

## Rocking the Bayan: PKS Strategy to Replace Golkar Party's Dominance in the 2019 Legislative Elections in Bandung Regency

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**Abstract:** *The Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) in several regions in principle has significant differences with national achievements in terms of increasing electability. Although the national achievement stagnated at 7-8%, in Bandung Regency, PKS succeeded in disrupting the dominance of the Golongan Karya (Golkar) party, which for almost 20 years controlled Bandung Regency in both the executive and legislative realms. This is based on the fact that in 2019, PKS took second place in the legislative vote. This research uses Peter Schroder's political marketing strategy theory with two variables, namely offensive strategies (market expansion strategies and market penetration strategies) and defensive strategies (market defense strategies and market closing strategies). This research is also dissected with a qualitative approach, where data analysis is operated with a mixed method between unstructured interviews with PKS leaders in Bandung Regency and the use of secondary data collected from mass media and PKS official social media. The results showed that PKS was able to move to the second position of the legislative election vote because it managed to take advantage of several strategic moments ranging from the 212 Islamic Defense Action in the national realm to populist program campaigns such as lifetime driving licenses and tax-free motor vehicles and was agile in positioning itself to respond to the internal conflict of the Golkar party in Bandung Regency by then carrying Golkar cadres who left the party.*

**Keywords:** *winning strategies, partai keadilan sejahtera, pragmatic islamism, legislative election, bandung regency.*

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## Introduction

Golkar's decades-long dominance in Bandung regency is slowly but surely being challenged by the Islamist group Prosperous Justice Party (PKS). Although PKS has had its ups and downs in the national arena due to corruption and immorality cases involving its cadres, these conditions have in fact not significantly affected PKS's glory in subscription vote areas such as West Sumatra-Riau, West Java, and West Nusa Tenggara. In fact, instead of weakening, PKS in West Java, especially in Bandung Regency, has gradually succeeded in eroding Golkar's long-standing dominance as the party synonymous with Bandung Regency since Obar Sobarna took over as Bandung Regent in 2000. The PKS Bandung Regency has the potential to follow in the footsteps of its predecessor in the city of Depok, where the PKS has been dominant in the region for many years.

Compared to other regions in Java, West Java has a unique pattern of Islamic behavior. West Java tends to be dynamic and difficult to generalize (Muhammad, n.d. 2016), whereas Central Java and East Java are compact mass bases of moderate Islamic groups represented by Nahdhatul Ulama (NU)-Muhammadiyah. In the urban base, the Islamic Union (Persis) and

Tarbiyah groups are the dominant groups. They occupy the positions of large mosques and community recitations. The NU plays a strong role only in Garut and Tasikmalaya. These are areas with a significant pesantren base (Mudzakkir, 2017). The Indonesian Islamic Da'wah Institute (LDII) also has a large mass base in West Java. (Lubis, 2011). In West Java, there is also a large boarding school that is quite controversial, namely Al-Zaytun, led by Panji Gumilang, based in Indramayu. We also need to remember that the strong base of Darul Islam (DI) in the early days of independence was in the West Java region, namely the northern districts of Bandung, Tasikmalaya, and Garut. The acculturation of local culture with Islamic teachings has further strengthened the ties between local culture and Islam in West Java, so that some Sundanese people conclude that "Sundanese society is an Islamic society and Islam is the religion of the Sundanese people" (Sujati, 2020).

This basis strengthens the author's argument: West Java has a unique, interesting, and different Islamic character. This uniqueness was then successfully and carefully exploited by PKS. West Java is also, in fact, PKS's largest vote bank at the national level. PKS's election performance in 2019 is as follows:

**Table 1.** PKS Party's Legitimate Vote Acquisition compared to the Winning Party in 2019

No	Region	Total Vote	Position
1	National	11.493.000	6
2	West Java	3.286.606	3
3	Bandung Regency	273.111	2

Sumber: *databoks.katadata.co.id*, 2023

The above performance is essentially based on a long consolidation. It started with PKS's decline in the 2014 elections. After the 2014 elections,

following the eruption of the 411 and 212 Islamic Bela Action events as a result of Basuki Tjahaja Purnama's (Ahok's) blasphemy case, PKS started to find the

right momentum. The PKS then used this event to strengthen its branding. It presented itself as a party close to the Ulama and Habaib. (Hidayat, 2020). The PKS appeared more sincere when the 212 Movement, following the 212 Islamic Defence Action, began to speak out forcefully about formalising Sharia.

After the West Java gubernatorial election in 2018, the success of the PKS manoeuvre in the 212 Islamic Bela Action agenda is increasingly visible. The PKS candidate, Sudrajat-Ahmad Syaikh, was defeated by the Ridwan Kamil-Uu Ruzhanul Ulum ticket. However, the PKS candidate was a remarkable success. The PKS itself ran a candidate who was completely new to the people of West Java, namely a retired military officer by the name of Sudrajat, who represented Gerindra, accompanied by the original PKS cadre, Ahmad Syaikh. As a result, Sudrajat-Ahmad Syaikh (6,317,465 votes, 28.74%) outperformed the big names also contesting West Java, such as Deddy Mizwar-Dedi Mulyadi (5,663,198 votes, 25.77%) and Tubagus Hasanuddin-Anton Charliyan (2,773,078

votes, 12.62%) (Akbar Bayu Tamtomo, 2018). With the slogan "Asyik wins, 2019 Ganti President", the issues designed for this election are even more Islamic populism, such as resistance and unrest against the old government. The PKS almost won in West Java.


The remnants of the struggle during the 2018 gubernatorial election in West Java were then used effectively and efficiently by the PKS Regional Leadership Council in the Bandung Regency in the run-up to the 2019 elections. As a party that has now declared itself an "open party" that does not specialise in the colour of Islam but does not abandon its Islam as the party's main identity, PKS has slowly begun to disrupt Golkar's hegemony in Bandung Regency since 2004, especially in legislative elections. The PKS has also benefited from the socio-anthropological conditions of the people of Bandung Regency. The majority of the population is Muslim. The following chart shows how the PKS has voted in Bandung Regency since the 2004 legislative elections:

**Table 2.** Comparison of Golkar and PKS seats 2004-2019

Year	Party	Acquisition
2004	Golkar	15 member
	PKS	6 member
2009	Golkar	9 member
	PKS	7 member
2014	Golkar	12 member
	PKS	6 member
2019	Golkar	11 member
	PKS	10 member

Source: kab-bandung.kpu.go.id, 2023.

**Graph 1.** Comparison of Golkar and PKS seats won in the 2004-2019 general elections



Source: Researcher's processing refers to data from the Bandung Regency KPU, 2023

The table and graph above show that Golkar's performance has fluctuated over the past 15 years. It had risen after its decline in the 2009 legislative election, but in the last election Golkar experienced a decline in seat acquisition. PKS, on the other hand, has been fairly consistent during its 15 years in Bandung Regency prior to the 2019 legislative election. And in 2019, PKS's peak performance began to show. PKS's breakthrough in the 2019 legislative elections is actually a positive signal, especially for Islamist groups, because it turns out that the hegemony of Golkar (and nationalist-secular groups) in Bandung Regency, which has been dominant for years, is slowly showing an opportunity to be conquered. Indeed, Golkar was defeated by the Democrats in the 2009 legislative elections. Whether the PKS will be able to defeat Golkar in the future, however, is another matter, as the PKS is already synonymous with Islamist groups.

Traditionally, Islamism is defined as Islam as ideology. However, this does not mean that Islamism is simply the

application of religion to politics. Islamists extend the traditional idea of Islam as an all-encompassing religion to modern society. In their view, Islam should shape everything in that society, from the way it is governed, to its education and legal systems, to its culture and economy. In this sense, Islamism is not an extension of religion into politics, but rather an attempt to reassert what Islamists believe has always been characteristic of Islam (Bubalo, 2005).

In addition to the previous statement, Armanjani explained that there are at least four things that are the basis for Islamists: First, Islamic principles must guide daily life, both personally and collectively. Second, Islam is a religion that stresses the importance of faith, while other religious beliefs contain errors or have limited validity. Third, traditional Islamic laws should govern sexual relations. Fourth, Western and secular culture only promotes a culture of consumerism and free-living, which is contrary to Islam (Adiwilaga, 2017b).

Organizations then serve to unite different elements of society to achieve goals that cannot be achieved by individuals (Setiawan, 2015). These elements also underlie Islamic organizations, which are established to create a shared love for Islam and its teachings (Purba & Ponirin, 2013).

In Indonesia, from the founding of the Islamic Society (SI) through the active Masyumi in the movement's history to the formulation of Pancasila and the controversial debate over the Jakarta Charter, the project of Islamism has been rooted in principle. Moreover, in 1948 the DI/TII or Indonesian Islamic State (NII) was founded by the SI alumnus who was also a friend of Sukarno, Kartosoewirjo (Adiwilaga, 2017a). All of them withered when the Soeharto-led New Order was established. All political maneuvers by Islamic groups were banned unless they were united in one party called the United Development Party.

The emergence of a Muslim middle class, centered on professionals, civil servants, intellectuals, and military officers, was catalyzed by the failure of Islamic political forces to make Islam a formal part of the state system (Hasan, 2011). This also stimulated the birth of pioneering organizations of the new generation of Islamism in Indonesia, such as DDII and KAMMI, which then systematically mobilized in mosques on state and large campuses.

The PKS's stance on Pancasila can be traced back to its predecessors' aggressive advocacy of the formalisation of Shari'a from the Liberal Democracy period under Masyumi's manoeuvres, as well as during the New Order. After the dissolution of Masyumi by the Soekarno government, Masyumi split into several groups such as the Indonesian Islamic Da'wah Council (DDII), PII, GPI and HMI-MPO. While NU,

Muhamamadiyah, HMI, PMII and other organisations accepted Pancasila as the sole principle, the Masyumi-derived groups adamantly rejected it. Most of the early generations of the Tarbiyah movement of the PKS came from these organisations (Hidayat, 2020). When it was founded, the PK (before the PKS) believed that only through Sharia could Muslims challenge the dominance of the Western powers. The Western powers were in cahoots with the Zionists to undermine Islam and Muslims (Hasan, 2015). This means the PKS is historically and culturally strong enough to be considered Islamist.

In addition to its vision, which affirms PKS as a da'wah party that gives priority to the unity of the people and the nation, PKS also has a mission to spread Islamic da'wah and its cadres as *anasir taghyir* (elements of change) (Hidayat, 2020). This means that the PKS is no longer an ordinary party but also a religious social movement, which operates not only when elections are called but whenever the need arises.

The idea that the PKS is an Islamist party is further strengthened by Zuly Qodir by carrying out comparisons on the ground. According to him, the PKS is purely a political party, and it's not a da'wah organization that preaches for the benefit of Muslims, let alone humanity. The PKS movement is a political movement. It is more defended when it benefits its cadres and parties. Qodir cited the case of how PKS was 'half-hearted' in the nomination of Syukri Fadloli in the Yogyakarta City Pilwalkot phase because none of its cadres became candidates even though they participated in the carrying but fought desperately when its cadres ran directly, as happened in West Java with the nomination of Ahmad Heryawan and Nur Mahmudi Ismail when he became mayor of Depok (Qodir, 2013).

The PKS dreams of formalizing Islamic law. Unlike its predecessors in Islamist groups, both mainstream and militant, which negotiate with Western values, the PKS has actively participated in the last five elections. Not only that, but the PKS also claims to care about the interests of women's groups. This is evidenced by its encouragement of female cadres to run (and even win) in parliamentary elections. Not only that, PKS also claims to care about human rights issues (HAM). For example, PKS has been active in supporting Palestinian independence and the Rohingya. However, it must be emphasized that all the issues that PKS takes up are rather selective. Therefore, the author categorizes PKS as pragmatic Islamists.

In principle, PKS has sufficient rooted capital to face any electoral contest as a cadre party and a party that claims to be an open party, as well as its consistency in winning national votes. Hidayat explained that PKS's strategy in the 2019 election is generally based on the use of internal consolidation strategies amidst conflicts within PKS's structure and leadership, as well as the militancy of cadres who want to fight together by conducting political campaigns. The main method they use is the Personal Direct Campaign (PDC), which initiates meetings between candidates and voters in their respective constituencies, compared to campaigning methods through campaign props. (Hidayat, 2020).

In terms of youth, PKS has strong roots on campus, represented by the Indonesian Muslim Student Action Unit (KAMMI). PKS deliberately targets young people in this outreach activity because PKS has a long-term socio-political vision based on the idea of instilling in the younger generation the idea of reforming society along the lines that religion defines as a duty to be pursued through civic

activism (Hasan, 2012). Moreover, PKS has other undercurrents, from PKS Muda and Gema Keadilan to the cadre system for Salimah mothers (Liqo' and Halaqah). Everything moves in this great spirit of militancy.

The established cadre system yielded satisfactory results in several regions. In Depok, based on 2019 election results, PKS won the most votes in Depok City DPRD, 180,219, with 12 of 50 available seats. The victory was achieved through the continuous consolidation of the cadres as well as the intensive campaign patterns that are an integral part of the central program (door-to-door, populist program campaigns, and so on) (Dinata & Andriyani, 2022). This has made PKS so dominant over the years in Depok City.

In another region in West Java, namely Purwakarta, PKS had a 500% increase in vote share from the previous election in 2014. Examining this through Schroder's theory of political strategy, Nurmalina explained that PKS managed to achieve these large votes by taking overt shortcuts, namely recruiting cadres from the professional class (NGO leaders, education, industry, and entrepreneurs), as well as a revolution in jargon that nods to the center, namely 'service to the people' (Nurmalina et al., 2023).

PKS is also quite dominant in Riau province. In 2018, in coalition with Nasdem and PAN, PKS managed to win Syamsuar-Edy Natar Nasution. Previously, the PKS only had 3 seats in parliament. However, after implementing an open coalition strategy and consolidating more intensively with various parties, especially the party wings together with the supporting coalition parties from among the nationalist parties to work and move together in conducting political marketing, and strengthening and optimising various media as part of political communication in

support of the candidates it promotes, PKS then managed to win the governor candidate (Syamsuadi et al., 2020). The victory of the governor of PKS also had an impact on the votes of PKS in the 2019 legislative elections, from only 3 seats in 2014 to 7 seats in the 2019 legislative elections. It was matching PAN's number, previously far above PKS.

In the 2019 elections, PKS offered four political programs, namely (1) a lifetime driving license (SIM), (2) tax-free vehicles, (3) tax-free for citizens earning less than Rp 8 million, and (4) a bill to protect the Ulama and religious symbols. Of the four policy programs offered to the public by the PKS, three are an expression of political pragmatism. There is only one program that can be seen as religious, and that is identity politics. This fourth point, however, is not specific to Islamic groups but is general to all religions (Argenti et al., 2022).

Of all these studies, in general, all of them examine the PKS, from how it maintains its power to how it will focus on increasing its votes from 2014 to 2019. But of all these studies, none has examined how PKS broke the dominance and hegemony of the previous party and how PKS maneuvers in Priangan, which is actually the most aggressive in West Java, are measured by dominance and very dynamic political dynamics.

The author deliberately embeds the term "pragmatist" after Islamism when narrating PKS in this discourse, more because PKS has a unique and special position. On the other hand, PKS has taqiyyah or other intentions when talking about Pancasila and sharia formalization (Rokhmad, 2014). On the other hand, however, the PKS also opens itself up to Western value mechanisms such as democracy (participation in elections), human rights issues (the question of a free

Palestine and the Gaza conflict) and - although a little timidly - the development of women's empowerment by producing female cadres with high electability (Miichi, 2020). The author will then use Schroder's theory of political marketing strategy to dissect the PKS's strategy in its efforts to win the 2019 legislative elections in Bandung Regency.

## **Method**

The type of research used in this research is qualitative research with an explanatory case study approach. Qualitative research itself, according to Feny Rita (Feny Rita Fiantika, Mohammad Wasil, 2022), is descriptive research and tends to use analysis. Qualitative research often emphasizes the subject's perspective, the process, and the meaning of the research using the theoretical basis as an umbrella and support to match the facts in the field. Meanwhile, the explanatory case study approach, according to Yin, quoted from Feny Rita (Feny Rita Fiantika and Mohammad Wasil, 2022), has the main objective of answering the question "how" or "why." Where in this case the researcher only transfers what the researcher sees into writing. Although this approach is actually only aimed at the context of real life. The data collection method was gathered from collecting various literature sources collected in the Mendeley data bank, with the resulting data output in the form of linking literature sources to emphasize the novelty of this research. This research also encouraged researchers to conduct in-depth interviews with the leadership of the Bandung Regency PKS Regional Representative Council and several legislative members elected in the 2019 and 2024 legislative elections in the Bandung Regency area.

First of all, the author conducts a process of collecting secondary data by

collecting related articles about PKS and Islamism, after which the author conducts a literature review process to test the originality of the research. Then the author conducts structured interviews with resource persons with the consideration that the resource person is a legislative member from PKS who won the election again. After that, researchers confirm the opinions of elected leaders and legislators to active cadres at the ranting level to the PKS branch in Bandung Regency.

## **Result and Discussion**

### **Pks Strategy to Win 2019 Bandung Legislative Election**

#### **1. Offensive Strategy**

The offensive strategy, according to Schroder, describes how a political party's efforts to increase the number of voters or want to increase its vote. To carry out this strategy, human resources who have a positive view of the party are needed so that the campaign can be successful. This strategy model is more aimed at the existence of clear and attractive differences between the party and also other political parties, whose aim is to take over the voters (Sahea et al., 2018). From this theory, here are some offensive strategies carried out by PKS Bandung Regency ahead of the 2019 legislative elections:

##### **a. Utilization of Ruling Party Internal Conflict in Bandung Regency**

The elected regent of Bandung, Dadang Supriatna, was previously one of Golkar's top cadres. From village headman to member of the legislature, his political career is quite distinguished. But everything changed when Golkar chose Kurnia Agustina as its candidate for regent. She was the wife of the previous regent, Dadang Nasser. Dadang Supriatna immediately resigned from Golkar. The National Awakening Party (PKB), together with the PKS, then welcomed Dadang

Supriatna with open arms and endorsed him as their candidate for Bandung Regent in Pilbup 2020. Dadang Supriatna was elected. He won with 55% of the vote (Iqbal, 2021).

This is also a good indication of the dynamics within the PKS. The reason is that PKS itself has a proposed regent candidate, namely Dadang Nasser's deputy in the previous management, Gun-Gun Gunawan. Gun-Gun should be a big capital considering that previously, Gun-Gun routinely consolidated to the grassroots while carrying out his duties as deputy regent. This modality is an important commodity considering that Gun-Gun's name is not foreign in the midst of the people of Bandung Regency. PKS, however, was once consistent in its principle of openness. They received input from the coalition parties (PKB, Democrat, and Nasdem), as well as the release of a previous survey institute that assessed the advancement of Sahrul Gunawan (artist, Nasdem cadre), which could increase the electability of the pair.

##### **b. Populist Programme Campaign**

In the run-up to the 2019 elections, the PKS has indeed been hit by a huge storm. From corruption cases involving its cadres in several regions, to internal conflicts in the central board marked by the departure of Anis Matta and Fahri Hamzah, to allegations of receiving corrupt funds from philanthropic institutions such as the Aksi Cepat Tanggap (ACT) case. In response to these issues, the PKS DPP, under the leadership of Sohibul Iman, began designing and rebranding a new image for PKS ahead of the 2019 elections. Some of the formulas formulated include the following:



**Table 2.** PKS Populist Issues ahead of 2019 Election

No	Populist Issues	Description
1	Close to ulama and habaib	Joining the ranks of the 212 movement
2	Supporting the Prabowo-Sandi pair	Expecting electoral blessings
3	Campaign for free motor vehicle tax and lifetime driving licence	Reaching the lower and middle-class vote
4	Bringing out "new" characters who are not symbolically identified	The appearance of Mardani Ali Sera as a figure who does not bring out the personal symbolism of PKS
5	Rejecting fuel hike	Antithesis to Government Policy
6	"Straight-line opposition" jargon	Upholding the principle of opposition and not joining the government carriage at all

Source: Hidayat, 2020

The advantage of PKS is that, despite having militant cadres, most PKS cadres pay attention to the boundary markers of party norms and ethics by swallowing whole without modification, the campaign message that has been formulated by the centre. This is then socialised by cadres in the regions, including Bandung Regency. One of them is the free motor vehicle tax and lifetime driving licence programme.

Indeed, if examined from macro and micro-economic aspects, this policy may not be realistic. However, these pre-requisite conditions are ignored by most PKS voters who mostly appreciate and even have high hopes for PKS to realise the program. As conveyed by one PKS voter

from the education community. According to R1:

"We support the PKS program for a lifetime driving license and free motor vehicle tax. It's better if it's already free, because every time we pay for, for example, a 5-year SIM, the money goes to the police, or to the tax; the tax is used to pay the police; the police just work like that. PKS for us is quite responsive to our complaints."

From the sample of statements quoted above, it can be concluded that support for the PKS's policies is indeed helped by the diminishing crisis of public trust in the government and especially in the police. The structural poverty experienced by the community ultimately seeks its outlet in the government. Beyond the limited bureaucratic understanding of the community, PKS does not try to bridge this understanding, but PKS jumps in to provide a quick and immediate offer to reduce public unrest. This excellent program is likely to increase the PKS vote in Bandung Regency.

In addition, although the researchers considered that PKS was inconsistent in several aspects, especially in the aspect of consistency in the application of values (Islamism but democratic), at the grassroots level of society, PKS is a consistent party, this can be seen from its "straight line opposition" jargon, where PKS takes a firm stand amid a heated issue. When PKS portrays itself as a party close to the ulama and Habib, PKS also consistently keeps its distance from the legitimate government, where on the other hand, PKS maintains the image that PKS is a party that is struggling against the unjust rulers represented by the legitimate government at that time, namely the president of the PDI-Perjuangan, Joko Widodo. Moreover, it protects the ummah and its representative council (ulama and Habib) from deviant policies that want to injure and divide the

ummah. The National Mandate Party (PAN), although its leaders were active in the 212 Islamic Defence Action, later in the process, its cadres were included in the government to fill ministerial seats.

#### c. Personal Direct Campaign and Down the Line

The direct introduction or socialization conducted by the Prosperous Justice Party in the 2019 legislative elections in Bandung Regency was done face-to-face, namely through -face and personal meetings, both formal and non-formal. While the introduction of indirect socialization was conducted by the Prosperous Justice Party through social media, such as introductions on Facebook, Instagram, billboards of candidates, and others.

This is in line with what was uploaded by the General Secretary of DPD PKS, Mr. Try Muryono, who revealed that:

"The Regional Leadership Council of the Prosperous Justice Party does several things in the introduction, namely directly and indirectly. Direct introduction means such as ... the Prosperous Justice Party introduces itself to the community with routine events, precisely on Sundays, doing hospitality and social services for the community, and the Regional Leadership Council of the Prosperous Justice Party goes around to people's homes to introduce the Prosperous Justice Party."

This argument is then in line with what was presented by Mr. Dedi Setiawan as a cadre of the Wanasuka Village Branch Management Council (DPRa), Pangalengan District 7, according to him:

"Political strategy in the aspect of introduction carried out, namely making an introduction to the community by means of cadres conducting a routine introduction called UPA, namely the Member Development Unit, where the introduction

carried out by cadres conducts recitations held in various places by taking turns."

Then to glue all the arguments above, the opinion of the chairman of DPD PKS Bandung Regency, Jajang Rohana, explained that going down the electoral district is the main strategy ahead of 17 April 2019, according to him:

"We instructed all polling station coordinators to go door-to-door with a hospitality program to visit at least 40 houses in their respective polling stations."

PKS's main campaign channel as a da'wah party is, of course, through recitations. This method is quite effective considering that the KPU and Bawaslu cannot say much when the campaign process is wrapped in religious offerings. Public sensitivity to things that are contrary to religion can trigger further conflicts, so the KPU and Bawaslu are reluctant to take risks there. Therefore, the consolidation carried out by PKS for a long time can run neatly, unlike other parties, especially nationalist-secular parties, which generally consolidate only through individual channels of cadres who become legislative members through the recess process.

PKS also has cadres who are so militant and flexible. Although PKS cadres tend to use Islamic symbols that are so inherent in their attributes and identities, training with mature concepts given to cadres, in the process then makes it easier for cadres to socialise and communicate with grassroots communities. The author sees directly in the field that generally, PKS cadres have a central role in one scope of society both at the RW and village levels in Bandung Regency. When NU clerics are passively "waiting" for people to problem solve, PKS cadres have succeeded in breaking the status quo of religious leaders by picking up the ball in responding to every phenomenon in the Bandung Regency community. This observation is an

affirmation of Jubba's argument that the moderatism of popular Islamic organisations has begun to be eroded by Islamist groups (Jubba et al., 2022).

Finally, by targeting a number of electoral districts for victory, the PKS Bandung Regency also devised a realistic but targeted strategy. As Jajang Rohana said:

"We made an evenly distributed candidacy strategy in each region and each segment that represents each territory and segmentation. In the three electoral districts with many seats, we are targeting 2 seats, namely in electoral districts 2, 6, and 7."

The results were quite satisfying, from a target of 11 seats, PKS Bandung Regency managed to scoop up 10 seats.

Moreover, 8 legislative members from PKS are new faces who have never previously run for office. This means that the party machine has really worked effectively.

#### d. Optimising Social Media

Social media is also a very effective and cheap campaign tool for PKS Regency. The author then examines the official social media of DPD PKS by examining the Instagram and Facebook portals, by analysing the content produced and posted ahead of the date of the 2019 legislative elections. (sebelum April 2019).

Following the timeline of content posted in the last three months, the author combines PKS Instagram and Facebook posts because the two platforms are synchronised and produce the same posts in terms of both content and time:

**Table 3.** Categorisation of PKS social media campaigns in the 3 months before parliamentary elections

No	Date	Dakwah	Populist Campaign	Presidential Campaign (PS-SU)	212 Flashback	Philanthropy and branding	Description
1	March 29, 2019			√			The tagline "the spirit of winning Prabowo-Sandi" was accompanied by a crowd watching the campaign.
2	March 22, 2019					√	PKS response to Kulonprogo floods with donations
3	March 14, 2019		√				PKS popularised the acronym PKS 8, which stands for clergy protection, tax-free cars, lifelong licences and 8m tax-free monthly income.
4	March 7, 2019					√	PKS advertises itself as the political party with the most transparent financial report
5	March 6, 2019			√			PKS campaigned for the PS-Sandi pair by convincing voters that PS won, writing a quieter status
6	February 27, 2019		√				PKS socialises the acronym PKS 8, which stands for cleric protection, tax-free motor vehicles, Sim for life, and 8 million tax-free monthly income.

7	February 26, 2019					√	PKS congratulated the young Indonesian national team for winning the AFF U-22 cup final. Signalling that the party supports youth and sports, especially football as a popular sport.
8	February 25, 2019					√	PKS portrays itself as close to millennials with a post with the caption "young people who are millennials choose PKS".
9	February 22, 2019	√					PKS Kab Bandung posts 8 ways to resist calamity
10	February 21, 2019		√				PKS explains tax-free benefits for income below 8 million
11	February 15, 2019				√		Explaining that PKS is supported by PA 212 and GNPf Ulama
12	February 15, 2019				√		PKS appreciates claims of support from PA 212 and GNPf Ulama
13	February 10, 2019		√				Call to vote for PKS candidates to realise the cleric protection bill law, free motorbike tax, and sim valid for life
14	February 8, 2019	√					PKS calls to be the best human being to benefit others
15	February 8, 2019					√	By promoting the rejection of money politics, PKS is branding itself as a clean party.
16	January 22, 2019	√					8 smiling benefits, using the number 8 as a representation of the PKS serial number
17	January 16, 2019		√				Campaign for the ratification of the bill on the protection of clerics, religious figures and religious symbols
18	January 10, 2019					√	PKS presented its icons Kea, Adi, Dilan, Eja and Tera, the separation of the words Justice and Prosperity, expressing its desire to always move with young people.

Source: Author's analysis by searching on the IG page @PKSKabbandung, 2023

Looking at the above data, we can see that DPD PKS Bandung Regency started campaigning intensively in February. This is because, as we can see, January was only used as a branding campaign, a populist program campaign, and a da'wah, where only one content appeared each. In February, on the other hand, PKS Bandung Regency posted almost 10 contents on Instagram and Facebook, with PKS focusing

the content of the posts on populist campaigns (lifetime SIM, 8 million rupiah income per month, tax-free motorcycles, etc.) as well as on branding (close to millennials as well as a transparent and clean party).

Interestingly, although it has been going on for almost two years, ahead of the 2019 legislative elections, PKS has re-romanticized 212 and even claimed that the

National Movement for Defending Fatwa Ulama (GNPF) supports PKS. The PKS has launched fierce attacks, particularly on populist political campaigns, in the run-up to the 2019 parliamentary elections on 17 April. On the other hand, many social media communities are skeptical, but as we will see in the next section, many people at the grassroots level actually welcome the policy.

#### e. The Recruitment of Prominent Figures as Cadres and Legislative Candidates

In response to the decline of PKS votes in Bandung Regency in the 2014 legislative elections, PKS made rapid changes by overhauling the regeneration system, from previously relying on a long and original regeneration process to a fairly instant regeneration process by recruiting several legislative candidates who have the title of 'influential' figures in several constituencies. But before that, here is a list of the elected legislative members of the 2019 Bandung Regency legislative election who came from the PKS:

**Table. 4** PKS members of the legislative assembly for 2014 and 2019

Name	Elected Years	Description
Tedi Surahman	2014, 2019	Incumbents, re-elected in 2019
Erna Nurhasanah	2014	Not re-elected
Thony Fathony	2014	Not re-elected
Asep Rukmawan	2014	Not re-elected
Jajang Rohana	2014	Not re-elected
Ela Nurlaela	2014, 2019	Incumbents, re-elected in 2019
Dasep Kurnia G	2019	Newly elected in 2019

Eka Ahmad Munandar	2019	Newly elected in 2019
Irwan Abu Bakar	2019	Newly elected in 2019
Maulana Fahmi	2019	Newly elected in 2019
Otjo Sutisna	2019	Newly elected in 2019
Uus Haerudin F	2019	Newly elected in 2019
Wawan Ruswandi	2019	Newly elected in 2019
Ahmad Zaaenal S	2019	Newly elected in 2019

Source: processed by the author from the KPU, 2023

The table above shows that there are only two incumbent MPs, i.e. those who have been re-elected for two terms, namely Tedi Surahman and Ela Nurlaela. Tedi Surahman won a seat in Bandung electoral district 2 (Dayeuhkolot, Katapang, Margaasih and Margahayu subdistricts). Meanwhile, Ela Nurlaela came from Bandung electoral district 7 (Arjasari, Banjaran, Cangkuang, Cimaung, Pamengpeuk, Pangalengan). Tedi Surahman won the vote in the industrial areas, while Ela Nurlaela is popular in the agricultural and plantation areas.

The remaining 8 seats were won by newcomers, such as Uus Haerudin Firdaus, the headmaster of the modern Islamic boarding school Mathlul Huda in Baleendah, who won two seats in the 6th district (Baleendah, Ciparay, Kertasari and Pacet) with Wawan Rustandi, who later became deputy chairman of the Bandung Regency DPRD. The following are the new

legislative members of the PKS parliamentary group according to their professional background:

**Table.5** List of non-official and non-cadre PKS parliamentary deputies for 2019

No	Name	Background
1	Otjo Sutisna	Former Village Head of Panyadap, Solokan Jeruk, Bandung Regency
2	Wawan Ruswandi	Cordova Integrated Islamic School Public Relations - Scout Management
3	Dasep Kurnia Gunarudin	Advocate/Lawyer
4	Uus Haerudin Firdaus	Chairman of Yayasan YPI Al-Anijiyah Pondok Pesantren Mathla'ul Huda
5	Ahmad Zaenal Sabarudin	Chairman of Masyarakat Relawan Indonesia (MRI) - Philanthropist

Source: Internal Data DPD PKS Bandung Regency, 2023

Of the 8 new names, apart from Irwan Abu Bakar (pure cadre, now moved to Gelora Party), Tedi Surahman and Ela Nurlaela (old cadre), the 5 seat winners representing PKS in Bandung Regency actually came from an external and immediate recruitment process. The backgrounds are quite diverse, but the DPD PKS Bandung Regency recruits carefully, taking into account the mass of each cadre recruited. For example, Otjo Sutisna, who managed to win a seat in Dapil 5 (Solokanjeruk, Ibum, Majalaya, Paseh), Otjo managed to win a seat because of the factor of being a former village head in a strategic industrial area. Otjo was even able to compete with one of the local strongmen of

the Golkar party, Obi Kristian of Golkar, for the parliamentary seat. Obi Kristian is the absolute ruler because Obi Kristian is the champion and incumbent in the constituency.

The names above are also new names but with old faces in the Bandung regency. Uus Haerudin Firdaus, for example, is a respected figure and can be categorised as a cleric who owns modern pesantren in the Baleendah and Jelesong areas. The PKS itself managed to get close to Uus Haerudin to run and win in electorate 6, which is a 'star war' electoral battle. These examples show that PKS is no longer focusing on the old way, which requires a long process such as deep-rooted regeneration, but that PKS has adapted by taking shortcuts in recruiting regional figures where the results are quite satisfactory for the party's vote acquisition.

## 2. Devensife Strategy

a. Socio-philanthropic campaigns on Islamic communities' market share in neighbourhoods

In terms of this devensive strategy, the PKS has its own challenges, as discussed above, because it has to deal with Golkar, which is quite hegemonic. Golkar has cadres that are loyal, deeply rooted and have controlled the bureaucracy for years through the leadership of the regent, who has been continuously elected from Golkar cadres themselves. Therefore, PKS Bandung Regency did not target the loyal cadres in the bureaucracy, the actors of the Ring 1 executive leadership of Bandung Regency. As well as campus renewal in the Bandung Regency area. PKS formulated an alternative policy by continuing the central strategy, namely face-to-face campaigns at the smallest grassroots level and outside, such as the village environment, which has great potential because generally rural communities in Bandung Regency have

their own sympathy and support for anything related to "Islam". Interestingly, PKS Bandung Regency did not campaign directly on the importance of formalising Islam in the constitution, as Islamists in other countries or even Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) have done. The PKS is softly and slowly winning votes in the village environment by providing free ambulance shuttle services in every village in Bandung Regency.

**Picture 1.** Ambulance Unit from DPD PKS Bandung Regency Projected for Use of Health services in the Village



Source: Instagram of DPD PKS Kab. Bandung, 2023

Of course, the programme is quite effective. Because the PKS operates institutionally, it is different from other parties whose cadres provide services individually through the recess process. Institutionally, the PKS provides ambulances for the village directly, using the party treasury. According to the opinion of the community, the arrangement of the loan permission is quite simple. According to R2:

"It is easy to borrow, unlike ambulances in villages with puskesmas or something like that. When we come from PKS, before there is an ambulance, we are first contacted by the person there (PKS), he said that if you need it, just WA.

Yesterday, by chance, my brother had to go to the emergency room at midnight. It is difficult to contact the villagers or the TKSK because they might be asleep at midnight. When I contacted PKS, they responded immediately, it didn't take long, 10 minutes, the ambulance was sent immediately. I was helped".

From the above statement, we can find further facts: PKS cadres in the field tend to have strong militancy and loyalty from the aspect of social service and service. This is also the advantage of the PKS at the village level. In addition to the above, PKS also routinely provides basic food aid and social services. The village community is quite touched by this policy because PKS does not only provide intensive assistance during the campaign season, but PKS does it through long consolidation. As Yosi Suzaki, General Treasurer of DPD PKS Bandung Regency, explained:

"PKS approaches the community not only during the political season but long before the election takes place. PKS has stepped forward to approach the community; maybe if you count, even after the 2014 presidential election, we have consolidated with the community."

These policies are quite brilliant and should be appreciated. These findings at least affirm the findings of Qodir and Misran, where, according to them, philanthropic politics (social donations and so on) are used as a way to gain votes or vote-getters as an effort to build, expand, and maintain constituents or show political attention and concern. (Qodir, 2022). PKS Bandung Regency then carefully builds it from the smallest institution, namely the village, with the hope that it can spread to the provincial and even national levels.

b. Liko' recitation (Salimah and Pos Wanita Keadilan) in the mothers' voting bags

The regeneration system is one of the things that sets the PKS apart as a cadre party. At the time of conception, tarbiyah groups were limited to educated people or Rohis. Each usroh is led by a mentor or murobbi and consists of 6 to 10 people divided into small groups managed by a cell system mechanism. This system was adopted indirectly from what had been implemented by the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.

The concept has also been adopted in the women's cadre system through the liqo' recitation group. Liqo' is an activity of Quran recitation, discussion, meeting, mentoring, and mutabaah. At the end of the activity, Liqo' opens a discussion related to contemporary situations. The activity is also conducted through a circular sitting mechanism between murabbi (teachers) and mutarabbi (students). The discussion is often referred to as halaqah. The liqo' is divided into two groups: the liqo' led by the murabbi, whose members are tahmidi (novice cadres), and the liqo' led by the naqib, whose members are kade muntasib (intermediate cadres), munthazim i (adult cadres), and expert cadres (Muhtadi, 2012).

This was also done by militant PKS cadres in Bandung Regency. The PKS aggressively organizes routine recitations, especially in villages. Unlike some mass organizations that hold events only on Islamic commemorations such as the Islamic New Year and the Prophet's Maulid, PKS has reformed the recitation technique involving mothers by innovating with the tadabbur alam program, namely self-reflection through recitation activities held outside the mosque. Such variations in recitation patterns have received a positive response from mothers, and this has been going on for a long time in Bandung Regency.

This recitation program also led Dadang Supriatna's partner to win the

Pilbup contestation in 2020. According to R3, which was taken from the Baleendah salimah recitation group, Bandung Regency:

"No, we don't have a direct campaign; there is no such thing as the teacher (recitation) telling us to vote for candidates; that's not allowed. But the teacher always tells us that the leader must be a man; there is no history of Bandung Regency being led by a woman... (after being asked where she knew Bandung Regency had never been led by a woman) ... Yes, from the teacher."

Although Salimah is militant and even aggressive in its recruitment of recitation members, such as following mothers directly to their homes when there is no news to attend the recitation, it is gentle and very careful, especially when it comes to political doctrine. According to the informant, Salimah's recitation leaders have never encouraged the congregation to vote for one of the candidates. However, they have wrapped it in a verse so that the suggestion slowly but forcefully penetrates the community. This formation has long been used by the PKS in the Bandung Regency, so the implication is that the candidates they promote almost always win in West Java.

## **Conclusion**

Although PKS Bandung Regency is not a dominant power holder like PKS Depok City and several other areas where its militant cadres are based, it has its own challenges in Bandung Regency, namely to shift the dominance of the nationalist-secular group represented by Golkar, which has controlled Bandung Regency for years with strong network capital and a diverse cadre composition ranging from businessmen, successors to previous dynastic politics, to local strongmen in each region. Armed with intensive and targeted



consolidation in Muslim groups as the majority group in Bandung Regency, and using the momentum of internal conflict within Golkar, the PKS then managed to exploit the gap by adopting an offensive strategy through populist policies formulated by the national board, and a defensive strategy through long consolidation at grassroots level. As a result, the PKS won the second largest number of seats in parliament and has not ruled out the possibility of increasing its share in the 2024 general election. It is hoped that this research will serve as a gateway to subsequent studies of PKS manoeuvres, particularly in West Java, which is the party's main stronghold.

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