Challenges and Implications of Indonesia's Strategic Position in Maritime Security

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Abstract: The primary goal is to evaluate the regional maritime security problems that Indonesia is now confronting. As is well known, with the beginning of the twenty-first century came the introduction of a new word in regional maritime architecture. The significance of the sea in the current era of globalization has prompted all countries to manage their maritime interests and share concerns in a collaborative, cooperative, and inclusive manner, according to the United Nations. Throughout the period, Indonesia grew more connected than it had been previously. Indonesia, located in Southeast Asia, rose to prominence as a worldwide power in this century. Of course, as a result of its actions, new issues in maritime security have arisen. International relations, maritime cooperation, port and shipping sectors, as well as comparative politics and international relations, as well as Southeast Asian politics and society, will find this article of interest on the topic of maritime security.

Keywords: Cooperation, Maritime, Regional, Security, Southeast Asia

Introduction

A scarcity of resources for law enforcement and maritime order preservation; the necessity and obligation to preserve maritime security; and a scarcity of resources for maritime law enforcement and maritime order maintenance. While Indonesia has a long history of maritime competence, the country has lagged behind in terms of regulating and mastering emerging technology so that the government can carry out its duties with greater control over the seas and oceans. The Indonesian Navy recognizes a lack of surveillance and investigation capability throughout the country's territorial waters, particularly in the Straits of Malacca and the Straits of Singapore. The Indonesian Navy recognizes a scarcity of defense both in terms of quality and quantity of instruments, infrastructure, and manpower throughout the country’s territorial waters.

Several governments have made their official marine strategy publications available for public consumption. The names of them are as follows: The United States of America, France, India, Canada, and the Netherlands are among the countries involved. The majority, if not all, of these maritime strategy texts maintain that protecting their maritime borders against conventional and
unconventional marine threats is of paramount importance. As demonstrated by including a defense dimension in states’ maritime strategies, combat plays a crucial role in the overall maritime strategy. The battlefield has shifted considerably as a result of defense technology advancements. According to several researchers, the technology employed in future wars is likely to be in its fifth iteration. There has been an increase in planes, submarines, surface ships, and missiles. As of 2016, the advancement of fighter aircraft technology confirms that we have entered fifth-generation warfare. A "Fifth-generation" fighter combines stealth, maneuverability, modern avionics, data fusion networks of sensors, and aircraft that can conduct a variety of tasks (Briganti 2012). Then, technology plays a critical role.

Submarines, for example, have reached the fifth generation of maritime combat technology. According to Keck, Russia has built fifth-generation submarines that place a premium on network-centric capabilities, diminishing the primacy of size and speed (Keck 2015). Sea lanes have been used as a connecting conduit between nations for several centuries and have benefited humanity's growth. According to eminent researcher Geoffrey Till, marine usage has four advantages. Its resources include a valuable route for transit and commerce, utility as a medium of information exchange, and utility as a tool for political control (Till 2005). With the advancement of technological technologies, the quick usage of the oceans to connect countries throughout the world has increased.

Maritime security cooperation is the focal point of cooperation among littoral states in Southeast Asia, and information-sharing is essential in resolving the region’s maritime security challenges. Since the early 2000s, the Maritime Security Initiative has been one of numerous previously unknown efforts to increase regional collaboration on maritime security. In 2003, members of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) convened in Cambodia to examine various issues, with maritime security being one of the most important. On the occasion of that meeting, the ARF adopted several measures, including increased contact and information sharing among personnel; antipiracy exercises; regional training in antipiracy; and control over the movement of radicals across borders by implementing new measures (Acharya, 2011).

The ASEAN Special Ministerial Meeting on Terrorism, held in 2002 by the ASEAN Special Ministerial Meeting, established an agreement on a strategy for implementing the Southeast Asian Community's Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crime, specifically addressing maritime security issues (ASEAN, 2002). As a response to the issue of sea piracy, the work plan includes a number of projects in information exchange and legal and law enforcement matters. At the ASEAN Maritime Forum and the ASEAN Regional Forum, participants discussed ways to deal with piracy, smuggling of commodities and people, the trafficking of illegal drugs, and terrorist attacks on ships, as well as other maritime calamities. International cooperative
security operations have been shown to be particularly effective in the Straits of Malacca, where multilateral cooperation has been particularly effective. For specific reasons, this has occurred due to a significant increase in anxiety, particularly among people in the business sector, as a result of the area's designation as a "War Zone" by the London-based insurance firm AXA in 2005 (Committee, 2005).

In response to growing public concern, the three coastal states of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore were driven to get together and collaborate to find an acceptable solution to the situation (Muhibat, 2007). For the most part, the littoral countries put their long-simmering territorial issues aside and began exchanging intelligence and conducting coordinated patrols of the area in response to the crisis. At the beginning of April 2004, authorities from the three coastal states agreed to organize the Malsindo, a joint patrol in the Malacca Straits comprised of all three countries' navies (Indonesia, 2004). In total, seventeen vessels from the three littoral states make up the joint special task force that protects the Straits of Hormuz and ensures effective year-round enforcement of maritime law in and around the canal and on patrol (Defence, 2004).

Combined coordinated air patrols over the Straits of Malacca, dubbed the Eye in the Sky (EiS), were developed in 2005 to expand the coverage of aviation patrols over the Straits of Malacca (Defence S. M., 2005). "Eye in the Sky" (EiS) is a military and marine enforcement agency of the participating countries from all around the world that participate in a joint maritime air patrol. Operating in a secure setting forces "shoulder-to-shoulder" teamwork, which means that team members must discuss knowledge and expose previously tightly held talents, despite a long-standing culture of secrecy and suspicion among the three individuals involved (Frost, 2008:190).

The Malacca Straits Maritime Patrols (MSSP) program was renamed in 2006, and the Indonesian Institute of Security (IIS) worked with the Malacca Straits Patrol (MSP) network to develop standard operating procedures for the marine patrols. Since 2006, as a result of this development, the MSP has been divided into three components: the MSSP, the EiS, and the Intelligence Exchange Group (IEG) all work together. As a way to help the group's work, officials from the three littoral governments have formed a joint coordination committee that meets once a month to assist the group's work. Additionally, a number of working groups have been formed to assist the committee in various ways. Participants also benefit from the sharing of information and intelligence. The MSP Information System, which the IEG developed to promote coordination and situational awareness among military personnel, was later implemented. When substantial efforts are made, littoral states cooperate under the guidance of a coordinated hotline command structure. When the MSP Information Sharing Exercise was launched in Singapore in 2008, military personnel from the three littoral states
and Thailand took part in the inaugural exercise. A year and a half later, in 2008, Thailand was admitted as an official member of the MSP (Defence S. M., Thailand Joins Malacca Straits Patrols, 2008).

Following adjustments to the original arrangements, Thailand began participating in the MSSP in October 2008 and the EiS in January 2009, after which it began participating in the MSSP in October 2008. Thailand’s operational area includes the Andaman Sea’s northern approaches to the Malacca Straits and the Andaman Sea’s southern approaches to the Strait of Malacca. Thailand’s operational area includes the Andaman Sea’s northern approaches to the Malacca Straits. As part of the MSP Information Sharing Initiative, a second MSP Information Sharing Exercise was conducted later in June 2010 to gather further MSP information.

Result and Discussion

Among other things, oceanic states are responsible for ensuring the safety of their waterways, protecting the marine environment, and maintaining good order on the high seas. Marine policy must be adaptable enough to deal with the ever-changing nature of threats to global and regional order. Ongoing policy development in Indonesia’s maritime sector is essential if the country is to keep maritime safety high on its priority list. It is theoretically correct that Indonesia’s marine security policy should reflect and be influenced by public perceptions of current hazards, and this has been the case in practice thus far. However, the results can be misinterpreted when such reflection is combined with limited abilities. Because Indonesia aspires to consolidate control over a larger maritime territory, the government faces both challenges and opportunities in the future.

Apart from the constant concerns that Indonesia faces, Indonesia’s maritime security continues to be threatened by the fact that multiple government agencies are responsible for marine affairs, resulting in a complicated web of overlapping authority. Due to the lack of clearly defined tasks in some of these groups, coordination of their operations has proven challenging, despite a coordination board, as previously noted in this article. Such misunderstandings exacerbate the incapacity to provide security and enforce the law at sea, a fact acknowledged by all parties involved in the current scenario. The coordinating board’s renewal in 2005

Method

This study included a qualitative methodology with a descriptive approach and data gathered through interviews and documents. Using qualitative analysis and a review of previous studies, this article seeks to answer the research question of how Indonesia should strategically restructure its maritime security in order to maintain its strategy in the region while contending with obstacles in southeast Asia. According to Bryman (2008), social research is based on prior experiences and explores new results and conversations in social science research in the present.
enhanced the board’s organizational structure, enhancing the board’s ability to carry out its responsibilities in the future. This agency is responsible for formulating general maritime security policy, the coordination of actions and marine security operations inside the territorial seas, the development of technical and administrative support, and assistance to institutions in the improvement of institutional capabilities.

Although the United States has demonstrated that putting various agencies under the same organizational roof does not guarantee good interagency cooperation, it does aid in the development of collaboration with other departments and agencies in other countries, as the experience of the United States has demonstrated (Rachman, 2009). If you want a complete strategy for maritime security, practical interagency cooperation and coordination are the essential components of it. Workplace politics and territorial disputes between agencies will persist if they are not addressed. Any reorganization initiatives will be rendered ineffective. In this particular area, it is in Indonesia’s best interests to continue to make progress.

State governments along the littoral border of pirate-infested waters are working to alleviate these risks. These countries frequently lack the resources necessary to adequately handle the issue, both in technical competence and actual security capacity, which is regrettable. Indonesia, for example, would be required to make significant investments in its law enforcement institutions to ensure that they have sufficient resources and personnel to maintain proper maritime security in the country’s waters. However, this is unlikely to be implemented anytime soon because other concerns are given greater importance, specifically to improving and expanding the nation’s economic, social, and cultural resources. The state’s lack of resources for military and law enforcement officers at sea should be addressed as a priority when responding to the employment of private security enterprises on its territory, but this should not be the only tactic employed.

Cooperating with neighboring countries and seeking support from regional and extra-regional powers are possible alternatives to military action. Opposing interests and sovereignty concerns have hindered the pursuit of greater regional cooperation in many areas. However, efforts have nonetheless yielded fruit, albeit far from the expected outcomes. The danger lies in the prospect of putting a halt to active cooperative projects, which is a possibility. The maintenance of long-term air and naval patrols is expensive, both in terms of staffing and financial resources. Even though Indonesia is concerned about a lack of resources and personnel, the recurrence of marine crimes is a continual reminder that the actions should continue. The partnership between Indonesia and other countries to safeguard the security of Indonesia’s and the region’s marine areas of operation will be discussed in the next section.
Conclusion

International cooperation is highly appreciated by the governments in the region, particularly Indonesia, which places a strong priority on international collaboration. While the direct engagement of an external actor is not wanted in developing collaboration, the concept of closer cooperation and the components necessary to accomplish such cooperation on a security issue are open for discussion and consideration. It should be implemented as soon as possible after approval. Indonesia and Southeast Asia are receptive to foreign help, provided it is non-military, non-partisan, and limited in scale. This is particularly true if the support is financial or technical.

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References


