Abstract: This study examines the relationship between the PDI Perjuangan Party and Islam in Indonesian electoral politics. This study is important because the relationship between nationalism and the position of Islam in the political realm of Indonesia with the largest Muslim population in the world is relatively complex and problematic. Based on Michael Foucault's concept of power, it can be seen that the position of Islam within the PDI Perjuangan Party forms a system of power relations. Methodologically, this study uses a qualitative approach and literature study methods. Literature studies are carried out by searching, collecting and studying written materials in the form of speech texts, Party Congress minutes, books, journals and also websites of authoritative institutions. The results of the study show that the relationship between PDI Perjuangan Party and Islam was built by integrating national and Islamic values in political programs that were in line with the party's ideology. The implementation of PDIP Party and Islam relations includes: First, consistently in the 2004, 2014 and 2019 presidential elections pairing nationalist-religious figures as Presidential Candidates and Vice-Presidential Candidates, namely Megawati Sukarnoputri-Hasyim Muzadi (2004), Joko Widodo-Jusuf Kalla (2014), and Joko Widodo-KH. Ma'ruf Amin (2019). Second, in the Pilkada pairing of nationalist-religious figures and the recorded number of NU cadres who became regional heads who came from PDIP Party was 109 regional heads, one of which was the pair Ganjar Pranowo (PDI Perjuangan Party) and Taj Yasin Maimoen (PPP) in the 2018 Pilkada. Third, collaboration PDI Perjuangan Party with religious institutions, such as NU and Muhammdiyah. Fourth, institutionally in the 2005-2010 Management it added the "Religion and Spirituality Sector" (now the "Religious Affairs and Belief in God Almighty" Sector) and the fundamental thing was establishing the Baitul Muslimin Indonesia (Bamusi) party wing on 29 March 2007. In this context Bamusi is an effort of Governmentalit.

Keywords: ideology; nationalism; islam; PDI Perjuangan party; megawati soekarnoputri.
Introduction
The relationship and position of Islam in the political realm of Indonesia, with 85% of the largest Muslim population in the world, is relatively complex and problematic. This issue has become an ideological debate between Islamic figures and secular nationalist figures in PPKI sessions at the beginning of independence, each of whom fought for Islamic ideology and nationality as the basis of the state. Acceptance of Indonesia's plurality, finally removing the clause "with the obligation to implement Islamic law for its adherents" to "The Almighty One," the word "Muqadimah" was replaced with "Preamble" in the 1945 Constitution, as well as eliminating the words "Muslims" as a condition for the position of President.

The dialectic between nationalism and Islam in Indonesian history has created a uniquely Indonesian nationalism, namely religious nationalism as a manifestation of values originating from modern nationalism, the majority religion (Islam), and the nation's traditional wisdom. In Memoir (1982), after the agreement to remove seven words from the Jakarta Charter in 1945, Mohammad Hatta reflected on the openness and acceptance of Indonesian plurality from the founding fathers of the nation:

"At that time, we were able to realize that the spirit of the Jakarta Charter was not lost by removing the words 'Belief in God with the obligation to implement Islamic law for its adherents' and replacing them with 'Belief in the One and Only God'."

Reformation has changed almost the entire 1945 Constitution through four amendments from 1999 to 2002, which changed state and nation-state administration. Some of these fundamental changes include: (i) the office of president and vice president is limited to two terms of office per five years; (ii) delegation of authority from the center to the regions; (iii) separation of the police from the armed forces; (iv) changes in parliamentary structure; and (v) rules regarding political parties and elections, including direct elections. With that, Indonesian pluralism, which was suppressed during the New Order Regime, reappeared. Acceptance of Indonesian pluralism is a form of appreciation for the founding fathers of the nation, who seriously considered the majority religion of society without eliminating the existence of other religions.

However, fundamental changes in the face of Indonesian politics have re-emerged the issue of relations and the position of Islam (Assyaukanie, 2009; Künkler et al., 2013; Platzdasch, 2009). History records that in the 1955 general election, Indonesia's political ideology was divided into Islamic groups and Nationalist groups. The vote share of the Nasionalis Indonesia Party (PNI), which is identified as a nationalist party, was 22.32%. The votes obtained by four Islamic parties were: the Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia Party (Masyumi) at 20.92%, the Nahdatul Ulama Party (NU) at 18.41%, the Syarikat Islam Indonesia Party (PSII) at 2.89%, and the Pergerakan Tarbiyah Islam (Perti) at 1.28% (Agustino, 2021).

The cumulative support of Indonesian Muslims for Islamic parties is 43.5%, and non-Islamic parties (including nationalists) receive 49.4%. Subtle differences indirectly contributed to the social and political tensions of the time. According to Aspinall (2019), the Islamic parties that were born in the Reformation Era, although not entirely, are
reproductions of variations in the conflict patterns regarding the role of Islam in Indonesian politics that were submerged during the New Order Regime. Some of the fundamental conflicts, between political Islam and secularism and between traditionalist and modernist Islam, show a pattern of continuity.

With the promulgation of Law No. 2 of 1999 concerning Political Parties (Parpol) with relatively easy conditions, such as citizens aged 21 years with at least 50 people being able to form a political party, after the 3rd amendment to the 1945 Constitution, the Political Party Law was replaced by Law No. 31 of 2002 and replaced again by Law No. 2 of 2008; many parties with Islamic ideology enlivened democracy. Nine of the 48 political parties that passed the 1999 election selection included Islam as a principle, namely: Persatuan Pembangunan Party (PPP), Persatuan Party (PP), Syarikat Islam Indonesia Party (PSII), Syarikat Islam Indonesia 1905 Party (PSII 1905), Bulan Bintang Party (PBB), the Masyumi Baru Party, and the Politik Islam Indonesia Masyumi Party, the Keadilan Party (PK), which is the embryo of the Keadilan Sejahtera Party (PKS), and the Kebangkitan Muslim Indonesia Party (Kami). This number increased by adding parties originating from Islamic organizations, such as the Muhammadiyah-based Amanat Nasional Party (PAN); the Kebangkitan Bangsa Party (PKB), the Nahdlatul Ummah Party (NU Party), the Kebangkitan Ummat Party (PKU), and the Solidaritas Uni Nasional Indonesia Party (SUNI), which were founded by the Nahdlatul Ummah (NU) elite; and the Cinta Damai Party (PCD), which was founded by the Surau Coordinating Board. Apart from that, Islamic groups also emerged, including: Hidayatullah, Hizbuttahrir, Salafi, Laskar Pembela Islam (Defenders of Islam/LPI), Laskar Jihad (Jihad Warrior), and Mujahidin Indonesia Warrior (Agustino, 2021; Künkler et al., 2013).

Several Islamic parties had raised the Islamic state platform in the election campaign, and there were efforts to include articles on Islamic law (sharia) as an obligation for all Muslims in the constitution in parliament. However, most members of parliament refused to change the constitution to require the state to apply sharia to all citizens (Elson, 2013; Hefner, 2020). This effort also failed due to opposition from the two largest Islamic organizations, Muhammadiyah (25–30 million members) and Nahdlatul Ulama (50–70 million), which have long propagated the ideals and practices of pluralist citizenship and tolerance (Künkler et al., 2013). In addition, Muslim leaders, including Abdurrahman Wahid (Gusdur), Nurcholish Madjid (Cak Nur), and Syafii Maarif, pointed out that in the Indonesian context, ideally, the state should not be based on religion (Hefner, 2000). The vote share of Islamic parties also decreased, from 16.5% in the 2009 elections compared to 21% in the 2004 elections (Platzdasch, 2009).

However, it cannot be denied that the 2016 DKI Jakarta Regional Head Election (Pilkada), which ultimately sentenced Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok) to 2 years under Law (UU) no. 1/PNPS/1965 concerning Blasphemy of Religion, became a test of pluralism marked by a decline in tolerance and the rise of Islamism (see Anindya et al., 2021; Mietzner & Muhtadi, 2019; Pepinsky et al., 2010). Politics with democracy that leads to liberalization delegitimizes the inclusive pluralism of Pancasila (Aspinall et al., 2020). Post-New Order pluralism, which was the key to reform, turned towards a trend of intolerance. Based on
several surveys, there are indications that there is politicization of Islam, which leads to conservatism and violence in politics (see survey review in Mietzner & Muhtadi, 2018).

The *Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan* Party (*PDI Perjuangan*), which was declared by Megawati Soekarnoputri in 1999, is an Indonesian political party that has a relatively different ideological orientation compared to other parties (Mietzner, 2013; Ufen, 2007). However, *PDI Perjuangan* often receives attention regarding its relations with Islam (Thaha, 2018). In the 1999 elections, religious issues arose regarding non-Muslim legislative candidates (*Caleg*) from *PDI Perjuangan* (see Eriyanto, 2002). After gaining the largest number of votes in the 1999 elections, the *PDI Perjuangan* stumbled over the pros and cons of a female presidential candidacy (*Capres*) when Megawati Soekarnoputri was proposed as a presidential candidate (see Murjoko, 2022), and legally, the Central Axis Coalition (*PAN*, *PPP*, *PKB*) stopped Megawati’s moves through the mobilization of support for Islamic identity.

Regarding the relationship between Islam and *PDI Perjuangan*, Thaha (2018) stated that *PDI Perjuangan* is often labeled as a party that is far from religious activities and distanced from religious circles, especially Muslims. This reality is a consequence of the fusion of five parties in the New Order Regime, namely: the *Nasional Indonesia* Party (*PNI*), the *Musyawarah Rakyan Banyak* Party (Murba Party), the *Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia* (Indonesian Independence Supporters Association/IPKI), the *Katolik* Party, and the *Kristen Indonesia* Party (Parkindo). The five are ideologically and on different party platforms: *PNI* has a nationalist-secular ideology; IPKI is formed by the military; Murba leans to the left; and there are two religious parties, namely Catholic and Christian (Lay, 2019). Moreover, in the initial period, 1999–2005, *PDI Perjuangan* did not have a forum for religious activities, compared to PNI, which founded *Djamiatul Muslimin Indonesia* (Jamusi), and PDI, which had the Indonesian Muslim Council (MMI).

What is the relationship between Islam and the *PDI Perjuangan*? What is the position of Islam in the *PDI Perjuangan* ideology? A number of questions will be discussed in this article by analyzing the nationalist-religious (Islamic) ideology within the *PDI Perjuangan* in several election cases (both the presidential and regional elections) and the party’s internal institutions as an effort to "maintain democracy." By using the concept of power from Michael Foucault (1990), it will be seen that the position of Islam within the *PDI Perjuangan* forms a system of power relations. This article will show the operationalization of power, which will complement previous articles or studies that analyze the relationship between state and religion in the contemporary Indonesian political arena, such as Thaha (2018), who sees the accommodation of religious activities, especially Islam, at *PDI Perjuangan* as an effort to accommodate the aspirations of Indonesian Muslims by combining Islamic and Indonesian values through institutional and religious activities. Muhtadi’s (2012) study discusses Islamic ideology in Indonesian politics by analyzing the *Keadilan Sejahtera* Party (PKS).

**Conceptual Framework**

Power, in Foucault’s sense, is positive and productive, different from Marxian or Weberian thinking regarding
class domination based on economic control, ideological manipulation, and charisma. Nor does it take the form of institutional thinking that sees power as a mechanism for subordinating the state to its citizens. According to Foucault (1990, pp. 92–93), power is understood as:

"...in the first instance as the multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which constitute their own organization; as the process which, through ceaseless struggles and confrontations, transforms, strengthens, or reserves them; as the support which these force relations find in one another, thus forming a chain or a system, or on the contrary, the disjunctions and contradictions which isolate them from one another; and lastly, as the strategy in which they take effect, whose general design or institutional crystallization is embodied in the state apparatus, in the formulation of the law, in the various social hegemony."

Effective power is an effort (strategy) to perpetuate relations or form a system within power relations (governmentality). Lemke (2000) interprets Foucault’s power relations as allowing subjects to become potential, which means being in a situation where the capacity for self-control can choose individual actions. Individuals do not feel forced or are in a situation where they take action because of another party (dominant group), which means that the position between subjects is equal. In Foucault’s (1982) terms, this is governmentality as a conduct of conduct, a power relationship that is built based on the actions of the subject who directs the action and others with open options for action. This is almost the same as Bourdieu’s concept of hegemony, namely "domination" by coercive means or through ideology or discourse. The opposite form of relationship is in the form of ideological manipulation.

Ideology is a doctrinal idea that is attached to power. Since the 18th century, the ideology—despite the ambiguity and multiple interpretations—of the political spectrum of Western democracies has been characterized by a dichotomy of “left” and “right.” For 200 years, there has been a tendency to classify people, groups, political parties, and governments based on ideological distinctions or spectrums. Ideology forms the entire social consciousness and translates objective reality that moves in various fields of human consciousness regarding fundamental conflicts and social relations (Gramsci, 1971). For Mannheim (1991), ideology is the basic idea of a social order or value system that expresses the interests of the ruling group or dominant groups in society. Meanwhile, Marx & Engels (1974) stated that ideology represents everything that humans say and imagine, which includes the production of ideas, conceptions, and consciousness, in a broad scope, such as politics, law, morality, religion, metaphysics, and so on. Ideology functions as the superstructure of civilization, namely: conventions and culture that form the dominant ideas of a society, whereas for Marx & Engels (1974), these powerful ideas from a certain era belong to the ruling class.

A more objective definition of ideology was put forward by Martin Selinger (in Heywood, 2021, p. 8–11),
namely ideology as a set of ideas that justify and explain organized social goals and actions. In political praxis, ideology is a system of action-oriented thinking. Apart from Selinger, Heywood (2021) also defines an ideology that is objective and neutral. According to him, ideology is a set of ideas or concepts that form the basis of organized political activities and actions (Heywood, 2021, p. 18). Ideology in this view has three characteristics, namely: (i) society’s world view; (ii) vision, ideals, or models of ideal societal order in the future; and (iii) guidelines or guides for political transformation that should be implemented.

Ideological diversity, in the sense of a battleground for ideas about democracy, culture, law, and religion, is a necessity in democratic contestation. In the context of religion and state, the majority of Indonesia’s Muslim population considers Islam, apart from social norms that determine individual attitudes and also determine political actions. Religion is an expression of social relations in Durkheim’s sense that helps provide group affiliation and a framework for political orientation.

Therefore, religious symbols and spaces are very likely to be politicized through the stronghold of "us" and "them" (Gunther & Diamond, 2003). For democracy, this can reduce the quality of democracy. Democracy is, as Dewey (1916) said, "more than a form of government; it is primarily a mode of associated living, of jointly communicated experience.” According to Robert Dahl (1971), democracy is not only determined by political participation but is also determined by the ability of citizens to accept diversity (tolerance). Political tolerance is essential for stability, which determines the quality of democracy (1997). Even Dahl (2000) said that "political tolerance is an essential attitude for democratic stability. This is where the important role of political parties in democracy lies: channeling the interests of citizens. Political parties strive for relationships and form a governmentality system to build public space based on equal and open thinking among citizens.

Method

This article uses a qualitative approach as an effort to explore complexity intensively and in depth to understand the phenomena observed by the author (Creswell, 2014) through the process of data collection, compilation, processing, and drawing conclusions. The results of all this are then described analytically based on objective empirical findings on the phenomenon being studied (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000; Flick, 2022). The method used is a literature study. Literature studies are carried out by searching, collecting, and studying written materials in the form of speech texts, Party Congress minutes, books, journals, and also the websites of authoritative institutions. The data analysis technique in this writing is based on the explanation by Creswell & Clark (2018): (i) organizing data, (ii) reading and memoing (taking notes), and (iii) describing, classifying, and interpreting data.

Result and Discussions

Nationalism and Religion-Islam

PDI Perjuangan is considered a political party that has a clear ideological line and firmly chooses the Pancasila ideology, according to Soekarno’s speech on June 1, 1945 (Geraldy, 2019; Romli, 2011). The PDI Perjuangan’s ideology of Pancasila is different from the Pancasila Democracy, which was created by the New Order Regime, but Pancasila is based on socio-nationalism, socio-democracy, and
cultural divinity. Based on the ideology of nationalism, the *PDI Perjuangan* then adopted a national, populist, and social justice identity. The 2015-2020 *PDI Perjuangan* Articles of Association contain: (a) tools for struggle to shape and build national character based on Pancasila 1 June 1945; (b) tools of struggle to give birth to national and state life that is divine and has a spirit of socio-nationalism and socio-democracy (*tri-sila*); (c) tools of struggle to oppose all forms of individualism and to revive the spirit of mutual cooperation in the life of society, nation, and state (*eka-sila*).

The long history of the *PDI Perjuangan*, since the PNI in 1927, has made it a party with a deep-rooted and strong base (Mietzner, 2012). This is proven by the support that the *PDI Perjuangan* received in the 1999 elections. The support that the *PDI Perjuangan* received, which cannot be denied, was mostly from Muslims. The majority of Muslim voters identify themselves—an alignment that will no longer depend on the election cycle but will permeate the party’s ideology and values (Harmel et al., 2019)—as part of the *PDI Perjuangan*. This alignment is because they feel that their religious interests are not only represented by Islamic-based parties (Platzdasch, 2009).

*PDI Perjuangan*’s accommodation of the interests of Muslims, namely integrating or converging Islamic and national values in political programs (Thaha, 2018), is consistent and in line with the ideology promoted by the party. This consistency directly refers to Sukarno’s speech:

“We founded the Indonesian state, which we all have to support. All in all, Not Christians for Indonesia, not Muslims for Indonesia, not Van Eck for Indonesia, not rich Nitisemito for Indonesia, but Indonesia for Indonesia, all for all!” (Speech on June 1, 1945, at the Pancasila Building).

"We cannot separate religion and nationalism; these two things are parallel and need each other. Nationalism and religion enrich and complement each other. Therefore, Pancasila recognizes and respects Islamic culture as part of Indonesian culture. In Pancasila, religion has a very important place and must be used as a moral foundation in social and state life." (State Speech on the 20th Anniversary of Pancasila, June 1, 1965, at the Merdeka Palace).

This is what is behind the *PDI Perjuangan* in every political step, as Megawati firmly stated as president, who also represents the party in her State of the Nation Address before the 2004 House of Representatives Session:

The Preamble to the 1945 Constitution is the only frame of reference for our national ideology, which allows our nation, which is a very diverse society, to live and work together as one nation and in one complete state. To convince each of us, when it feels necessary, we occasionally ask ourselves: will there be a united Indonesia without our agreement and loyalty in implementing and realizing the essence of the values contained in the Preamble to the 1945 Constitution? I think the answer is: never will.
Our negligence in understanding, socializing, and actualizing the norms of the Preamble to the 1945 Constitution within our respective circles can have far-reaching consequences because each layer and group will clearly have its own dynamics of life. Without being linked to the national context, the dynamics of the internal life of this group can be trapped in a narrow circle of aspirations, interests, and even obsessions and cause the layers and groups concerned to lose their national orientation, with consequences that can even endanger our national and state life as a whole.

The choice of PDI Perjuangan in the 2004 presidential election, which paired Megawati Soekarnoputri and Hasyim Muzadi, was not just a practical political choice to gain votes but could be identified as a party struggle in the substantive realm, seeking Islamic values to be accepted and felt useful by many parties through contextualization in party policy. However, the ideology of Islamic parties in the 2004 period tended to break down ideological barriers and melt away. PDI Perjuangan's substantive steps were taken because in the previous period Islamic ideology seemed to have hardened, which was evident in a number of activities carried out by the Islamic party, such as the emergence of discussions on the Jakarta Charter in the process of amending the 1945 Constitution in 2002 (Marshall, 2018). Although the proposal met with strong opposition not only from nationalist parties such as Golkar and PDI-P but also from the two new Islamists, PKB and PAN.

PDI Perjuangan's collaboration with religious institutions such as NU and Muhammadiyah, as many scholars say, is a joint effort by the party and the majority of PDI Perjuangan supporters to be able to develop a pluralist, moderate, and tolerant Islam (Hefner, 2000; Stepan & Menchik, 2010). In practice, PDI Perjuangan collaborates on nominations for executive institutions (both central and regional) with NU. The recorded number of NU cadres who became regional heads who came from PDIP was 109 regional heads.

This is a highlight of the PDI Perjuangan collaboration because of the same vision. Pluralism and tolerance are NU benchmarks, which, among other things, are based on the assumption that Indonesian Muslims are not dogmatic followers but have maturity in religion, as said by KH. Hasyim Muzadi (Mkf, 2003):

"Three factors cause Indonesia to not have a terrorist character. The first factor is historical. Muslims were born after Hindus and Buddhists, so the Islamization process was not through violence but acculturation. Second, culturally, Indonesia consists of various tribes with various subcultures, so it is impossible to approach religion violently. Third, Indonesian Muslims differentiate the implementation of sharia at the civil society level from the implementation of sharia in state law.

In the 2004 and 2009 legislative elections, the PDI Perjuangan was unable to repeat its success in 1999. The Megawati-Hasyim pair were not elected as president and vice president. However, in that period, the PDI Perjuangan took important and significant steps. After the
second *PDI Perjuangan* Congress in 2005, apart from confirming its political stance to be outside the government as an opposition party (see the results of the Second *PDI Perjuangan* Party Congress, 2005), it provided space for activities and thoughts regarding religion, especially Islam.

The first step, in the 2005–2010 *PDI Perjuangan* DPP management, was to add the Religion and Spirituality Sector to the party structure, which then, in the 2010–2015 management, changed to the Religious and Cultural Sector, and changed again in the 2015–2020 management, until now, into the field of religion and belief in God Almighty. The position of head of the field was entrusted to Prof. Dr. Hamka Haq, MA, an Islamic figure and academic and former Dean of the Ushuluddin and Philosophy Faculty of Alauddin State Islamic University (UIN) Makassar.

The next step, which is also an effort by the *PDI Perjuangan* to carry out the mandate of the party Congress, is party transformation by consolidating the party through cadre formation. Attention to cadre formation was an ingredient in the 1st *PDI-P* Congress in 2000 as a praxis for party institutionalization and consolidation. Party institutionalization began with party cadre formation through the Cadre Teacher Candidate School, which was implemented in 2001. *PDI Perjuangan* began to transform by converging the mass party and the cadre party. Thus, the process of party institutionalization is inseparable from systemic party consolidation. However, after 2005, the *PDI Perjuangan* consciously recruited Muslim activists as party cadres. Some of them occupy strategic positions and are trusted to represent the *PDI Perjuangan* in executive and legislative institutions, including Hamka Haq (General Chair of Baitul Muslimin Indonesia, Bamus), Azwar Anas (Regent of Banyuwangi), Jalaludin Rakhmat (member of the DPR RI), and Zuhairei Misrawi (Indonesian Ambassador to Tunisia).

After two presidential periods as an opposition party, in the 2014 elections, *PDI Perjuangan* again received the largest number of votes and succeeded in placing the pair Joko Widodo and Jusuf Kalla (Jokowi-JK) as president and vice president, respectively. The pair, supported by the *PDI Perjuangan* together with the Great Indonesia Coalition (*Nasional Demokrat Party, PKB, Hanura Party, and the Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia Party*), faced Prabowo and Hatta Rajasa, who were supported by the Merah Putih (Red & White) Coalition (Golkar, Gerindra, PAN, PKS, PPP, and PBB). In the 2014 Presidential Election, the Merah Putih Coalition was mostly an Islamic party, and in the campaign, the Islamic issue again hit the *PDI Perjuangan*. However, the issue did not affect the electability of the Jokowi-JK pair. One of the reasons is the inclusion of PKB in the Great Indonesia Coalition. In the 2014 elections, PKB survived with supporters from the Nahdliyin—different from PAN, which originates from Muhammadiyah—but this does not make this Islamic organization its main base. The relationship between Muhammadiyah and PAN is not as close as the relationship between PKB and NU. After the decline in PKB votes in the 2009 elections, Muhaimin Iskandar, as General Chair of PKB, carried out internal improvements to the party. PKB uses the tagline "Politis rahmatan lil 'alamin" with the analogy of a tree with roots reaching down with NU, its branches rising with the competence of its figures, and its fruit for the people of Nahdliyin and all Indonesian society to feel. And JK is one
of the political branding branches of PKB, apart from K.H. Hasyim Muzadi, K.H. Said Aqil Siraj, and Khofifah Indarparawansa.

A similar case could be seen when the PDI Perjuangan paired Ganjar Pranowo and Taj Yasin Maimoen (Gus Yasin), a PPP cadre who graduated from Ahmad Kaftaro University, Damascus, Syria, and was born in the Al Anwar Sarang Islamic Boarding School, Rembang (Tasropi, 2022). Ganjar-Gus Yasin in the 2018 regional elections in Central Java clearly showed a pair representing nationalist-religious people. In the East Java Regional Election, PDI Perjuangan did the same thing by pairing party cadre Puti Guntur Soekarno with NU figure Saifullah Yusuf (Gus Ipul). Apart from religious issues—fake news circulating on social media stating that the PDI Perjuangan was not for Islamic voters—in the end, the Puti-Gus Ipul pair lost to the Khofifah Indar Parawansa and Emil Dardak pair.

When the PDI Perjuangan's Jokowi and Ma'ruf Amin in the 2019 presidential election competed with Prabowo and Sandiaga Uno, the situation of Islam in Indonesian politics was still heating up (BBC, 2019; Fossati, 2019). Both pairs of presidential candidates used Islam during the campaign. The only thing that differentiates the two candidates is the campaign they carry out, which is a manifestation of their ideology and political platform. The Jokowi-Amin pair, supported by the Advanced Indonesia Coalition (PDI Perjuangan, Golkar, NasDem Party, PKB, PPP, Hanura Party, Solidaritas Indonesia Party (PSI), Persatuan Indonesia Party (Perindo), PKPI, and Bulan Bintang Party (PBB), translated Islam within the framework of nationalism (Mietzner, 2015). Concern with Islam is aimed at closeness to Islamic groups, both traditional Islam and modernist Islam. Apart from that, the Jokowi-Amin couple demonstrated Islamic values through a number of pro-Islamic populist programs, such as the development of sharia financial products and halal tourism (Kuwado, 2019). Meanwhile, Prabowo-Uno, who is supported by the Indonesia Adil Makmur Coalition (Gerindra Party, PKS Party, PAN Party, Demokrat Party, and Berkarya Party), puts the issue of Islam face-to-face with the problem of Muslim economic deprivation, which considers ethnicity (Chinese) and other religions (Christians or Buddhists) to disproportionately control the economy and wealth of the country (Aspinall, 2015; Nadzir, 2019; Stott, 2019).

**Bamusi: Governmentality Efforts**

Another fundamental step of the PDI Perjuangan was to establish a party wing that aimed "to build national insight among the Indonesian Islamic community through a cultural-religious approach in accordance with the personality of the Indonesian nation" (AD ART/Articles of Association & Bylaws Bamusi), namely: Baitul Muslimin Indonesia (Bamusi). The establishment of Bamusi was initiated at that time by the Chairman of the Central Advisory Council, Taufiq Kemas, who argued that Bamusi could bridge the dichotomy between Islamists and nationalists so that cooperation could be achieved for Indonesian unity (Hidayat & Ahmadi, 2007).

Bamusi's presence within the nationalist party is a fundamental, strategic step, but one full of careful consideration (Sutarto et al., 2019). After going through preparations by the formation of the Formation Team, consisting of Hamka Haq, Said Abdullah, Arif Budimanta Irmandi Lubis, Zainun Ahmadi, M. Nova Andika, and Achmad Baskara (PDI Perjuangan archive), on March 29, 2007, Megawati Soekarnoputri...
declared Bamusi at the DPP headquarters in Jalan Lenteng Agung, South Jakarta. Thus, Bamusi was officially in the second management period of the PDI Perjuangan DPP, 2005–2010. On that occasion, Prof. Dr. Hamka Haq was appointed as General Chair of the Central Management and Zainun Ahmadi, MH, as Secretary General. The presence of figures from NU and Muhammadiyah in Bamusi provides a unique frame for national diversity.

Based on PDI Perjuangan DPP Decree No. 50/TAP/DPP/V/2007, it is stated that Bamusi’s principles and aspirations are in line with PDI Perjuangan, namely Pancasila 1 June 1945. Pancasila principles are the basis for Bamusi in seeking a pluralistic Indonesian discourse in which there are values: religious, democratic, open, nationalistic, and familial. In the AD ART, Bamusi has a responsibility that is not simple, namely: (i) realizing the ideals of the Proclamation of Independence of August 17, 1945, as intended in the Preamble to the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia; (ii) building a religious and Pancasila Indonesian society; (iii) creating an Indonesian Muslim society with a national perspective; (iv) fighting for the aspirations of the Indonesian Muslim community in national and state life, in accordance with principles, identity, and character; and (v) forming an Indonesian Muslim society that is devoted to God Almighty, has personality, and upholds nationality, democracy, and social justice.

Bamusi’s task of uniting plural Indonesian values received a positive assessment from Abdul Mu’ti, a Muhammadiyah figure, who stated:

“The political ideology of the PDI Perjuangan is based on Marhaenism, which was developed by Soekarno. As the leader of the nation, Soekarno was a figure who was strongly anticolonialism, bourgeois, and elitist. Soekarno’s association of thoughts and personal interactions with socialist figures made him close to the marhaen, the proletariat, the common people, and the poor. ...with various refinements, reinterpretations, and contextualization, the Bamusi manhaj can be developed in line with Soekarno’s ideas. It requires a contextual reinterpretation and teachings of Islam and systematically formulating them in "kiti theology" or "people’s ideology," which supports the poor." (quoted from Sutarto et al., 2019).

During his journey, Bamusi played a major role in building commitment and cooperation between other institutions, especially NU and Muhammadiyah. The formation of Bamusi indirectly influenced PDI Perjuangan policy by supporting the ratification of the Bill (RUU) with religious (Islamic) nomenclature into law. Some of these bills are: in 2008 the Hajj Implementation Bill, the National Sharia Securities Bill (SBSN), and the Sharia Banking Bill; in 2009 the Religious Justice Bill; in 2011 the Bill on Handling the Poor and the Bill on Zakat Management; in 2014 the Halal Product Guarantee Bill and the Hajj Financial Management Bill.

Apart from building cooperation between institutions, since July 2008, Bamusi has also published a magazine called Baitul Muslimin Monthly Magazine. In the writings in the magazine founded by H.M. Said Abdullah, Bamusi spread discourse according to his tagline, namely: religion, nationality, and diversity. Apart from magazines, following the
development of the Industrial Revolution 5.0 society, Bamusi also targets the younger generation through Bamusi TV as well as social media platforms such as YouTube, Instagram, and Facebook with Islamic preaching content. Thus, as Megawati firmly stated at the inauguration of the Bamusi Central Committee in 2016, "... then it developed into a religion that *rahmatan lil alamin*, a religion that is tolerant and lives side by side with adherents of other religions and beliefs in peace and mutual cooperation" (Sihaloho, 2016), Bamusi’s role and contribution are meaningful in the context of building relations between the *PDI Perjuangan* as nationalists and religious-Islamists in a shared 'big house'.

**Conclusion**

The relationship between national ideology and religion, coupled with culture, is still a crucial problem in Indonesia. Even though the potential for conflict over the role of Islam in Indonesian politics has never been large, especially to the point where it could threaten democracy (Buehler, 2009), the issue of the position of religion in Indonesian politics is still something that must be on the agenda for every political party. Political parties create democracy, which is part of political society to control state power and its political apparatus (Linz & Stepan, 1996). In addition, political parties play a very strategic liaison role between the government process and citizens (Lipset, 2000), articulating group interests to encourage government responsiveness to its citizens, resolving conflicts by building channels of representation, providing influence on the political process in the legislature, and recruiting political elites (Scarrow et al., 2017; Dalton et al., 2011; Stokes, 1999).

However, *PDI Perjuangan*, which has a nationalist ideology, has proven that Islamic values and national values can melt and be integrated. The unification of nationalism and religion (Islam) is not always visible in the composition of power struggles in the executive but also in how this ideology is manifested in real activities and inter-institutional cooperation. In this way, it is hoped that ideology will become a hegemonic discourse so that it can create equal power relations between citizens and the state.

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