonesian Archipelago Sea Route, the Archipelago Sea Defense Strategy, carried out with stages of destroying the enemy in its territory (Outer Mandala), destroying the enemy on the way (Main Mandala), and destroying the enemy after entering the Indonesian territorial sea area (Inner Mandala).

With this concept of big island defense, it is necessary to reorganize and build the strength of combat divisions on each big island in addition to the existing regular units. In addition, at each level of the regional command unit, a production unit with agricultural, livestock, fisheries, health, construction, nuklir, zen, and cyber capabilities will be established.

This doctrine also stresses the importance of integrating the components of national defense, namely the embodiment of integration and synergy of the Main Component, Reserve Component, and Supporting Component in military defense, as well as the main elements and other elements of national power in non-military defense. As in previous doctrines,

facing military threats places the TNI as the main component to carry out the tasks of Military Operations for War (MOW). Non-military defense that has been prepared can be transformed into military defense through mobilization into a reserve component to enlarge and strengthen the main component, as well as preparing supporting components to improve the capabilities and strength of the main component and reserve component.

Facing non-military threats puts forward government agencies outside the defense sector as the main element in accordance with the form and nature of the threat faced. TNI involvement in non-military defense is carried out through Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) to provide assistance to the main elements. Facing hybrid threats, the integration of national defense components is carried out based on the type of threat by combining military defense components and nonmilitary defense elements.

This doctrine also explains the spectrum of conflict and the involvement of state defense elements. Starting from civil order, civil emergency, military emergency, to a state of war. In the event that the spectrum of conflict increases to a state of war that begins with a declaration of war by the president with the approval of the House of Representatives, then all the nation's forces carry out military defense by prioritizing the TNI as the main component carrying out MOW assisted by the Reserve Component and Supporting Component.

As in the previous doctrine, the implementation of warfare is carried out through deterrence, action, and recovery. Deterrence is carried out by building military and nonmilitary defense postures throughout the territory of the Republic of

Indonesia. Deterrence is also carried out by preparing the state territory as a defense mandala. The implementation of deterrence starts from the Outer Mandala as the foremost defense layer, namely the defense mandala outside the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and the airspace above it, namely the area after 200 miles to the free sea. The main Mandala is the main defense layer of the defense mandala, starting from the EEZ as far as 200 miles to the territorial sea boundary, the seabed, and the airspace above it as far as 12 miles from the baseline. The Inner Mandala is the rear defense layer outside the main mandala, from the 12-mile territorial sea limit to the land area, including inland waters, archipelagic waters, airspace above, and land area. Another important deterrence factor is the preparation of decentralized defense logistics on the major islands and their small islands.

In terms of prosecution, as explained earlier, it depends on the type of threat, be it a military threat, a non-military threat, or a hybrid threat. Meanwhile, recovery is intended for rehabilitation of the damage caused by war and riots by involving all stakeholders according to their respective duties and functions. In addition, recovery is also aimed at realizing the condition of the area, facilities, and infrastructure, and the psychology of the community back to normal.

The 2023 Doctrine has also projected in detail how the development of the ideal national defense posture will look like in the future based on the defense strategy being implemented. The development of this defense posture includes military defense covering land, sea, air, and non-military defense.

Conclusion

Proper assessment of potential threats and the development of the strategic environment, both globally, regionally, and nationally, are very important in formulating a country's defense doctrine. Thus, the state defense doctrine is essentially dynamic and must continue to adapt to changes in potential threats that are increasingly rapid and complex. In that situation, the evolution of defense doctrine will continue to occur.

There were significant changes in defense doctrine before and after the 1998 Reformation. This could not be separated from the political upheaval in the country, which also had implications for the concept of defense and security. The separation of the TNI and Polri, which seemed to separate the functions of defense and security, became one of the markers of the 1998 post-reform defense doctrine. Meanwhile, until now, the understanding of the meaning of security itself has not reached an agreement among stakeholders in the defense and security sector.

What needs to be reviewed in relation to the above is the juridical aspect of the defense and security system itself. Article 30, paragraph (2), of the 1945 Constitution states that:

"The defense and security of the state is carried out through a system of defense and security of the people by the Indonesian National Army and the Indonesian National Police as the main force and the people as the supporting force."

Meanwhile, Law No. 3 of 2002 on National Defense in Article 1, paragraph (2), states that:

"The national defense system is a universal defense system that involves all citizens, territories, and other national resources, as well as being prepared early

by the government and held in a total, integrated, directed and continuous manner to uphold the sovereignty of the state, territorial integrity and safety of the entire nation from all threats."

From these two provisions, it appears that the 1945 Constitution still uses the concept of a universal people's security defense system (Sishankamrata) with the main forces being the TNI and Polri. Meanwhile, Law No. 3 of 2002 specifically states that the national defense system is a universal defense system. In this case, defense and security are no longer combined in a narrow sense, and the word "people" is no longer used.

In the view of Makmur Supriyatno (2014), the understanding of Sishankamrata as in the past is no longer relevant because the demands of the situation and conditions in the present are different, so fundamentally the concept must change, which includes how to build universality, namely building space, tools, and fighting conditions carried out synergistically, in accordance with the corridors of national and international law in the context of national defense. Therefore, it is necessary to review the concept of defense and security in order to synchronize with each other and not to rule out the possibility of amending the 1945 Constitution again to reformulate the concept of defense and security in a broad sense. This is also important because it is the basis for the preparation of the State Defense Doctrine.

Of the five doctrines that have been issued, namely the 1991 State Security Defense Doctrine, the 2007 State Defense Doctrine, the 2014 State Defense Doctrine, the 2015 State Defense Doctrine, and the 2023 State Defense Doctrine, there are a number of similarities and also prominent differences. The Universal People's Defense and Security System, as mandated

in the 1945 Constitution, remains the main guideline, characterized by the unity of the TNI and the people. In addition, populism, universality, and territoriality are also the main characteristics of the universal people's defense and security. Meanwhile, the implementation of warfare broadly consists of deterrence, action, and recovery.

In terms of the division of defense zones, or later called defense mandalas, basically all doctrines divide them into three mandalas, namely the Outer Mandala, which is outside the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and the airspace above it; the Main Mandala, starting from the EEZ to the territorial sea boundary, the seabed, and the airspace above it; and the Inner Mandala, from the territorial sea boundary to the land area, including inland waters, island waters, the airspace above it, and the land area. From the division of this defense mandala, the strengthening of the Navy and Air Force is very necessary considering its operational area, which is expected to be able to reach the Outer Mandala and Main Mandala before the enemy manages to enter the Inner Mandala. At the same time, the ability of the Army in the mainland area (large islands) must also be improved.

In relation to defense components, in accordance with Law No. 3 of 2002 on National Defense, defense components consist of the main component, namely the TNI, reserve components, and supporting components. In terms of military threats, the TNI becomes the main instrument by carrying out Military Operations for War (MOW) supported by reserve components and supporting components. While in the case of non-military threats, the relevant ministries/institutions will be the main element and, of course, can be supported by TNI elements through the pattern of Military Operations other than War

(MOOTW). In its development, a new type of threat was identified, namely a hybrid threat, which is a combination of military and non-military threats. To overcome this threat, military and non-military defense forces can be collaborated. This is still the guideline until the issuance of the 2023 State Defense Doctrine.

Along with technological advances, threats are no longer just on land, sea, and air, but also in cyberspace and space. This certainly requires new tactics and strategies in dealing with these threats. Even with these technological advances, the territorial boundaries of a country are becoming increasingly absurd, which will certainly have implications for the types of threats and actors who carry out threats where currently not only state actors but also non-state actors or other actors supported by a country.

Referring to the latest defense doctrine (2023), it has essentially sought to identify the latest threat types and contemporary warfare models, including urban warfare. Urban warfare capabilities are particularly important in the future given the growth and development of cities throughout Indonesia. In this context, as part of early efforts in the framework of building national defense, the government needs to determine and designate cities or urban areas as important (strategic) areas to be designated as important and strategic objects (centers of gravity) that must always be protected and guarded from various possible urban warfare threats and as a place of emergency government.

In addition, this doctrine has also formulated the direction of future defense strategy development, in this case the concept of defense of large islands and strategic island groups. This certainly requires the development of a defense posture in the region of large islands,

including decentralized aspects of defense logistics to support the independence of the defense of large islands and strategic island groups in critical situations.

The implementation of the defense doctrine that has been prepared basically requires synergy and integration of all defense components, both military defense, characterized by Integrated Tri Matra (Army, Navy, and Air Force), and non-military defense. Defense posture development should also be implemented continuously. In addition, defense doctrine must be able to evolve to adjust to the development of the strategic environment and the dynamics of emerging threats in order to remain relevant as a guideline for the implementation of national defense.

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