Intra-party Conflict and the Emergence of Islamic-Based Parties in the post-2019 Election in Indonesia

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Abstract: This article explains the emergence of new Islamic-based parties after the-2019 election in Indonesia. They are Ummah Party, Masyumi-Reborn Party, and Gelora Party. By using intra-party conflicts and path dependency theories, this study reveals that the emergence of those new Islamic parties is associated with frictions among party actors that troubled their prior parties, namely PAN, PBB, and PKS. The formation of the Ummah Party and Masyumi-Reborn Party was also situated by the 2014 and 2019 political contest, which represent the oppositional stance that could not be accommodated by the prior parties. Meanwhile, Gelora Party offered itself as a middle ground between the pro and contra camps of the government and provided a solution for the Islamic conservatism. This article argues that the emergence of new Islamic parties continues a pattern that has long plagued Indonesian Islamic-based parties, namely political fragmentation.

Keywords: Islamic parties, Indonesia, intra-party conflict, political fragmentation

Introduction

The number of Islamic-based parties has dwindled since the beginning of post-Suharto era. From around 42 parties ahead of the 1999 election to only five parties in the 2019 election. They include PPP, PAN, PKB, PKS, and PBB. However, although the government had stipulated the election law in 2017 that raised the electoral threshold by 4 percent, the new Islamic-based parties still emerged. They are Partai Ummat (Ummah Party), Partai Masyumi (Masyumi-Reborn Party), and Partai Gelora (Gelora Party). This article tries to explain the emergence of those parties in relation to intra-party conflicts and political fragmentation.

The limited participation of Islamic parties in Indonesia's democracy have been a concern of many social and political scientists. Some of them explaining it by using the conflict perspectives. Mashad (2008), for example, demonstrated that the fragmentation of Islamic parties in the post-reform era was induced by the fragility of its organizational solidity. Internal conflict is inevitable as a result of the contradictory views and interests that occurred among the party elites, and the disillusioned elites urge you to leave and form new parties. Noor (2016), who
scrutinized the PPP internal conflict in 2014, revealed that the leadership weakness and the strong elites’ interest have a role in creating the intra-party conflict. Those studies seem to agree that the inner conflict and fragmentation has degraded the Islamic-based parties’ electoral performance.

The frequent intra-party conflict that leads to fragmentation indicates the weak institutionalization of Islamic-based parties. Ufen (2006) stated that the parties in Indonesia were not supported by reliable organizational management so that the parties were highly dependent on government incentives. On this matter, Slater (2004) also expressed a similar view, that parties in Indonesia, including Islamic parties, tend to build pragmatic cooperation and coalitions to ensure access to various state resources. Such a condition has increase the tension of competition among party elites in fulfilling their political ambitions.

Other scholars emphasized the weak organizational performance and program behind the limitedness of Islamic parties. Such as Pepinsky, Liddle, & Mujani (2012) explained that the Islamic parties were hard to compete with the nationalist parties as the later have a clearer platform and work program. The Islamic-based parties are also less successful in electoral performance and are constantly disturbed by internal conflicts. In sum, Islamic-based parties’ vote acquisition tends to be high when economic conditions are uncertain, and it tends to be low in a stable economic condition. That could be one of the reasons why the votes of Islamic-based parties in post-reform Indonesia have never exceeded 33.75 percent in aggregate.

Other researchers explain the failure of Islamic parties to dominate Indonesian politics from socio-political cleavage or aliran (stream). Menchik (2006) and King (2000) stated that Indonesian Muslims are politically difficult to unite because they comprise divergent entities. Cultural division within the Muslim group are also diverse, including their political views. Not all Muslim voters are comfortable with Islamic parties. Some make it a political ideology, and some think there is no need to insert religion in political matter. At the same time, the political ideology of political parties in Indonesia does not adhere to a strict secular-religious dichotomy. Nationalist parties are also accommodating to the issues or interests of Islamic groups. In some nationalist parties, there are organs carry out religious functions, such as the Baitul Muslimin Indonesia in the PDIP and the Majelis Zikir (Zikr Council) in the Democrat Party. Likewise, many of politicians came from Islamic organizations in the nationalist party. This situation burden the Islamic-based parties in strengthening their positioning as a major representation for Muslim voters.

Of the many studies on the dynamics of Islamic parties in Indonesia, they generally explain the limitedness of Islamic parties in terms of institutionalization, leadership, and organizational performance. However, few studies highlight why Islamic parties continue to emerge during increasingly fierce electoral competition. In this regard, this article analyzes the establishment of new Islamic-based parties after the 2019 election: Ummah Party, the Masyumi-Reborn Party, and the Gelora Party. Two of the three parties, namely the Ummah
Party and the Masyumi-Reborn Party, carried Islam as their party's ideology. Meanwhile, the Gelora Party does not use Islam as formal ideology. However, the party cannot be overlooked from a robust Islamic narrative. For example, their founders claim that they were a form of post-Islamic struggle (Partai Gelora, 2020) and the idea of limiting religion's political role in realizing a state order tends to lead to secularization without being anti-Islam (Badamchi, 2015). With these ideological variations, the Islamic-based parties in this article are determined not only on party’s ideology but also on its Islamic base, activists or politicians, and political narratives.

The emergence of new Islamic-based parties after the 2019 elections is unprecedented, as they emerge under a political system designed to limit the number of political parties. Ahead of the 2019 election, the government and the legislature had stipulated Law no. 7/2017, where the parliamentary threshold was increased by 4 percent. This regulation is also intended to simplify political parties. Not to mention, the threshold in the 2024 Election Bill is proposed to be increased to 5 percent (Bayhaqi, 2021). This means that minor parties and new parties will find it hard to place their representatives in the DPR. In addition, the new parties had to compete with the much more existing/established parties.

However, the parliamentary threshold and tighter electoral competition did not prevent the formation of new Islamic-based parties. They emerged with the main actors who came from prior parties, such as Amin Rais (Ummah Party), Ahmad Yani (Masyumi-Reborn Party), and Anis Matta (Gelora Party). Accordingly, this article tries to answer why new Islamic-based parties emerged after 2019? What factors prompted the establishment of these parties? By explaining the causes of the emergence of new Islamic parties, this article is expected to enrich the understanding of the characteristics and dynamics of Islamic-based parties in Indonesia.

This paper relies on a theoretical explanation of intra-party conflict and path-dependency to project the phenomenon of the emergence of new Islamic-based parties. Intra-party conflicts are commonplace in political parties because parties are organizations that consist of diverse individuals. Due to the various compositions, conflicts often occur between party units, for example, as cadres were dissatisfied with central policies, disagreement over party platforms, and disputes over the selection of party management (Gherghina, Close, & Kopecký, 2019). Meanwhile, Nurdin, Saputra, & Prayitno (2019), who studied the PPP and PKS, exposed that the intra-party conflict also could be stimulated by the differences between its elites support of national political contests. Examining PKS’s internal conflicts in 2016, Akmar (2019) showed that ideological differences drove internal conflicts. The diversity within the party also causes differences in policy preferences, both in terms of internal-party and government policies. At a certain level, these discrepancies also trigger competition and conflict among cadres who have political ambitions (Ceron, 2016).
This article uses path-dependency analysis due to the continuity of political fragmentation patterns driven by conflict between party elites. This perspective views that the outcomes or circumstances that take place in an organization have paths of dependency on previous processes, routines, and practices (Braithwaite, 2020). Based on the explanation of path-dependency, this article argues that the emergence of new Islamic-based parties after the 2019 election is an implication impelled by processes, routines, and practices that have occurred in the previous political events. In line with the flow of the explanation, this article looks at the emergence of new Islamic-based parties related to the conflicts in the parties where its actors took part in their former parties. Such as the Ummah Party, which is associated with PAN, the Masyumi-Reborn Party with the PBB, and the Gelora Party with PKS. In understanding intra-party conflicts that lead to the emergence of new Islamic-based parties, this research also scrutinizes the external context, namely the political events around the 2014 and 2019 elections.

Methods
This research was built through a qualitative method using a path dependency approach. This approach builds on the political science tradition that takes the historical institutionalist context. This approach aligns with the theory that views unexpected changes in institutional aspects as the actors make inappropriate decisions that eventually hindering progress (Greener, 2005). The study exercised on-desk research, collecting data from the Internet that informed the events and parties’ actors statements relating to the emergence of Ummah Party, Masyumi-Reborn Party, and Gelora Party. We scrutinized relevant events and actors’ statements not only from those parties but also encompass the prior parties, i.e. PAN, PKS, and PBB.

This study analyzed the narratives about events and statements from actors recorded in various media, such as news media and social media. News sources that provide descriptions of events are selected from national media known to have good reporting reputations, such as Tempo.co, Detik.com, Merdeka.com, and Kompas.com. The analysis focused on both the narratives and statements of the parties actors relating to its intra-party conflicts before the 2014 election to 2019 election. In addition, the narrative or discourse of the opposition of activist groups against the Jokowi’s government was also examined as part explanation of the emergence of new Islamic-based parties, especially the Ummah Party and the Masjumi-Reborn Party.

Result and Discussion
Roots of Islamic-based Intra-party Conflict and Fragmentation
The discussion of this article starts from the historical-institutional tracking of Islamic-based political parties based on political periods, especially those who were still active in the last general election (2019), namely PPP, PKB, PAN, PKS, PBB. Conflicts in Islamic parties are not new but have started since post-independence. In 1952, there was an internal conflict within the Masyumi Party due to the disappointment of the NU group over the lack of strategic positions they had. The NU group then left the Masyumi Party and
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founded the NU Party. In the New Order era, the PPP, which was formed in 1973, also often experienced internal conflicts caused by government intervention that removed specific figures for the sake of regime stability. Clashes also occurred due to differences in political views and attitudes of party elites towards the ruling government, until some NU figures left PPP with the slogan "return to khittah" in 1984 as a critical step against Suharto (Budiarti, 2016).

After the 1999 elections, Islamic parties emerged because political openness after the 1998 reformation encouraged Islamic figures to actualize their political views through elections. With diverse sociological backgrounds, the parties formed also varied according to their social bases and theological views. Around 42 parties out of the 148 newly formed parties were classified as Islam-based. However, only 20 Islam-based parties passed the verification in the election. The spirit of establishing a new Islamic party was also influenced by historical orientation, in which Islamic parties had achieved significant electoral achievements in 1955. Assuming the majority of Islamic voters in Indonesia, Islamic leaders perceive this condition as a political opportunity in realizing Islamic-based political ideas (Romli, 2004).

However, after the 1999 elections, conflicts between Islamic-based parties began to appear in PPP. In 2002, Hamzah Haz’s camp conflicted with Zainudin MZ’s camp, which caused Zainudin MZ to establish PPP Reformasi, and later became the Reform Star Party (PBR). During that period, conflicts also occurred in the PKB, when Matori Abdul Djalil committed ‘disobedience’ by attending the MPR Special Session in 2001, which impeached Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) and supported Megawati as president. Matori was later appointed as Minister of Defense in the Gotong Royong Cabinet (2001-2004). The PKB then split between the Alwi Shihab camp supported by Gus Dur (PKB Kuningan) and the Matori camp (PKB Batutulis). Matori then founded a new party called the Democratic Awakening Party (Pekade). The conflict of divisions also occurred at the PBB, which gave birth to the Indonesian Islamic Party (PII) and the Indonesian Al-Islam Party (PAS) (Kamarudin, 2013).

After the 2004 elections, PKB again experienced internal conflicts. This time, Gus Dur fired Alwi Shihab and Syaifullah Yusuf from the party board because they were appointed as ministers in the government of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) without Gus Dur's approval. Alwi Shihab’s camp had put up a fight by mobilizing kyai langitan and holding a counter-party meeting in Surabaya. Gus Dur’s camp finally won the dispute and placed Muhamin Iskandar as general chairman in 2005. However, in 2008 battle occurred again in the PKB elite circle involving Gus Dur and Muhamin Iskandar. The party was again divided because the two camps held an Extraordinary Congress (MLB), namely the Gus Dur camp (PKB Parung) and the Muhamin Iskandar camp (PKB Ancol). Muhamin later won the party dispute (Kamarudin, 2013). The prolonged conflict within the PKB prompted the establishment of new parties. In 2007, a group of kyai founded the Nahdatul Ulama Awakening Party (PKNU). Meanwhile,
Yenni Wahid registered the Indonesian National Sovereignty Party (PKBI) to participate in the 2009 election.

In 2006, internal party conflicts also rocked PAN. In line with the increasing openness of PAN, including in party recruitment and management, some cadres from Muhammadiyah circles were disappointed because they felt marginalized. The group then decided to form a new political party called the Matahari Bangsa Party (PMB) with Islamic principles. The nuanced factional conflict can be seen from their claim that the party was born from Muhammadiyah ideology that PAN did not absorb (Detik.com, 2006). However, PMB then faded after it failed to gain enough votes in the 2009 election. During this period, PKS was also indicated to have experienced internal conflicts. Yet, the closed party mechanism keeps the conflict from being exposed. The voices of disappointment came from PKS cadres who saw the changes in the party that were increasingly open and its militancy decreased. They then formed ‘PKS Watch’ to sound their critical views. Meanwhile, among the more senior groups, they formed the Care Cadre Forum (FKP) in 2007. They were concerned about the dismissal of critical cadres and wanted the party reaffirmed its ideology.

After the 2009 election, conflicts within the PKS became increasingly noticeable. In 2013, the PKS executive leader, Luthfi Hasan Ishaq (LHI), was arrested by the KPK for a bribery. The incident ignited the anger of the cadres over the pragmatic leaning of the party board. Moreover, at that time, the party was facing the 2014 election. At the 5th PKS National Conference (Munas) in Bandung, 2015, the party meeting changed the party board. Anis Matta’s group, which was considered responsible for the LHI case, no longer occupied strategic positions. Anis Matta then founded the Indonesian New Direction Movement (Garbi), an organization to carry out his ideas that could not be implemented in the PKS. In 2016, a conflict occurred between Fahri Hamzah (an ally of Anis Matta) and party officials, leading to Fahri’s dismissal.

Ahead of the 2014 election, internal conflicts retook place in PPP. There was friction between the general chairman, Suryadarma Ali, and the party secretary-general, Romahurmuzy. Suryadarma Ali’s unilateral action to support Prabowo for the 2014 presidential election triggered the conflict between them. Meanwhile, the party has not yet produced an agreement regarding support for the presidential election. Romahurmuzy, who is Secretary-General, opposed Ali, which was followed by the firing of each other between the two camps. PPP was split after each camp held a congress, namely the Surabaya congress led by Romahurmuzy and the Jakarta congress led by Humphrey Djemat. The conflict subsided after the Supreme Court won the Romahurmuzy's camp in 2017.

At the PBB, internal conflicts arose when facing the 2019 election. The conflict was inseparable from the political constellation of the presidential race, marked by the rise of conservative Islam in opposition to the Jokowi-Kalla government. In 2016 and 2017, some PBB's politicians sympathized with or joined the 212 Islamic Defending Action (ABI) movement, including the Chairman of the Shura Council, MS Kaban. They then supported ijtima ulama in determining support for presidential candidates in 2019, where the move was a sort of
support for Prabowo (Cnnindonesia.com, 2019). However, Yusril Ihza Mahendra as the party’s general chairman, decided that PBB should join the Jokowi-Ma’ruf coalition (Anugrahadi, 2019). Yusril’s political move disappointed other party elites who opposed the Jokowi’s government, and they eventually left the party.

Internal conflicts due to differences in political support in facing the 2019 elections were also experienced by PAN. Amien Rais, who was critical of the Jokowi government from the start, tried to bring party support to Prabowo-Sandi in the 2019 presidential election. Meanwhile, other party officials, including Zulkifli Hasan, tended to bring PAN to the government and become part of the Jokowi-Amin coalition. The internal friction eventually formed two camps, namely the Amien Rais camp and the Zulkifli camp, which resulted in the party’s split after the 2019 election.

From the description above, generally, the intra-party conflicts of Islamic-based parties are triggered by the formation of interest-based elites circles that fighting for party authority. The intra-party conflicts also related to the governmental politics for some parties, such as in the PKB, which was affected by the political constellation in 2001 and 2004, PPP in 2014, and PAN and PBB in 2019. Nevertheless, it should be noted that intra-party conflicts happen not only to Islamic-based parties but also to other parties, such as Golkar Party (2014), Hanura Party (2019), and Berkarya Party (2019). This means that the intra-party conflict stems from the problem of party institutionalization, where organizational management is unable to overcome competition among its elites. In this discussion, the conflicts between Islamic-based parties have provided a historical context for the emergence of new Islamic parties after 2019. In detail, a discussion of the conflicts and fragmentation behind the founding of the Ummah Party, Masyumi-Reborn Party, and Gelora Party depicted as follows:

Conflicts and Fragmentation on the Emergence of new Islamic-Based Parties

Ummah Party

The Ummah Party was declared on April 29, 2021, with General Chairman Ridho Rahmadi and the position of Secretary-General held by Ahmad Muhajir Sodruddin. Its founder is Amien Rais, former Chairman of the PAN Board of Trustees. The Amien Rais exit from PAN was preceded by a prolonged friction with Zulkifli Hasan, the General Chair of PAN. The quarrel between the two party’s top leaders was triggered by discrepancy in responding the Jokowi’s government, whereas Amien constantly criticized the government, Zulkifli tend to conform. Just after the 2014 election, PAN made a tactical move by employing the two side strategy. In the opposition side, their maneuver at KMP had succeeded in placing Zulkifli Hasan as the leader of the MPR. The party then joined the government in 2016, which obtained the minister’s seat for Bureaucratic Reform State Apparatus Empowerment (PAN-RB) filled with Asnan Abnur.

Despite being part of the ruling government, PAN was often at odds with the government, as in the Election Bill and
the Civil Organization Bill in 2017 (Setyawan, 2018). Amien Rais also continued to criticize the government. He built proximity to the opposition parties, Gerindra Party and PKS, preparing to challenge the incumbent Jokowi in the 2019 election. Amien Rais even played as one of the central figures in various protests against the government, for example, at the 212 Defending Islam Action. Ahead of the 2019 election, Amin dragged PAN closer to the opposition forces. He stated that the constituents did not want the party to be in Jokowi’s coalition. The lack of alignment with PAN in various government policies and Amien Rais’s attitude that continues to attack the government made PAN thrown out of the government coalition in 2018 (Ali, 2018).

The friction between Zulkifli and Amien Rais regarding the party’s stance towards the government coalition heated up again in the 2019 presidential election. Zulkifli Hasan wanted the party to be in the Jokowi-Amin camp. On the other hand, Amies Rais has far built a perception at the grassroots that PAN was part of the coalition that supports Prabowo. In the ranks of the central party board, the majority have agreed that the party would join the Jokowi-Amin coalition. However, Amien Rais as Chairman of the party’s Board of Trustees later ‘canceled’ the agreement and directed the party’s support to Prabowo-Sandiaga. Amien Rais’ actions then sparked disappointment from the Zulkifli camp (Aditya, 2021a).

The PAN conflict then increasingly led to a split at the 5th PAN congress event in Kendari. At the event, Amin Rais’ camp accused the congress of being fraudulent. Amin Rais was not included in the management structure in the party board for the 2020-2025 period (Prabowo, 2020). Before the congress took place, divisions had already appear in which many cadres of regional administrators (regional and branch leaders), known to be Amin Rais loyalists, were replaced. Amin’s supporters believed that if the congress was fair, they would undoubtedly win. However, they suspected the government intervention was present, so that Zulkifli Hasan won the board. After the congress was over, the PAN new board letter from the Ministry of Law and Human Rights was issued, which became the basis for the suspicions of Amin Rais’ camp that Zulkifli Hasan had the government support. Loyalist Amin Rais also did not accept the Zulkifli legitimacy. They insisted that Amin Rais should be in the party board. Because his demands were not responded to, Amien Rais loyalists then planned to create a party version of Amin Rais’ camp, namely PAN Reformasi (Putra, 2020).

Then, Amin Rais and his son, Hanafi Rais, who had served as vice-chairman of PAN and chairman of the PAN faction in the DPR, decided to resign. Interestingly, Hanafi Rais’ decision was regretted by his younger brother who also serves as the administrator of the PAN, Mumtaz Rais. In the conflict between Zulkifli and Amin Rais, Mumtaz Rais was in Zulkifli’s side. This may be related to a personal relationship, where Zulkifli is the father-in-law of Mumtaz Rais. Because Mumtaz supported Zulkifli, he ended up in a family conflict with Amin Rais (Akbar, 2020a).

The conflict between the two camps can also be seen as a ‘family’ conflict and indicates the PAN’s party institutionalization as somewhat problematic.
Responding to the formation of the Reform PAN, Amin Rais initially disagreed because he was more focused on changing the congress's results (Akbar, 2020b). However, in July 2020, Amien admitted that he had been dismissed as a PAN cadre because he was not willing to support the Jokowi-Amin government. Amien's refusal is due to his belief that the current state has been controlled by oligarchic forces, which have caused political and economic sovereignty to have shifted entirely from the people to the capitalists (Aritonang, 2021). In August 2021, supporters of Amien Rais with his figurehead Agung Mozin urged the formation of a new party. On October 1, 2020, Amien Rais announced that his new party would use the name Ummah Party and at the same time, PAN stated that Amien Rais was no longer their cadre. Amien Rais then declared the establishment of the Ummah Party on April 29, 2021. In its leadership structure, Amien Rais served as Chairman of the Syuro Council, General Chairperson Ridho Rahmadi, and Secretary-General Ahmad Muhajir Sodruddin (Aditya, 2021b).

Apart from being motivated by conflicts between elites in PAN, the establishment of the Ummah Party was driven by taking advantage of public disillusionment with the political order in the Jokowi era. However, in general, this party criticized the whole political power system by the oligarchs, where both the executive and the legislature are colluded and abandoned people's interests. Therefore, the narrative carried by the Ummah Party is related to continuing the struggle of the Amien Rais camp in PAN in fighting against injustice, where the antagonist is pinned to the Jokowi's government (Saputro, 2021).

The resistance narrative, which is also ideologically nuanced, with perceptions of injustice and tyranny, indicates that the Ummah Party uses a populist strategy. The populist strategy implemented by the Ummah Party is a compulsion because the party was born out of discontent with the Jokowi's government but was not accommodated by the previous party, PAN. This strategy is also plausible because the Ummah Party was founded by figures still considered charismatic, especially among Muhammadiyah followers, PAN constituents loyal to Amien Rais, and those who more agree with Amien Rais' critical stance in responding to the Jokowi's government. Specifying Islam as party's ideology and the fact that since the 2014 election most Muhammadiyah followers did not vote Jokowi (Kompas.com, 2014) might be the base for the Ummah Party to grasp the Muhammadiyah followers in the 2024 election.

**Masyumi-Reborn Party**

The Masyumi-Reborn Party was founded on November 7, 2020. The date of its founding was coincided with the 75th anniversary of the old Masyumi Party. The party's general chairman is Ahmad Yani, a politician who has changed parties several times, including PAN, PPP, and PBB. The general vice chairmen are Zulkifli Ali, Ahmad Heri, Alfian Tanjung, Abdul Khoir, and Ahmad Murjoko. Meanwhile, the party’s Syuro Council chairman is Abdullah Hehamahua (a former KPK adviser) with members Ahmad Cholil Ridwan, Abdul Manan, Adnin Arnas, Abbas
Thaha Bachtiar Nasir, Masri Sitanggang, Sahar El Hasan (Cnnindonesia.com, 2021). Of these figures, names like Alfian Tanjung has been imprisoned because cornered the government with accusations of the PKI. As the name implies, the Masyumi-Reborn Party aspires to restore the glory of the Masyumi Party, which once took part in the 1955 elections. At that time, the Masyumi Party was in second place with 57 seats after the PNI. Their primary aspiration is almost similar to the orientation of the Crescent Star Party (PBB), where Yusril Izha Mahendra is also an ideological pupil of M. Natsir.

The similarity with the PBB is not only in historical and ideological romanticism but also in characters. Several figures have previously worked at the PBB, including Ahmad Yani, Abbas Thaha, Masri Sitanggang, and Sahar El Hasan. This means that there are signs of ongoing internal divisions at the PBB, which have caused some of its leaders to leave and establish new parties. There were differences in political direction at the PBB around the 2019 presidential election, where the Chair of the PBB Syuro Council recommended parties to support Prabowo-Sandi (Antara, 2019). Meanwhile, Yusril Izha Mahendra sided with Jokowi-Amin and became the head of the candidate legal team. After the 2019 presidential election, the PBB under Yusril decided to continue supporting the Jokowi-Amin government until 2024 (Hakim, 2019). The PBB Secretary-General, Afriansyah Ferry Noor, acknowledged that their internal friction during the 2019 presidential election was due to some cadres that had been at clashed with Yusril Izha Mahendra and were therefore not accommodated in the party board for the 2020 period (Andayani, 2020). However, not all disillusioned figures at the PBB have founded or joined the Masyumi-Reborn Party. MS Kaban, who once held the Chair of the PBB Shura Council, chose to join the Ummah Party with Amien Rais (Aditya, 2021c).

Like PAN, the intra-party conflict at the PBB also involved some party leaders who opposed the Jokowi’s government. Ahmad Yani, a former PBB politician who later became chairman of the Masyumi-Reborn Party, once joined the Indonesian Rescue Action Coalition (KAMI), a forum or organization that actively criticizes the Jokowi’s government. They consisted of opposition figures such as Gatot Nurmantyo, Hidayat Nur Wahid, Amien Rais, and Rocky Gerung. Although it has nothing to do with KAMI, the involvement of several figures from the Masyumi-Reborn Party in it shows that there is a shading of the struggling spirit that puts forward an oppositional attitude to the Jokowi government with a narrative that is also almost the same as the Ummah Party.

The oppositional and populist-style narrative of the Masyumi-Reborn Party can be seen in its vision that puts forward an orientation to fix politics, which, according to them, is far from Pancasila values. They highlight the political processes under the Jokowi administration, which are far from prioritizing the people's interests. As in the case of the passing of the omnibus law, the mineral and coal law, and the issue of land reform. They also criticized the vast amount of state debt and the neglecting of religious values in education. Furthermore, the Masyumi-Reborn Party initiated the formation of the Islamic
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Faction as happened in 1955 and 1994 (Detiknews, 2021). Therefore, they claim they do not want to compete with the existing Islamic parties but rather target Islamic voters who have not voted for an Islamic party. They saw a significant potency of the Islamic voter in the low voter turnout for Islamic parties in the 2019 election, which was only around 30% (Alfons, 2021).

The presence of politicians who have been critical of the government and the background of disappointment with the previous party, which did not accommodate oppositional stances, made the emergence of the Masyumi-Reborn Party not much different from the Ummah Party. The two parties also contain many similarities in terms of ideological views and political narratives. However, even though it is based on an Islamic mass base and targets the ABI 212 sympathizers, the Masyumi-Reborn Party does not display a solid political Islamic narrative. They also show less ideological differences with the PBB. The political account that is put forward is more about national politics, justice, and the economy. The factors that encourage the emergence of the party are more about power contestation among the party elites, and it intensified due to differences in views in responding to the political situation.

Gelora Party

The Gelora Party was founded on October 28, 2019, with general chairman Anis Matta, Deputy General Chairman Fahri Hamzah, and secretary-general Mahfuz Sidiq. The party platform promoted by this party is different from the Ummah Party and the Masyumi-Reborn Party, where the Gelora Party has a more open, nationalist ideological view but does not contradict the Islamic ideology and nationalist. They offer alternative politics in the midst of strengthening indications of political flow, especially among Muslims. They prefer to put their political orientation in the middle or moderate by highlighting public issues, such as economic welfare and people's living standards (Umam, 2020). Before the Gelora Party was founded, Anis Matta and several PKS politicians had formed Garbi that implemented the idea of Anis Matta's New Indonesia Direction.

However, the internal conflict between the Anis Matta camp and the PKS board has not subsided since the 2015 PKS national meeting. The conflict escalated, and Anis Matta's group eventually left PKS and founded the Gelora Party (Umam, 2020). The internal conflict in PKS had been going on for a long time before Anis Matta's group decided to leave the party. The conflict is related to the feud between the two camps, representing contradictory views, namely the conservative and progressive, also known as the justice faction and the prosperous faction. The conservative camp consists of seniors in PKS who occupy the Syuro Council, while the prosperous, progressive camp consists of young cadres who have a direction of renewal. They were driven by, among others, Anis Matta, Mahfudz Shidiq, and Fahri Hamzah (Herdiansah, 2016).

If traced, internal conflicts in PKS have emerged after the 2004 elections. The trigger is the visional difference among the inner elites. In 2009, frictions about Anis Matta's group intensified because of his statements about an open
and a middle way party orientation. In 2013, the LHI arrest made Anis Matta a PKS caretaker. However, since the case, Anis Matta has been under the spotlight because he is considered responsible for tarnishing the party’s image. At the 2015 PKS National Conference, Hilmy Aminudin’s position as Chairman of the Syuro Council was replaced by Salim Segaf, and Mohamad Sohibul Iman held the party’s president. Since the change in party board, the Anis Matta group no longer occupies a strategic position in the party. In 2016, Fahri Hamzah was asked by Salim Segaf to step down from the position of deputy chairman of the DPR to be replaced by Ledia Hanifa. However, Fahri disobeyed and took the case to court. At the same time, the term orang.sini (the ingroup, osin) emerged as the ruling camp, which means those who submit to Sohibul Iman and Salim Segaf as official party officials. Meanwhile, the term orang.sana (the outgroup, osan) refers to Anis Matta’s loyalist who was dissatisfied or defiant at the PKS leadership.

According to Mahfudz Shidiq, the conflict occurred due to contradicting views that could not be compromised anymore. The conservative camp insisted on maintaining the initial concept of the party’s founding, which required cadres to obey the party. This qiyadah doctrine was considered authoritarian, where obedience in the party was everything. According to Anis Matta’s camp, this kind of doctrine hinders the political achievements of both the party and its cadres. For example, Mardani Ali Sera initially wanted to be nominated for deputy governor of DKI in 2017 but failed after the Shura Council did not give his blessing (al Faqir & Kadafi, 2019). Another objection from Anis Matta’s camp is the closed management of the party, including how decisions are made. Since the conflict escalated, the PKS board, after the 2015 National Conference, fired cadres who were deemed to be against or close to Anis Matta. For example, in Situbondo, the chairman of the party region who was fired for refusing to sign a resignation letter with a blank date (Erwati, 2018).

From that series of events, Anis Matta began to think about reforms and initiated a New Direction for Indonesia. The idea was welcomed by former cadres, which the party dismissed. Anis Matta carried out an aggressive political campaign by spreading billboards in regions with the slogan “Arah Baru Indonesia” (ABI). The PKS leadership did not like anis Matta’s political movement and his ABI idea (Putri, 2018). Anis Matta is considered presumptuous to carry out a political safari and strongly emphasizes that he wants to run as a presidential candidate for 2019, even without the party’s permission. In fact, PKS already has its mechanism in determining who will be campaigned as a presidential candidate from the party (Erizal, 2018). These frictions indicate political ambition among the elite, which is not accommodated due to the tight party regular mechanism.

Because it was no longer possible to realize the idea of an open party, Anis Matta and his group left PKS and founded the Gelora Party. Although many cadres regretted the split, the movement was very well accepted by Anis Matta’s followers. Anis Matta has more freedom to realize his vision of a party that emphasizes openness and freedom of thought by establishing a new party. However, the idea of eliminating the
dichotomy of nationalism and Islam does not mean that the Gelora Party is out of the Islamic vision. They often express the concept of post-Islamism and refer to Turkey's Erdogan as a political path that can solve the nation's problems. Internally, Anis Matta wants to build an organizational culture that allows criticism for improvement. The party's platform is promoting the spirit to stop the dichotomy between Islam-based parties and nationalist parties and combine them with the Pancasila principle. Even though Fahri Hamzah rejects the notion that the Gelora Party is religious, their Islamic narrative remains strong. For example, in its last paragraph, the party's manifesto states, "By putting your trust in Allah..." (Partai Gelora, 2019).

The establishment of the Gelora Party, thus, was the implementation of political ideas among the PKS progressive camp that did not have a place in the party. This is in line with Gherghina, Close, & Kopecký (2019) about the cadre's dissatisfaction with the party platform. The idea of reform and modern parties brought by Anis Matta and his group did not get enough support among PKS inner circles, which are conservative. Therefore, the founding of the Gelora Party was driven by fragmentation within the PKS due to two things. First, differences in ideological views or party orientations eventually gave rise to the post-Islamist narrative in the Gelora Party as a contradiction to the Islamist party pinned on PKS. Second, the contest of interests among the elites, which the progressive camp failed to realize their ideas as they failed to sustain the party's board structure.

**Table 1. Depiction of New Islamic-based Parties Emergence**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aspects</th>
<th>Ummah Party</th>
<th>Masyumi-R Party</th>
<th>Gelora Party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prior intra-party conflict</td>
<td>PAN</td>
<td>PBB</td>
<td>PKS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discontent toward the government</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideological division</td>
<td>Yes but not prominent</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic vision</td>
<td>Overt</td>
<td>Overt</td>
<td>Subtle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Base</td>
<td>Muhammadiyah or/and Amien Rais followers, ABI 212 sympathizers</td>
<td>Masyumi followers, ABI 212 sympathizers</td>
<td>Ex-PKS progressive followers, youth intellectuals</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Conclusion**

This article concludes that two factors led to the emergence of new Islamic parties after the 2019 general election. First, borrowing from the path-dependency theory, the establishment of the three post-2019 Islamic-based parties was driven by conflict events that had long existed in the previous parties. The conflict occurred because of differences in views,
platforms, and strategies in responding to political developments and power contestation among the party’s elites. Second, the factor of political turbulence that rocked Islamic parties in 2014-2019. The ongoing political polarization in this period has increased identity-based awareness in the Islamic voter base, impacting demands for parties to accommodate both aspects of the values and interests of constituents. The development of the situation affected the party’s internal turmoil, especially in PAN and PBB. Some parties within the party are motivated to fight for the interests and values of the voter base that are not or are not accommodated by the party. Interestingly, the political turbulence that also rocked the PPP did not lead to the emergence of new parties. This issue is interesting to be studied in future research.

The emergence of new Islamic-based parties after the 2019 election still has a similar pattern as conflicts that have occurred before, as revealed by Mashad (2008). Internal party conflicts in Islamic parties are also in line with differences in policy preferences, both internal to the party and the government (Ceron, 2016), as shown by the Ummah Party (PAN) and the Masyumi-Reborn Party (PBB). However, in the post-election period of 2019, the establishment of Islamic-based parties was also influenced by political turbulence from the presidential contest, which ignited polarization. This condition had an impact significantly on the Ummah Party and the Masjumi-Reborn Party. Meanwhile, the Gelora Party is not carried away by the current polarization in the sense of siding with one of the camps, whether pro Jokowi or in opposition. They try to offer the idea of a middle ground by combining Islamic and nationalist views. Such statements are not new in Indonesian political landscape. The Democrat Party, for example, also carries a nationalist-religious orientation as an accommodative idea of the dualism of political views that have been built on the socio-political history in Indonesia, Islam vs. nationalist.

The arguments brought by the Gelora Party tend to reflect anti-thesis attitudes and thoughts towards the construction of the PKS political ideology. However, the polarized political situation has somewhat inflicted the Gelora Party establishment. They offer an alternative to a segment of the electorate who is hindered by the dichotomy between pro-government, nationalist, secularist on the one hand, and anti-regime government, Islamist, and religious on the other. Meanwhile, the Ummah Party and the Masyumi-Reborn Party positioned themselves as opposition forces for the government regime. In fact, the conflict behind the establishment of the two parties was driven by differences in its faction’s stance towards the Jokowi government. The Ummah Party and the Masyumi-Reborn Party are trying to attract voters who are dissatisfied with the performance of the Jokowi government. The founders or administrators of the Ummah Party and Masyumi-Reborn Party are adamant in the opposition and consider their actions as a nation and state while also reflecting negative aspects of the Jokowi government. The inclusion of Islamic symbols in the party also indicates targeting the Muslim segment of voters who feel under-represented by PKS, PBB, and PAN.
The emergence of new Islamic-based parties after 2019 still shows the problem of weak party institutionalization, as revealed by Tan (2006) and Ufen (2008). The problematic of party institutionalization is also marked by the fragility of solidarity and commitment to the party's struggle simply because of its elites power contestation and differences in responding to political developments. The actors of the Islamic-based parties generally are unable to put the party's interests above theirs. They are weak in designing party actions as part of a strategic struggle to achieve long-term goals. The Islamic-based party politicians also tend to use the party as a personal instrument (personalization) that serves their short-term political interests. This is indicated by the ease with which the side who 'lose' in conflicts choose to leave the party and establish a new one. On the other hand, the ruling party faction also tends to eliminate opposing side to smooth out the party's achievements in the next election.

**About Author**

The author is a lecturer of political sociology in the Department of Political Science, Universitas Padjadjaran. His field of study includes politics in Muslim societies and identity politics.

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Herdriansah, Intra-party Conflict and the Emergence of Islamic-Based Parties in the post-2019 Election in Indonesia


